On Thu, Aug 26, 2021 at 10:49:45AM +0200, Andrew Jones wrote: > On Wed, Aug 25, 2021 at 11:14:59AM -0700, Oliver Upton wrote: > > On Wed, Aug 25, 2021 at 8:07 AM Andrew Jones <drjones@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > On Wed, Aug 25, 2021 at 11:39:34AM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote: > > > > On Wed, 25 Aug 2021 11:02:28 +0100, > > > > Oliver Upton <oupton@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Aug 25, 2021 at 2:27 AM Marc Zyngier <maz@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > > Exposing new hypercalls to guests in this manner seems very unsafe to > > > > > > > me. Suppose an operator is trying to upgrade from kernel N to kernel > > > > > > > N+1, which brings in the new 'widget' hypercall. Guests are live > > > > > > > migrated onto the N+1 kernel, but the operator finds a defect that > > > > > > > warrants a kernel rollback. VMs are then migrated from kernel N+1 -> N. > > > > > > > Any guests that discovered the 'widget' hypercall are likely going to > > > > > > > get fussy _very_ quickly on the old kernel. > > > > > > > > > > > > This goes against what we decided to support for the *only* publicly > > > > > > available VMM that cares about save/restore, which is that we only > > > > > > move forward and don't rollback. > > > > > > > > > > Ah, I was definitely missing this context. Current behavior makes much > > > > > more sense then. > > > > > > > > > > > Hypercalls are the least of your > > > > > > worries, and there is a whole range of other architectural features > > > > > > that will have also appeared/disappeared (your own CNTPOFF series is a > > > > > > glaring example of this). > > > > > > > > > > Isn't that a tad bit different though? I'll admit, I'm just as guilty > > > > > with my own series forgetting to add a KVM_CAP (oops), but it is in my > > > > > queue to kick out with the fix for nVHE/ptimer. Nonetheless, if a user > > > > > takes up a new KVM UAPI, it is up to the user to run on a new kernel. > > > > > > > > The two are linked. Exposing a new register to userspace and/or guest > > > > result in the same thing: you can't rollback. That's specially true in > > > > the QEMU case, which *learns* from the kernel what registers are > > > > available, and doesn't maintain a fixed list. > > > > > > > > > My concerns are explicitly with the 'under the nose' changes, where > > > > > KVM modifies the guest feature set without userspace opting in. Based > > > > > on your comment, though, it would appear that other parts of KVM are > > > > > affected too. > > > > > > > > Any new system register that is exposed by a new kernel feature breaks > > > > rollback. And so far, we only consider it a bug if the set of exposed > > > > registers reduces. Anything can be added safely (as checked by one of > > > > the selftests added by Drew). > > > > > > > > < It doesn't have to be rollback safety, either. There may > > > > > simply be a hypercall which an operator doesn't want to give its > > > > > guests, and it needs a way to tell KVM to hide it. > > > > > > > > Fair enough. But this has to be done in a scalable way, which > > > > individual capability cannot provide. > > > > > > > > > > > Have I missed something blatantly obvious, or do others see this as an > > > > > > > issue as well? I'll reply with an example of adding opt-out for PTP. > > > > > > > I'm sure other hypercalls could be handled similarly. > > > > > > > > > > > > Why do we need this? For future hypercalls, we could have some buy-in > > > > > > capabilities. For existing ones, it is too late, and negative features > > > > > > are just too horrible. > > > > > > > > > > Oh, agreed on the nastiness. Lazy hack to realize the intended > > > > > functional change.. > > > > > > > > Well, you definitely achieved your goal of attracting my attention :). > > > > > > > > > > For KVM-specific hypercalls, we could get the VMM to save/restore the > > > > > > bitmap of supported functions. That would be "less horrible". This > > > > > > could be implemented using extra "firmware pseudo-registers" such as > > > > > > the ones described in Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/psci.rst. > > > > > > > > > > This seems more reasonable, especially since we do this for migrating > > > > > the guest's PSCI version. > > > > > > > > > > Alternatively, I had thought about using a VM attribute, given the > > > > > fact that it is non-architectural information and we avoid ABI issues > > > > > in KVM_GET_REG_LIST without buy-in through a KVM_CAP. > > > > > > > > The whole point is that these settings get exposed by > > > > KVM_GET_REG_LIST, as this is QEMU's way to dump a VM state. Given that > > > > we already have this for things like the spectre management state, we > > > > can just as well expose the bitmaps that deal with the KVM-specific > > > > hypercalls. After all, this falls into the realm of "KVM as VM > > > > firmware". > > > > > > > > For ARM-architected hypercalls (TRNG, stolen time), we may need a > > > > similar extension. > > > > > > > > > > Thanks for including me Marc. I think you've mentioned all the examples > > > of why we don't generally expect N+1 -> N migrations to work that I > > > can think of. While some of the examples like get-reg-list could > > > eventually be eliminated if we had CPU models to tighten our machine type > > > state, I think N+1 -> N migrations will always be best effort at most. > > > > > > I agree with giving userspace control over the exposer of the hypercalls > > > though. Using pseudo-registers for that purpose rather than a pile of > > > CAPs also seems reasonable to me. > > > > > > And, while I don't think this patch is going to proceed, I thought I'd > > > point out that the opt-out approach doesn't help much with expanding > > > our migration support unless we require the VMM to be upgraded first. > > > > > > And, even then, the (N_kern, N+1_vmm) -> (N+1_kern, N_vmm) case won't > > > work as expected, since the source enforce opt-out, but the destination > > > won't. > > > > Right, there's going to need to be a fence in both kernel and VMM > > versions. Before the fence, you can't rollback with either component. > > Once on the other side of the fence, the user may freely migrate > > between kernel + VMM combinations. > > > > > Also, since the VMM doesn't key off the kernel version, for the > > > most part N+1 VMMs won't know when they're supposed to opt-out or not, > > > leaving it to the user to ensure they consider everything. opt-in > > > usually only needs the user to consider what machine type they want to > > > launch. > > > > Going the register route will implicitly require opt-out for all old > > hypercalls. We exposed them unconditionally to the guest before, and > > we must uphold that behavior. The default value for the bitmap will > > have those features set. Any hypercalls added after that register > > interface will then require explicit opt-in from userspace. > > > > With regards to the pseudoregister interface, how would a VMM discover > > new bits? From my perspective, you need to have two bitmaps that the > > VMM can get at: the set of supported feature bits and the active > > bitmap of features for a running guest. > > > > I think we should model the pseudo-register approach off of x86's > CPUID approach. x86 has specific get/set ioctls for CPUIDs > (KVM_GET/SET_CPUID2), but I think we should get by with just > get/set-one-reg. However, it might be nice/necessary to have something > like x86's KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID which returns all the registers > at once as a bitmap and the set bits would inform userspace of what's > supported by the hardware and KVM. > > So a new ioctl similar to KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID would be your > first bitmap that shows what's supported and then userpace can > determine what it wants to change and calculate the appropriate > pseudo-registers to set/clear bits on with set-one-reg, as x86 > would do with kvm-set-cpuid2. > I see Marc just replied stating we'll probably just have a single register. The KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID type of ioctl would be overkill in that case (get-one_reg is enough). Anyway it can always be added later if we expand into more registers. Thanks, drew _______________________________________________ kvmarm mailing list kvmarm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm
