On Wed, Jun 17, 2015 at 05:12:57PM +0200, Igor Mammedov wrote: > On Wed, 17 Jun 2015 16:32:02 +0200 > "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > On Wed, Jun 17, 2015 at 03:20:44PM +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 17/06/2015 15:13, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > > > > > Considering userspace can be malicious, I guess yes. > > > > > I don't think it's a valid concern in this case, > > > > > setting limit back from 509 to 64 will not help here in any way, > > > > > userspace still can create as many vhost instances as it needs > > > > > to consume memory it desires. > > > > > > > > Not really since vhost char device isn't world-accessible. > > > > It's typically opened by a priveledged tool, the fd is > > > > then passed to an unpriveledged userspace, or permissions dropped. > > > > > > Then what's the concern anyway? > > > > > > Paolo > > > > Each fd now ties up 16K of kernel memory. It didn't use to, so > > priveledged tool could safely give the unpriveledged userspace > > a ton of these fds. > if privileged tool gives out unlimited amount of fds then it > doesn't matter whether fd ties 4K or 16K, host still could be DoSed. > Of course it does not give out unlimited fds, there's a way for the sysadmin to specify the number of fds. Look at how libvirt uses vhost, it should become clear I think. -- MST -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
