On 2022-06-17 09:45, Quentin Perret wrote:
On Friday 17 Jun 2022 at 11:38:14 (+0300), Mike Rapoport wrote:
On Fri, Jun 17, 2022 at 09:21:31AM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> On Thu, 16 Jun 2022 16:11:34 +0000, Quentin Perret wrote:
> > Commit a7259df76702 ("memblock: make memblock_find_in_range method
> > private") changed the API using which memory is reserved for the pKVM
> > hypervisor. However, it seems that memblock_phys_alloc() differs
> > from the original API in terms of kmemleak semantics -- the old one
> > excluded the reserved regions from kmemleak scans when the new one
> > doesn't seem to. Unfortunately, when protected KVM is enabled, all
> > kernel accesses to pKVM-private memory result in a fatal exception,
> > which can now happen because of kmemleak scans:
> >
> > [...]
>
> Applied to fixes, thanks!
>
> [1/1] KVM: arm64: Prevent kmemleak from accessing pKVM memory
> commit: 9e5afa8a537f742bccc2cd91bc0bef4b6483ee98
I'd really like to update the changelog to this:
Commit a7259df76702 ("memblock: make memblock_find_in_range method
private") changed the API using which memory is reserved for the pKVM
hypervisor. However, memblock_phys_alloc() differs from the original
API in
terms of kmemleak semantics -- the old one didn't report the reserved
regions to kmemleak while the new one does. Unfortunately, when
protected
KVM is enabled, all kernel accesses to pKVM-private memory result in a
fatal exception, which can now happen because of kmemleak scans:
$ echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
[ 34.991354] kvm [304]: nVHE hyp BUG at: [<ffff800008fa3750>]
__kvm_nvhe_handle_host_mem_abort+0x270/0x290!
...
Fix this by explicitly excluding the hypervisor's memory pool from
kmemleak like we already do for the hyp BSS.
Looks good to me, thanks.
Now updated. Thanks,
M.
--
Jazz is not dead. It just smells funny...
_______________________________________________
kvmarm mailing list
kvmarm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm
