Hi Fuad, On Fri, May 27, 2022 at 08:55:42AM +0100, Fuad Tabba wrote: > Hi Peter, > > On Thu, May 26, 2022 at 9:08 PM Peter Collingbourne <pcc@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > On Thu, May 19, 2022 at 7:40 AM Will Deacon <will@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > From: Fuad Tabba <tabba@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > > > > Return an error (-EINVAL) if trying to enable MTE on a protected > > > vm. > > > > I think this commit message needs more explanation as to why MTE is > > not currently supported in protected VMs. > > Yes, we need to explain this more. Basically this is an extension of > restricting features for protected VMs done earlier [*]. > > Various VM feature configurations are allowed in KVM/arm64, each requiring > specific handling logic to deal with traps, context-switching and potentially > emulation. Achieving feature parity in pKVM therefore requires either elevating > this logic to EL2 (and substantially increasing the TCB) or continuing to trust > the host handlers at EL1. Since neither of these options are especially > appealing, pKVM instead limits the CPU features exposed to a guest to a fixed > configuration based on the underlying hardware and which can mostly be provided > straightforwardly by EL2. > > This of course can change in the future and we can support more > features for protected VMs as needed. We'll expand on this commit > message when we respin. > > Also note that this only applies to protected VMs. Non-protected VMs > in protected mode support MTE. I see. In this case unless I'm missing something the EL2 side seems quite trivial though (flipping some bits in HCR_EL2). The patch below (in place of this one) seems to make MTE work in my test environment (patched [1] crosvm on Android in MTE-enabled QEMU). [1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/platform/crosvm/+/3689015 >From c87965cd14515586d487872486e7670874209113 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu, 2 Jun 2022 19:16:02 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] arm64: support MTE in protected VMs Enable HCR_EL2.ATA while running a vCPU with MTE enabled. To avoid exposing MTE tags from the host to protected VMs, sanitize tags before donating pages. Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@xxxxxxxxxx> --- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h | 4 +++- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 6 +++--- arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h index 952e3c3fa32d..9ca9296f2a25 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h @@ -73,10 +73,12 @@ void kvm_shadow_destroy(struct kvm *kvm); * Allow for protected VMs: * - Branch Target Identification * - Speculative Store Bypassing + * - Memory Tagging Extension */ #define PVM_ID_AA64PFR1_ALLOW (\ ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_BT) | \ - ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS) \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_MTE) \ ) /* diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c index e33ba9067d7b..46ddd9093ac7 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static void pvm_init_traps_aa64pfr1(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) /* Memory Tagging: Trap and Treat as Untagged if not supported. */ if (!FIELD_GET(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_MTE), feature_ids)) { hcr_set |= HCR_TID5; - hcr_clear |= HCR_DCT | HCR_ATA; + hcr_clear |= HCR_ATA; } vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 |= hcr_set; @@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ static void pvm_init_trap_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * - Feature id registers: to control features exposed to guests * - Implementation-defined features */ - vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 = HCR_GUEST_FLAGS | - HCR_TID3 | HCR_TACR | HCR_TIDCP | HCR_TID1; + vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 = HCR_GUEST_FLAGS | HCR_TID3 | HCR_TACR | HCR_TIDCP | + HCR_TID1 | HCR_ATA; if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_RAS_EXTN)) { /* route synchronous external abort exceptions to EL2 */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c index 392ff7b2362d..f513852357f7 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c @@ -1206,8 +1206,10 @@ static int pkvm_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa, goto dec_account; } - write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock); pfn = page_to_pfn(page); + sanitise_mte_tags(kvm, pfn, PAGE_SIZE); + + write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock); ret = pkvm_host_map_guest(pfn, fault_ipa >> PAGE_SHIFT); if (ret) { if (ret == -EAGAIN) -- 2.36.1.255.ge46751e96f-goog _______________________________________________ kvmarm mailing list kvmarm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm
