Am Tue, 21 Apr 2015 10:41:51 +1000
schrieb David Gibson <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>:
> On POWER, storage caching is usually configured via the MMU - attributes
> such as cache-inhibited are stored in the TLB and the hashed page table.
>
> This makes correctly performing cache inhibited IO accesses awkward when
> the MMU is turned off (real mode). Some CPU models provide special
> registers to control the cache attributes of real mode load and stores but
> this is not at all consistent. This is a problem in particular for SLOF,
> the firmware used on KVM guests, which runs entirely in real mode, but
> which needs to do IO to load the kernel.
>
> To simplify this qemu implements two special hypercalls, H_LOGICAL_CI_LOAD
> and H_LOGICAL_CI_STORE which simulate a cache-inhibited load or store to
> a logical address (aka guest physical address). SLOF uses these for IO.
>
> However, because these are implemented within qemu, not the host kernel,
> these bypass any IO devices emulated within KVM itself. The simplest way
> to see this problem is to attempt to boot a KVM guest from a virtio-blk
> device with iothread / dataplane enabled. The iothread code relies on an
> in kernel implementation of the virtio queue notification, which is not
> triggered by the IO hcalls, and so the guest will stall in SLOF unable to
> load the guest OS.
>
> This patch addresses this by providing in-kernel implementations of the
> 2 hypercalls, which correctly scan the KVM IO bus. Any access to an
> address not handled by the KVM IO bus will cause a VM exit, hitting the
> qemu implementation as before.
>
> Note that a userspace change is also required, in order to enable these
> new hcall implementations with KVM_CAP_PPC_ENABLE_HCALL.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s.h | 3 ++
> arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c | 12 ++++++
> arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_pr_papr.c | 28 +++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 119 insertions(+)
...
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s.c
> index cfbcdc6..453a8a4 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s.c
> @@ -821,6 +821,82 @@ void kvmppc_core_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
> #endif
> }
>
> +int kvmppc_h_logical_ci_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + unsigned long size = kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 4);
> + unsigned long addr = kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 5);
> + u64 buf;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (!is_power_of_2(size) || (size > sizeof(buf)))
> + return H_TOO_HARD;
> +
> + ret = kvm_io_bus_read(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, addr, size, &buf);
> + if (ret != 0)
> + return H_TOO_HARD;
> +
> + switch (size) {
> + case 1:
> + kvmppc_set_gpr(vcpu, 4, *(u8 *)&buf);
> + break;
> +
Most of the code in book3s.c seems not to use a empty line after a
"break;", so may I suggest to remove these empty lines here, too, to
keep the coding style a little bit more consistent?
> + case 2:
> + kvmppc_set_gpr(vcpu, 4, be16_to_cpu(*(__be16 *)&buf));
> + break;
> +
> + case 4:
> + kvmppc_set_gpr(vcpu, 4, be32_to_cpu(*(__be32 *)&buf));
> + break;
> +
> + case 8:
> + kvmppc_set_gpr(vcpu, 4, be64_to_cpu(*(__be64 *)&buf));
> + break;
> +
> + default:
> + BUG();
If I got the code right, a malicious guest could easily trigger this
BUG() statement, couldn't it? ... so a BUG() is maybe not the right
thing to do here. Would it be appropriate to return an error value to
the guest instead?
> + }
> +
> + return H_SUCCESS;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvmppc_h_logical_ci_load);
Thomas
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