Re: [PATCH] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Do not expose HFSCR sanitisation to nested hypervisor

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Fabiano Rosas <farosas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@xxxxxxxxx> writes:
>
>> Excerpts from Fabiano Rosas's message of March 6, 2021 9:10 am:
>>> As one of the arguments of the H_ENTER_NESTED hypercall, the nested
>>> hypervisor (L1) prepares a structure containing the values of various
>>> hypervisor-privileged registers with which it wants the nested guest
>>> (L2) to run. Since the nested HV runs in supervisor mode it needs the
>>> host to write to these registers.
>>> 
>>> To stop a nested HV manipulating this mechanism and using a nested
>>> guest as a proxy to access a facility that has been made unavailable
>>> to it, we have a routine that sanitises the values of the HV registers
>>> before copying them into the nested guest's vcpu struct.
>>> 
>>> However, when coming out of the guest the values are copied as they
>>> were back into L1 memory, which means that any sanitisation we did
>>> during guest entry will be exposed to L1 after H_ENTER_NESTED returns.
>>> 
>>> This is not a problem by itself, but in the case of the Hypervisor
>>> Facility Status and Control Register (HFSCR), we use the intersection
>>> between L2 hfscr bits and L1 hfscr bits. That means that L1 could use
>>> this to indirectly read the (hv-privileged) value from its vcpu
>>> struct.
>>> 
>>> This patch fixes this by making sure that L1 only gets back the bits
>>> that are necessary for regular functioning.
>>
>> The general idea of restricting exposure of HV privileged bits, but
>> for the case of HFSCR a guest can probe the HFCR anyway by testing which 
>> facilities are available (and presumably an HV may need some way to know
>> what features are available for it to advertise to its own guests), so
>> is this necessary? Perhaps a comment would be sufficient.
>
> Well, I'd be happy to force them through the arduous path then =); and
> there are features that are emulated by the HV which L1 would not be
> able to probe.
>
> I think we should implement a mechanism that stops all leaks now, rather
> than having to ponder about this every time we touch an hv_reg in that
> structure. I'm not too worried about HFSCR specifically.
>
> Let me think about this some more and see if I can make it more generic,
> I realise that sticking the saved_hfscr on the side is not the most
> elegant approach.

Yeah that would be good.

I don't really like the patch as it is, ie. having to pass *saved_hfscr
and so on.

But in general I agree that we should avoid leaking details across
boundaries, even if we don't think they are particularly sensitive.

cheers



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