[PATCH] KVM: x86: fix RSM into 64-bit protected mode, round 2

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Commit b10d92a54dac ("KVM: x86: fix RSM into 64-bit protected mode")
reordered the rsm_load_seg_64() and rsm_enter_protected_mode() calls,
relative to each other. The argument that said commit made was correct,
however putting rsm_enter_protected_mode() first whole-sale violated the
following (correct) invariant from em_rsm():

         * Get back to real mode, to prepare a safe state in which to load
         * CR0/CR3/CR4/EFER.  Also this will ensure that addresses passed
         * to read_std/write_std are not virtual.

Namely, rsm_enter_protected_mode() may re-enable paging, *after* which

  rsm_load_seg_64()
    GET_SMSTATE()
      read_std()

will try to interpret the (smbase + offset) address as a virtual one. This
will result in unexpected page faults being injected to the guest in
response to the RSM instruction.

Split rsm_load_seg_64() in two parts:

- The first part, rsm_stash_seg_64(), shall call GET_SMSTATE() while in
  real mode, and save the relevant state off SMRAM into an array local to
  rsm_load_state_64().

- The second part, rsm_load_seg_64(), shall occur after entering protected
  mode, but the segment details shall come from the local array, not the
  guest's SMRAM.

Fixes: b10d92a54dac25a6152f1aa1ffc95c12908035ce
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
index 9da95b9..25e16b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -2311,7 +2311,16 @@ static int rsm_load_seg_32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u64 smbase, int n)
 	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
 }
 
-static int rsm_load_seg_64(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u64 smbase, int n)
+struct rsm_stashed_seg_64 {
+	u16 selector;
+	struct desc_struct desc;
+	u32 base3;
+};
+
+static int rsm_stash_seg_64(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			    struct rsm_stashed_seg_64 *stash,
+			    u64 smbase,
+			    int n)
 {
 	struct desc_struct desc;
 	int offset;
@@ -2326,10 +2335,20 @@ static int rsm_load_seg_64(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u64 smbase, int n)
 	set_desc_base(&desc,      GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, offset + 8));
 	base3 =                   GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, offset + 12);
 
-	ctxt->ops->set_segment(ctxt, selector, &desc, base3, n);
+	stash[n].selector = selector;
+	stash[n].desc = desc;
+	stash[n].base3 = base3;
 	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
 }
 
+static inline void rsm_load_seg_64(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				   struct rsm_stashed_seg_64 *stash,
+				   int n)
+{
+	ctxt->ops->set_segment(ctxt, stash[n].selector, &stash[n].desc,
+			       stash[n].base3, n);
+}
+
 static int rsm_enter_protected_mode(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
 				     u64 cr0, u64 cr4)
 {
@@ -2419,6 +2438,7 @@ static int rsm_load_state_64(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u64 smbase)
 	u32 base3;
 	u16 selector;
 	int i, r;
+	struct rsm_stashed_seg_64 stash[6];
 
 	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
 		*reg_write(ctxt, i) = GET_SMSTATE(u64, smbase, 0x7ff8 - i * 8);
@@ -2460,15 +2480,18 @@ static int rsm_load_state_64(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u64 smbase)
 	dt.address =                GET_SMSTATE(u64, smbase, 0x7e68);
 	ctxt->ops->set_gdt(ctxt, &dt);
 
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(stash); i++) {
+		r = rsm_stash_seg_64(ctxt, stash, smbase, i);
+		if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+			return r;
+	}
+
 	r = rsm_enter_protected_mode(ctxt, cr0, cr4);
 	if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
 		return r;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
-		r = rsm_load_seg_64(ctxt, smbase, i);
-		if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
-			return r;
-	}
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(stash); i++)
+		rsm_load_seg_64(ctxt, stash, i);
 
 	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
 }
-- 
1.8.3.1

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