Re: [PATCH v5 1/3] arm64: KVM: Propagate full Spectre v2 workaround state to KVM guests

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On 15/04/2019 12:15, Andre Przywara wrote:
> Recent commits added the explicit notion of "Not affected" to the state
> of the Spectre v2 (aka. BP_HARDENING) workaround, where we just had
> "needed" and "unknown" before.
> 
> Export this knowledge to the rest of the kernel and enhance the existing
> kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor() to report this new state as well.
> Export this new state to guests when they use KVM's firmware interface
> emulation.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@xxxxxxx>
> ---
>  arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h     | 12 +++++++++---
>  arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h |  6 ++++++
>  arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h   | 16 ++++++++++++++--
>  arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c      | 23 ++++++++++++++++++-----
>  virt/kvm/arm/psci.c                 | 10 +++++++++-
>  5 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index 770d73257ad9..836479e4b340 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -364,7 +364,11 @@ static inline void kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
>  static inline void kvm_arm_vhe_guest_enter(void) {}
>  static inline void kvm_arm_vhe_guest_exit(void) {}
>  
> -static inline bool kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor(void)
> +#define KVM_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN		-1
> +#define KVM_BP_HARDEN_NEEDED		0
> +#define KVM_BP_HARDEN_MITIGATED		1

I find the naming here a little confusing - it's not really clear what
"mitigated" means (see below).

> +
> +static inline int kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor(void)
>  {
>  	switch(read_cpuid_part()) {
>  #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> @@ -372,10 +376,12 @@ static inline bool kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor(void)
>  	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A12:
>  	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
>  	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17:
> -		return true;
> +		return KVM_BP_HARDEN_NEEDED;
>  #endif
> +	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A7:
> +		return KVM_BP_HARDEN_MITIGATED;
>  	default:
> -		return false;
> +		return KVM_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN;
>  	}
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> index 6ccdc97e5d6a..3c5b25c1bda1 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> @@ -622,6 +622,12 @@ static inline bool system_uses_irq_prio_masking(void)
>  	       cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_IRQ_PRIO_MASKING);
>  }
>  
> +#define ARM64_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN		-1
> +#define ARM64_BP_HARDEN_NEEDED		0
> +#define ARM64_BP_HARDEN_MITIGATED	1
> +
> +int get_spectre_v2_workaround_state(void);
> +
>  #define ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN		-1
>  #define ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE	0
>  #define ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL		1
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index a01fe087e022..bf9a59b7d1ce 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -555,9 +555,21 @@ static inline void kvm_arm_vhe_guest_exit(void)
>  	isb();
>  }
>  
> -static inline bool kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor(void)
> +#define KVM_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN		-1
> +#define KVM_BP_HARDEN_NEEDED		0
> +#define KVM_BP_HARDEN_MITIGATED		1
> +
> +static inline int kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor(void)
>  {
> -	return cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR);
> +	switch (get_spectre_v2_workaround_state()) {
> +	case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_NEEDED:
> +		return KVM_BP_HARDEN_NEEDED;
> +	case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_MITIGATED:
> +		return KVM_BP_HARDEN_MITIGATED;
> +	case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN:
> +	default:
> +		return KVM_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN;
> +	}
>  }
>  
>  #define KVM_SSBD_UNKNOWN		-1
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> index a1f3188c7be0..7fa23ab09d4e 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> @@ -555,6 +555,17 @@ cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
>  static bool __hardenbp_enab = true;
>  static bool __spectrev2_safe = true;
>  
> +int get_spectre_v2_workaround_state(void)
> +{
> +	if (__spectrev2_safe)
> +		return ARM64_BP_HARDEN_MITIGATED;
> +
> +	if (!__hardenbp_enab)
> +		return ARM64_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN;
> +
> +	return ARM64_BP_HARDEN_NEEDED;
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * List of CPUs that do not need any Spectre-v2 mitigation at all.
>   */
> @@ -834,13 +845,15 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
>  ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
>  		char *buf)
>  {
> -	if (__spectrev2_safe)
> +	switch (get_spectre_v2_workaround_state()) {
> +	case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_MITIGATED:
>  		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");

Here "mitigated" means "not affected".

> -
> -	if (__hardenbp_enab)
> +        case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_NEEDED:
>  		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Branch predictor hardening\n");

And "harden needed" means mitigated.

> -
> -	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
> +        case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN:
> +	default:
> +		return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
> +	}
>  }
>  
>  ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
> diff --git a/virt/kvm/arm/psci.c b/virt/kvm/arm/psci.c
> index 34d08ee63747..1da53e0e38f7 100644
> --- a/virt/kvm/arm/psci.c
> +++ b/virt/kvm/arm/psci.c
> @@ -412,8 +412,16 @@ int kvm_hvc_call_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  		feature = smccc_get_arg1(vcpu);
>  		switch(feature) {
>  		case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1:
> -			if (kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor())
> +			switch (kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor()) {
> +			case KVM_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN:
> +				break;
> +			case KVM_BP_HARDEN_NEEDED:
>  				val = SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS;
> +				break;
> +			case KVM_BP_HARDEN_MITIGATED:
> +				val = SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED;

Would KVM_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED be a more logical name?

Steve

> +				break;
> +			}
>  			break;
>  		case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2:
>  			switch (kvm_arm_have_ssbd()) {
> 

_______________________________________________
kvmarm mailing list
kvmarm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm



[Index of Archives]     [Linux KVM]     [Spice Development]     [Libvirt]     [Libvirt Users]     [Linux USB Devel]     [Linux Audio Users]     [Yosemite News]     [Linux Kernel]     [Linux SCSI]

  Powered by Linux