On Fri, Mar 20, 2020 at 01:22:48PM +0100, Greg Kurz wrote: > On Fri, 20 Mar 2020 11:26:42 +0100 > Laurent Dufour <ldufour@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > The Hcall named H_SVM_* are reserved to the Ultravisor. However, nothing > > prevent a malicious VM or SVM to call them. This could lead to weird result > > and should be filtered out. > > > > Checking the Secure bit of the calling MSR ensure that the call is coming > > from either the Ultravisor or a SVM. But any system call made from a SVM > > are going through the Ultravisor, and the Ultravisor should filter out > > these malicious call. This way, only the Ultravisor is able to make such a > > Hcall. > > "Ultravisor should filter" ? And what if it doesn't (eg. because of a bug) ? > > Shouldn't we also check the HV bit of the calling MSR as well to > disambiguate SVM and UV ? The trouble with doing that (checking the HV bit) is that KVM does not expect to see the HV bit set on an interrupt that occurred while we were in the guest, and if it is set, it indicates a serious problem, i.e. that an interrupt occurred while we were in the code that transitions from host context to guest context, or from guest context to host context. In those cases we don't know how much of the transition has been completed and therefore whether we have guest values or host values in the CPU registers (GPRs, FPRs/VSRs, SPRs). If we do see HV set then KVM reports a severe error to userspace which should cause userspace to terminate the guest. Therefore the UV should *always* have the HV bit clear in HSRR1/SRR1 when transitioning to KVM. Paul.
