On Tue, 23 Apr 2019 05:42:35 +0100,
Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
>
> When pointer authentication is supported, a guest may wish to use it.
> This patch adds the necessary KVM infrastructure for this to work, with
> a semi-lazy context switch of the pointer auth state.
>
> Pointer authentication feature is only enabled when VHE is built
> in the kernel and present in the CPU implementation so only VHE code
> paths are modified.
>
> When we schedule a vcpu, we disable guest usage of pointer
> authentication instructions and accesses to the keys. While these are
> disabled, we avoid context-switching the keys. When we trap the guest
> trying to use pointer authentication functionality, we change to eagerly
> context-switching the keys, and enable the feature. The next time the
> vcpu is scheduled out/in, we start again. However the host key save is
> optimized and implemented inside ptrauth instruction/register access
> trap.
>
> Pointer authentication consists of address authentication and generic
> authentication, and CPUs in a system might have varied support for
> either. Where support for either feature is not uniform, it is hidden
> from guests via ID register emulation, as a result of the cpufeature
> framework in the host.
>
> Unfortunately, address authentication and generic authentication cannot
> be trapped separately, as the architecture provides a single EL2 trap
> covering both. If we wish to expose one without the other, we cannot
> prevent a (badly-written) guest from intermittently using a feature
> which is not uniformly supported (when scheduled on a physical CPU which
> supports the relevant feature). Hence, this patch expects both type of
> authentication to be present in a cpu.
>
> This switch of key is done from guest enter/exit assembly as preparation
> for the upcoming in-kernel pointer authentication support. Hence, these
> key switching routines are not implemented in C code as they may cause
> pointer authentication key signing error in some situations.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
> [Only VHE, key switch in full assembly, vcpu_has_ptrauth checks
> , save host key in ptrauth exception trap]
> Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@xxxxxxx>
> Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@xxxxxxx>
> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@xxxxxxx>
> Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@xxxxxxx>
> Cc: kvmarm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> ---
> Changes since v9:
>
> * Removed hardcoding of enum values[Mark Zyngier].
> * Changed kvm_ptrauth_asm.h to kvm_ptrauth.h[Mark Zyngier].
> * Removed macro __ptrauth_save_state and applied inline [Marc Zyngier].
> * Moved kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_setup_lazy, kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_enable and
> kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_disable from *.c to kvm_emulate.h file [Marc Zyngier].
> * Added/Modified comments at few places [Marc Zyngier].
>
> arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 2 +
> arch/arm64/Kconfig | 5 +-
> arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 16 ++++++
> arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 14 +++++
> arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ptrauth.h | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 6 ++
> arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c | 36 +++++++++---
> arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S | 15 +++++
> arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 43 +++++++++++++-
> virt/kvm/arm/arm.c | 2 +
> 10 files changed, 234 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ptrauth.h
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
> index 8927cae..efb0e2c 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
> +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
> @@ -343,4 +343,6 @@ static inline unsigned long vcpu_data_host_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> }
> }
>
> +static inline void vcpu_ptrauth_setup_lazy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
> +
> #endif /* __ARM_KVM_EMULATE_H__ */
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> index 7e34b9e..3cfe2eb 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> @@ -1301,8 +1301,9 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH
> context-switched along with the process.
>
> The feature is detected at runtime. If the feature is not present in
> - hardware it will not be advertised to userspace nor will it be
> - enabled.
> + hardware it will not be advertised to userspace/KVM guest nor will it
> + be enabled. However, KVM guest also require VHE mode and hence
> + CONFIG_ARM64_VHE=y option to use this feature.
SVE seems to have the exact same requirements, and has
depends on !KVM || ARM64_VHE
Why don't we have that for PTR_AUTH too?
>
> endmenu
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
> index d384279..613427f 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
> @@ -98,6 +98,22 @@ static inline void vcpu_set_wfe_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 |= HCR_TWE;
> }
>
> +static inline void vcpu_ptrauth_enable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 |= (HCR_API | HCR_APK);
> +}
> +
> +static inline void vcpu_ptrauth_disable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 &= ~(HCR_API | HCR_APK);
> +}
> +
> +static inline void vcpu_ptrauth_setup_lazy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + if (vcpu_has_ptrauth(vcpu))
> + vcpu_ptrauth_disable(vcpu);
> +}
> +
> static inline unsigned long vcpu_get_vsesr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> return vcpu->arch.vsesr_el2;
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index 7ccac42..7eebea7 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -161,6 +161,18 @@ enum vcpu_sysreg {
> PMSWINC_EL0, /* Software Increment Register */
> PMUSERENR_EL0, /* User Enable Register */
>
> + /* Pointer Authentication Registers in a strict increasing order. */
> + APIAKEYLO_EL1,
> + APIAKEYHI_EL1,
> + APIBKEYLO_EL1,
> + APIBKEYHI_EL1,
> + APDAKEYLO_EL1,
> + APDAKEYHI_EL1,
> + APDBKEYLO_EL1,
> + APDBKEYHI_EL1,
> + APGAKEYLO_EL1,
> + APGAKEYHI_EL1,
> +
> /* 32bit specific registers. Keep them at the end of the range */
> DACR32_EL2, /* Domain Access Control Register */
> IFSR32_EL2, /* Instruction Fault Status Register */
> @@ -530,6 +542,8 @@ static inline bool kvm_arch_requires_vhe(void)
> return false;
> }
>
> +void kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_trap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> +
> static inline void kvm_arch_hardware_unsetup(void) {}
> static inline void kvm_arch_sync_events(struct kvm *kvm) {}
> static inline void kvm_arch_sched_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) {}
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ptrauth.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ptrauth.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..f337237
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ptrauth.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +/* arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ptrauth.h: Guest/host ptrauth save/restore
> + * Copyright 2019 Arm Limited
> + * Authors: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
> + * Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@xxxxxxx>
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef __ASM_KVM_PTRAUTH_H
> +#define __ASM_KVM_PTRAUTH_H
> +
> +#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
> +
> +#include <asm/sysreg.h>
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
> +
> +#define PTRAUTH_REG_OFFSET(x) (x - CPU_APIAKEYLO_EL1)
> +
> +/*
> + * CPU_AP*_EL1 values exceed immediate offset range (512) for stp instruction
> + * so below macros takes CPU_APIAKEYLO_EL1 as base and calculates the offset of
> + * the keys from this base to avoid an extra add instruction. These macros
> + * assumes the keys offsets are aligned in a specific increasing order.
> + */
> +.macro ptrauth_save_state base, reg1, reg2
> + mrs_s \reg1, SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1
> + mrs_s \reg2, SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1
> + stp \reg1, \reg2, [\base, #PTRAUTH_REG_OFFSET(CPU_APIAKEYLO_EL1)]
> + mrs_s \reg1, SYS_APIBKEYLO_EL1
> + mrs_s \reg2, SYS_APIBKEYHI_EL1
> + stp \reg1, \reg2, [\base, #PTRAUTH_REG_OFFSET(CPU_APIBKEYLO_EL1)]
> + mrs_s \reg1, SYS_APDAKEYLO_EL1
> + mrs_s \reg2, SYS_APDAKEYHI_EL1
> + stp \reg1, \reg2, [\base, #PTRAUTH_REG_OFFSET(CPU_APDAKEYLO_EL1)]
> + mrs_s \reg1, SYS_APDBKEYLO_EL1
> + mrs_s \reg2, SYS_APDBKEYHI_EL1
> + stp \reg1, \reg2, [\base, #PTRAUTH_REG_OFFSET(CPU_APDBKEYLO_EL1)]
> + mrs_s \reg1, SYS_APGAKEYLO_EL1
> + mrs_s \reg2, SYS_APGAKEYHI_EL1
> + stp \reg1, \reg2, [\base, #PTRAUTH_REG_OFFSET(CPU_APGAKEYLO_EL1)]
> +.endm
> +
> +.macro ptrauth_restore_state base, reg1, reg2
> + ldp \reg1, \reg2, [\base, #PTRAUTH_REG_OFFSET(CPU_APIAKEYLO_EL1)]
> + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, \reg1
> + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, \reg2
> + ldp \reg1, \reg2, [\base, #PTRAUTH_REG_OFFSET(CPU_APIBKEYLO_EL1)]
> + msr_s SYS_APIBKEYLO_EL1, \reg1
> + msr_s SYS_APIBKEYHI_EL1, \reg2
> + ldp \reg1, \reg2, [\base, #PTRAUTH_REG_OFFSET(CPU_APDAKEYLO_EL1)]
> + msr_s SYS_APDAKEYLO_EL1, \reg1
> + msr_s SYS_APDAKEYHI_EL1, \reg2
> + ldp \reg1, \reg2, [\base, #PTRAUTH_REG_OFFSET(CPU_APDBKEYLO_EL1)]
> + msr_s SYS_APDBKEYLO_EL1, \reg1
> + msr_s SYS_APDBKEYHI_EL1, \reg2
> + ldp \reg1, \reg2, [\base, #PTRAUTH_REG_OFFSET(CPU_APGAKEYLO_EL1)]
> + msr_s SYS_APGAKEYLO_EL1, \reg1
> + msr_s SYS_APGAKEYHI_EL1, \reg2
> +.endm
> +
> +/* Both ptrauth_switch_to_guest and ptrauth_switch_to_host macros will check for
Comment style.
> + * the presence of one of the cpufeature flag ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH or
> + * ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF and then proceed ahead with the save/restore
> + * of Pointer Authentication key registers.
> + */
> +.macro ptrauth_switch_to_guest g_ctxt, reg1, reg2, reg3
> +alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH
> + b 1000f
> +alternative_else_nop_endif
> +alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF
> + b 1001f
> +alternative_else_nop_endif
> +1000:
> + ldr \reg1, [\g_ctxt, #(VCPU_HCR_EL2 - VCPU_CONTEXT)]
> + and \reg1, \reg1, #(HCR_API | HCR_APK)
> + cbz \reg1, 1001f
> + add \reg1, \g_ctxt, #CPU_APIAKEYLO_EL1
> + ptrauth_restore_state \reg1, \reg2, \reg3
> +1001:
> +.endm
> +
> +.macro ptrauth_switch_to_host g_ctxt, h_ctxt, reg1, reg2, reg3
> +alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH
> + b 2000f
> +alternative_else_nop_endif
> +alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF
> + b 2001f
> +alternative_else_nop_endif
> +2000:
> + ldr \reg1, [\g_ctxt, #(VCPU_HCR_EL2 - VCPU_CONTEXT)]
> + and \reg1, \reg1, #(HCR_API | HCR_APK)
> + cbz \reg1, 2001f
> + add \reg1, \g_ctxt, #CPU_APIAKEYLO_EL1
> + ptrauth_save_state \reg1, \reg2, \reg3
> + add \reg1, \h_ctxt, #CPU_APIAKEYLO_EL1
> + ptrauth_restore_state \reg1, \reg2, \reg3
> + isb
> +2001:
> +.endm
> +
> +#else /* !CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */
> +.macro ptrauth_switch_to_guest g_ctxt, reg1, reg2, reg3
> +.endm
> +.macro ptrauth_switch_to_host g_ctxt, h_ctxt, reg1, reg2, reg3
> +.endm
> +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */
> +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
> +#endif /* __ASM_KVM_PTRAUTH_H */
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> index 7f40dcb..8178330 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> @@ -125,7 +125,13 @@ int main(void)
> DEFINE(VCPU_CONTEXT, offsetof(struct kvm_vcpu, arch.ctxt));
> DEFINE(VCPU_FAULT_DISR, offsetof(struct kvm_vcpu, arch.fault.disr_el1));
> DEFINE(VCPU_WORKAROUND_FLAGS, offsetof(struct kvm_vcpu, arch.workaround_flags));
> + DEFINE(VCPU_HCR_EL2, offsetof(struct kvm_vcpu, arch.hcr_el2));
> DEFINE(CPU_GP_REGS, offsetof(struct kvm_cpu_context, gp_regs));
> + DEFINE(CPU_APIAKEYLO_EL1, offsetof(struct kvm_cpu_context, sys_regs[APIAKEYLO_EL1]));
> + DEFINE(CPU_APIBKEYLO_EL1, offsetof(struct kvm_cpu_context, sys_regs[APIBKEYLO_EL1]));
> + DEFINE(CPU_APDAKEYLO_EL1, offsetof(struct kvm_cpu_context, sys_regs[APDAKEYLO_EL1]));
> + DEFINE(CPU_APDBKEYLO_EL1, offsetof(struct kvm_cpu_context, sys_regs[APDBKEYLO_EL1]));
> + DEFINE(CPU_APGAKEYLO_EL1, offsetof(struct kvm_cpu_context, sys_regs[APGAKEYLO_EL1]));
> DEFINE(CPU_USER_PT_REGS, offsetof(struct kvm_regs, regs));
> DEFINE(HOST_CONTEXT_VCPU, offsetof(struct kvm_cpu_context, __hyp_running_vcpu));
> #endif
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c
> index 0b79834..516aead 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c
> @@ -173,20 +173,40 @@ static int handle_sve(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
> return 1;
> }
>
> +#define __ptrauth_save_key(regs, key) \
> +({ \
> + regs[key ## KEYLO_EL1] = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ ## key ## KEYLO_EL1); \
> + regs[key ## KEYHI_EL1] = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ ## key ## KEYHI_EL1); \
> +})
> +
> +/*
> + * Handle the guest trying to use a ptrauth instruction, or trying to access a
> + * ptrauth register.
> + */
> +void kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_trap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt;
> +
> + if (vcpu_has_ptrauth(vcpu)) {
> + vcpu_ptrauth_enable(vcpu);
> + ctxt = vcpu->arch.host_cpu_context;
> + __ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APIA);
> + __ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APIB);
> + __ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APDA);
> + __ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APDB);
> + __ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APGA);
> + } else {
> + kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
> + }
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Guest usage of a ptrauth instruction (which the guest EL1 did not turn into
> * a NOP).
> */
> static int kvm_handle_ptrauth(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
> {
> - /*
> - * We don't currently support ptrauth in a guest, and we mask the ID
> - * registers to prevent well-behaved guests from trying to make use of
> - * it.
> - *
> - * Inject an UNDEF, as if the feature really isn't present.
> - */
> - kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
> + kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_trap(vcpu);
> return 1;
> }
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S
> index 675fdc1..93ba3d7 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S
> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
> #include <asm/kvm_arm.h>
> #include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
> #include <asm/kvm_mmu.h>
> +#include <asm/kvm_ptrauth.h>
>
> #define CPU_GP_REG_OFFSET(x) (CPU_GP_REGS + x)
> #define CPU_XREG_OFFSET(x) CPU_GP_REG_OFFSET(CPU_USER_PT_REGS + 8*x)
> @@ -64,6 +65,13 @@ ENTRY(__guest_enter)
>
> add x18, x0, #VCPU_CONTEXT
>
> + // Macro ptrauth_switch_to_guest format:
> + // ptrauth_switch_to_guest(guest cxt, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3)
> + // The below macro to restore guest keys is not implemented in C code
> + // as it may cause Pointer Authentication key signing mismatch errors
> + // when this feature is enabled for kernel code.
> + ptrauth_switch_to_guest x18, x0, x1, x2
> +
> // Restore guest regs x0-x17
> ldp x0, x1, [x18, #CPU_XREG_OFFSET(0)]
> ldp x2, x3, [x18, #CPU_XREG_OFFSET(2)]
> @@ -118,6 +126,13 @@ ENTRY(__guest_exit)
>
> get_host_ctxt x2, x3
>
> + // Macro ptrauth_switch_to_guest format:
> + // ptrauth_switch_to_host(guest cxt, host cxt, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3)
> + // The below macro to save/restore keys is not implemented in C code
> + // as it may cause Pointer Authentication key signing mismatch errors
> + // when this feature is enabled for kernel code.
> + ptrauth_switch_to_host x1, x2, x3, x4, x5
> +
> // Now restore the host regs
> restore_callee_saved_regs x2
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
> index 7046c76..7f06c2e 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
> @@ -1007,6 +1007,35 @@ static bool access_pmuserenr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct sys_reg_params *p,
> { SYS_DESC(SYS_PMEVTYPERn_EL0(n)), \
> access_pmu_evtyper, reset_unknown, (PMEVTYPER0_EL0 + n), }
>
> +static bool trap_ptrauth(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> + struct sys_reg_params *p,
> + const struct sys_reg_desc *rd)
> +{
> + kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_trap(vcpu);
> +
> + /*
> + * Return is false for both cases and PC remains same,
> + * a) Re-execute the same key register access instruction after enabling
> + * ptrauth.
> + * b) UNDEF is injected as ptrauth is not supported/enabled.
> + */
This comment is pretty confusing. You say that PC remains the same,
but that's obviously not true for (b). I've fixed it locally as such:
/*
* Return false for both cases as we never skip the trapped
* instruction:
*
* - Either we re-execute the same key register access instruction
* after enabling ptrauth.
* - Or an UNDEF is injected as ptrauth is not supported/enabled.
*/
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +static unsigned int ptrauth_visibility(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> + const struct sys_reg_desc *rd)
> +{
> + return vcpu_has_ptrauth(vcpu) ? 0 : REG_HIDDEN_USER | REG_HIDDEN_GUEST;
> +}
> +
> +#define __PTRAUTH_KEY(k) \
> + { SYS_DESC(SYS_## k), trap_ptrauth, reset_unknown, k, \
> + .visibility = ptrauth_visibility}
> +
> +#define PTRAUTH_KEY(k) \
> + __PTRAUTH_KEY(k ## KEYLO_EL1), \
> + __PTRAUTH_KEY(k ## KEYHI_EL1)
> +
> static bool access_arch_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> struct sys_reg_params *p,
> const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
> @@ -1058,9 +1087,11 @@ static u64 read_id_reg(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT) |
> (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_SHIFT) |
> (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_SHIFT);
> - if (val & ptrauth_mask)
> - kvm_debug("ptrauth unsupported for guests, suppressing\n");
> - val &= ~ptrauth_mask;
> + if (!vcpu_has_ptrauth(vcpu)) {
> + if (val & ptrauth_mask)
> + kvm_debug("ptrauth unsupported for guests, suppressing\n");
> + val &= ~ptrauth_mask;
> + }
> }
>
> return val;
> @@ -1460,6 +1491,12 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc sys_reg_descs[] = {
> { SYS_DESC(SYS_TTBR1_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_unknown, TTBR1_EL1 },
> { SYS_DESC(SYS_TCR_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_val, TCR_EL1, 0 },
>
> + PTRAUTH_KEY(APIA),
> + PTRAUTH_KEY(APIB),
> + PTRAUTH_KEY(APDA),
> + PTRAUTH_KEY(APDB),
> + PTRAUTH_KEY(APGA),
> +
> { SYS_DESC(SYS_AFSR0_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_unknown, AFSR0_EL1 },
> { SYS_DESC(SYS_AFSR1_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_unknown, AFSR1_EL1 },
> { SYS_DESC(SYS_ESR_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_unknown, ESR_EL1 },
> diff --git a/virt/kvm/arm/arm.c b/virt/kvm/arm/arm.c
> index 7039c99c..156c09d 100644
> --- a/virt/kvm/arm/arm.c
> +++ b/virt/kvm/arm/arm.c
> @@ -385,6 +385,8 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
> vcpu_clear_wfe_traps(vcpu);
> else
> vcpu_set_wfe_traps(vcpu);
> +
> + vcpu_ptrauth_setup_lazy(vcpu);
> }
>
> void kvm_arch_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> --
> 2.7.4
>
I've tentatively applied these fixes on top of your series, no need to
resend anything for now.
Thanks,
M.
--
Jazz is not dead, it just smell funny.
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