On Wed, Jun 03, 2020 at 04:10:25PM -0700, Ram Pai wrote: > On Tue, Jun 02, 2020 at 03:36:39PM +0530, Bharata B Rao wrote: > > On Mon, Jun 01, 2020 at 12:05:35PM -0700, Ram Pai wrote: > > > On Mon, Jun 01, 2020 at 05:25:18PM +0530, Bharata B Rao wrote: > > > > On Sat, May 30, 2020 at 07:27:50PM -0700, Ram Pai wrote: > > > > > H_SVM_INIT_DONE incorrectly assumes that the Ultravisor has explicitly > > > > > called H_SVM_PAGE_IN for all secure pages. > > > > > > > > I don't think that is quite true. HV doesn't assume anything about > > > > secure pages by itself. > > > > > > Yes. Currently, it does not assume anything about secure pages. But I am > > > proposing that it should consider all pages (except the shared pages) as > > > secure pages, when H_SVM_INIT_DONE is called. > > > > Ok, then may be also add the proposed changes to H_SVM_INIT_DONE > > documentation. > > ok. > > > > > > > > > In other words, HV should treat all pages; except shared pages, as > > > secure pages once H_SVM_INIT_DONE is called. And this includes pages > > > added subsequently through memory hotplug. > > > > So after H_SVM_INIT_DONE, if HV touches a secure page for any > > reason and gets encrypted contents via page-out, HV drops the > > device pfn at that time. So what state we would be in that case? We > > have completed H_SVM_INIT_DONE, but still have a normal (but encrypted) > > page in HV? > > Good point. > > The corresponding GFN will continue to be a secure GFN. Just that its > backing PFN is not a device-PFN, but a memory-PFN. Also that backing > memory-PFN contains encrypted content. > > I will clarify this in the patch; about secure-GFN state. I feel all this is complicating the states in HV and is avoidable if UV just issued page-in calls during memslot registration uvcall. Regards, Bharata.
