Hi Marc,
On 05/22/2018 04:06 PM, Marc Zyngier wrote:
As for Spectre variant-2, we rely on SMCCC 1.1 to provide the
discovery mechanism for detecting the SSBD mitigation.
A new capability is also allocated for that purpose, and a
config option.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@xxxxxxx>
---
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 9 ++++++
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 3 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index eb2cf4938f6d..b2103b4df467 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -938,6 +938,15 @@ config HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS
If unsure, say Y.
+config ARM64_SSBD
+ bool "Speculative Store Bypass Disable" if EXPERT
+ default y
+ help
+ This enables mitigation of the bypassing of previous stores
+ by speculative loads.
+
+ If unsure, say Y.
+
menuconfig ARMV8_DEPRECATED
bool "Emulate deprecated/obsolete ARMv8 instructions"
depends on COMPAT
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
index bc51b72fafd4..5b2facf786ba 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
@@ -48,7 +48,8 @@
#define ARM64_HAS_CACHE_IDC 27
#define ARM64_HAS_CACHE_DIC 28
#define ARM64_HW_DBM 29
+#define ARM64_SSBD 30
NIT: Could you indent 30 the same way as the other number?
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx>
Cheers,
--
Julien Grall
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