Spectre - BHB

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Hello,

We've been talking internally about Spectre-BHB (disclosed a couple of
weeks ago [0])
and thought it could be interesting to start some discussion on the mailing
list, especially around the software mitigation.

As a start, here is the overhead of the mitigation [1] for some guest operations
on a Neoverse N1 core [0]. The table shows the avg. latency of each operation,
measured using kvm-unit-tests/arm/micro-bench.

Micro-bench          not-mitigated   mitigated
                     nsecs           nsecs           overhead
=============================================================
hvc                  292             317             8.56%
mmio_read_user       1609            1704            5.90%
mmio_read_vgic       419             444             5.97%
eoi                  29              29              0.00%
ipi                  1509            1548            2.58%
lpi                  1643            1758            7.00%
timer_10ms           798             844             5.76%

Some details:
- Using 56e337f2cf13 with and without MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY.
- Each test (row) runs for 1 minute in a tight loop.

We are still evaluating the effect of this on real workloads.

Thanks!
Ricardo

[0] Spectre-BHB white paper:
https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/spectre-bhb
[1] 558c303c9734af5a813739cd284879227f7297d2 arm64: Mitigate spectre
style branch history side channels
[2] the specific vector is spectre_bhb_k24 (Arm Neoverse-N1), from the
Spectre-BHB white paper in [0].
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