On 2014-07-28 19:17, Joel Schopp wrote: > > On 07/25/2014 03:11 PM, Shiva V wrote: >> Hello, >> I am exploring on finding a way to ensure runtime integrity of >> >> a executable in untrusted hypervisors. >> >> In particular, this is my requirements: >> >> 1. I have a 2 virtual machines. (A, B). >> >> 2. VM-A is running some service (exe) inside it. For example any resource >> >> accounting service intended to monitor for VM-B. >> >> 3. I need a way to verify run time integrity from VM-B of the executable >> >> running inside VM-A. >> >> 4. Both the vm's are not privileged vm's and are just normal client virtual >> >> machines. >> >> 5. Underlying hypervisor is untrusted. > If the hypervisor is untrusted you have broken the root of trust and are > going to be pretty out of luck. > > Any solution will require a level below the hypervisor that you trust. > An example would be hardware that isolates memory from the hypervisor, > ie > https://www.google.com/patents/WO2013054528A1?cl=en&dq=Joel+Schopp&hl=en&sa=X&ei=YYPWU6aVJNProATe5IHACQ&ved=0CDMQ6AEwAw The hypervisor has full control of and insight into the guest vCPU state. Only protecting some portions of guest memory seems insufficient. We rather need encryption of every data that leaves the CPU or moves from guest to host mode (and decryption the other way around). I guess that would have quite some performance impact and is far from being easy to integrate into modern processors. But, who knows... Jan -- Siemens AG, Corporate Technology, CT RTC ITP SES-DE Corporate Competence Center Embedded Linux -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
