On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 04:50:48PM +0000, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> We're now ready to map our vectors in weird and wonderful locations.
> On enabling ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS, a vector slots gets allocated
s/slots/slot/
> if this hasn't been already done via ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> and gets mapped outside of the normal RAM region, next to the
> idmap.
>
> That way, being able to obtain VBAR_EL2 doesn't reveal the mapping
> of the rest of the hypervisor code.
>
> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@xxxxxxx>
> ---
> Documentation/arm64/memory.txt | 3 +-
> arch/arm64/Kconfig | 16 +++++++++
> arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h | 5 ++-
> arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig | 2 +-
> arch/arm64/kvm/va_layout.c | 3 ++
> 6 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/arm64/memory.txt b/Documentation/arm64/memory.txt
> index c58cc5dbe667..c5dab30d3389 100644
> --- a/Documentation/arm64/memory.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/arm64/memory.txt
> @@ -90,7 +90,8 @@ When using KVM without the Virtualization Host Extensions, the
> hypervisor maps kernel pages in EL2 at a fixed (and potentially
> random) offset from the linear mapping. See the kern_hyp_va macro and
> kvm_update_va_mask function for more details. MMIO devices such as
> -GICv2 gets mapped next to the HYP idmap page.
> +GICv2 gets mapped next to the HYP idmap page, as do vectors when
> +ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS is selected for particular CPUs.
>
> When using KVM with the Virtualization Host Extensions, no additional
> mappings are created, since the host kernel runs directly in EL2.
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> index 7381eeb7ef8e..e6be4393aaad 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> @@ -904,6 +904,22 @@ config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
>
> If unsure, say Y.
>
> +config HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS
> + bool "Harden EL2 vector mapping against system register leak" if EXPERT
> + default y
> + help
> + Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can
> + be used to leak privileged information such as the vector base
> + register, resulting in a potential defeat of the EL2 layout
> + randomization.
> +
> + This config option will map the vectors to a fixed location,
> + independent of the EL2 code mapping, so that revealing VBAR_EL2
s/VBAR_EL2/the vector base register/ ?
> + to an attacker does no give away any extra information. This
s/no/not/
> + only gets enabled on affected CPUs.
> +
> + If unsure, say Y.
> +
> menuconfig ARMV8_DEPRECATED
> bool "Emulate deprecated/obsolete ARMv8 instructions"
> depends on COMPAT
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
> index 97af11065bbd..f936d0928661 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
> @@ -360,31 +360,91 @@ static inline unsigned int kvm_get_vmid_bits(void)
> return (cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(reg, ID_AA64MMFR1_VMIDBITS_SHIFT) == 2) ? 16 : 8;
> }
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS
> +/*
> + * EL2 vectors can be mapped and rerouted in a number of ways,
> + * depending on the kernel configuration and CPU present:
> + *
> + * - If the CPU has the ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR cap, the
> + * hardening sequence is placed in one of the vector slots, which is
> + * executed before jumping to the real vectors.
> + *
> + * - If the CPU has both the ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS and BP
^cap
Maybe s/BP hardening/the ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR cap/ ?
> + * hardening, the slot containing the hardening sequence is mapped
> + * next to the idmap page, and executed before jumping to the real
> + * vectors.
> + *
> + * - If the CPU only has ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS, then an empty slot
...has the ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS cap
Or maybe change the above ones from 'has the ... cap' to just 'has ...',
like this one.
> + * is selected, mapped next to the idmap page, and executed before
> + * jumping to the real vectors.
> + *
> + * Note that ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS is somewhat incompatible with
> + * VHE, as we don't have hypervisor-specific mappings. If the system
> + * is VHE and yet selects this capability, it will be ignored.
> + */
> #include <asm/mmu.h>
>
> +extern void *__kvm_bp_vect_base;
> +extern int __kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot;
> +
> static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
> {
> struct bp_hardening_data *data = arm64_get_bp_hardening_data();
> - void *vect = kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector);
> + void *vect = kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector));
> + int slot = -1;
>
> - if (data->fn) {
> - vect = __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start +
> - data->hyp_vectors_slot * SZ_2K;
> + if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) && data->fn) {
Now that I'm trying to consider heterogeneous systems, I'm wondering why
harden BP isn't checked with this_cpu_has_cap() like harden EL2 vectors.
I'm also wondering if it's even possible for CPUs to come up without all
of them having harden EL2 vectors if the boot CPU has it. Won't
verify_local_cpu_errata_workarounds() require it? I'm probably just
getting lost in all the capability stuff...
> + vect = __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start;
> + slot = data->hyp_vectors_slot;
> + }
>
> - if (!has_vhe())
> - vect = lm_alias(vect);
> + if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS) && !has_vhe()) {
> + vect = __kvm_bp_vect_base;
> + if (slot == -1)
> + slot = __kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot;
> }
>
> - vect = kern_hyp_va(vect);
> + if (slot != -1)
> + vect += slot * SZ_2K;
> +
> return vect;
> }
>
> +/* This is only called on a !VHE system */
> static inline int kvm_map_vectors(void)
> {
> + /*
> + * HBP = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> + * HLE2 = ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS
s/HLE2/HEL2/
> + *
> + * !HBP + !HEL2 -> use direct vectors
> + * HBP + !HEL2 -> use hardenned vectors in place
hardened
> + * !HBP + HEL2 -> allocate one vector slot and use exec mapping
> + * HBP + HEL2 -> use hardenned vertors and use exec mapping
hardened vectors
> + */
> + if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) {
> + __kvm_bp_vect_base = kvm_ksym_ref(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start);
> + __kvm_bp_vect_base = kern_hyp_va(__kvm_bp_vect_base);
> + }
> +
> + if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS)) {
What happened to this_cpu_has_cap()? Did we switch because this is only
running on the boot CPU?
> + phys_addr_t vect_pa = __pa_symbol(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start);
> + unsigned long size = (__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end -
> + __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start);
> +
> + /*
> + * Always allocate a spare vector slot, as we don't
> + * know yet which CPUs have a BP hardening slot that
> + * we can reuse.
> + */
> + __kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot = atomic_inc_return(&arm64_el2_vector_last_slot);
> + BUG_ON(__kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot >= BP_HARDEN_EL2_SLOTS);
> + return create_hyp_exec_mappings(vect_pa, size,
> + &__kvm_bp_vect_base);
> + }
> +
> return 0;
> }
> -
> #else
> static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
> {
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h
> index 3baf010fe883..0b0cc69031c1 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h
> @@ -51,10 +51,12 @@ struct bp_hardening_data {
> bp_hardening_cb_t fn;
> };
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> +#if (defined(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) || \
> + defined(CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS))
> extern char __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start[], __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end[];
> extern atomic_t arm64_el2_vector_last_slot;
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data);
>
> static inline struct bp_hardening_data *arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(void)
> @@ -81,6 +83,7 @@ static inline struct bp_hardening_data *arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(void)
>
> static inline void arm64_apply_bp_hardening(void) { }
> #endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
> +#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR || CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS */
>
> extern void paging_init(void);
> extern void bootmem_init(void);
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig
> index bd8cc03d7522..a2e3a5af1113 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig
> @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ config KVM_ARM_PMU
> virtual machines.
>
> config KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS
> - def_bool KVM && HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> + def_bool KVM && (HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR || HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS)
>
> source drivers/vhost/Kconfig
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/va_layout.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/va_layout.c
> index 9d35c17016ed..fd2d658a11b5 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/va_layout.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/va_layout.c
> @@ -151,6 +151,9 @@ void __init kvm_update_va_mask(struct alt_instr *alt,
> }
> }
>
> +void *__kvm_bp_vect_base;
> +int __kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot;
> +
> void kvm_patch_vector_branch(struct alt_instr *alt,
> __le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst)
> {
> --
> 2.14.2
>
Thanks,
drew
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