Re: [PATCH 2/4] arm64: alternatives: apply boot time fixups via the linear mapping

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On 10/02/17 17:16, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
One important rule of thumb when designing a secure software system is
that memory should never be writable and executable at the same time.
We mostly adhere to this rule in the kernel, except at boot time, when
regions may be mapped RWX until after we are done applying alternatives
or making other one-off changes.

For the alternative patching, we can improve the situation by applying
the fixups via the linear mapping, which is never mapped with executable
permissions. So map the linear alias of .text with RW- permissions
initially, and remove the write permissions as soon as alternative
patching has completed.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h    |  1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/alternative.c |  6 ++---
 arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c         |  1 +
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c             | 25 ++++++++++++++++----
 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h
index 47619411f0ff..5468c834b072 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h
@@ -37,5 +37,6 @@ extern void create_pgd_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, phys_addr_t phys,
 			       unsigned long virt, phys_addr_t size,
 			       pgprot_t prot, bool page_mappings_only);
 extern void *fixmap_remap_fdt(phys_addr_t dt_phys);
+extern void mark_linear_text_alias_ro(void);

 #endif
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/alternative.c
index 06d650f61da7..eacdbcc45630 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static void __apply_alternatives(void *alt_region)

 		pr_info_once("patching kernel code\n");

-		origptr = ALT_ORIG_PTR(alt);
+		origptr = lm_alias(ALT_ORIG_PTR(alt));
 		replptr = ALT_REPL_PTR(alt);
 		nr_inst = alt->alt_len / sizeof(insn);

Correct me if I am wrong, I think this would make "get_alt_insn" generate branch
instructions based on the  aliased linear mapped address, which could branch to linear
address of the branch target which doesn't have Execute permissions set.
I think we sould use ALT_ORIG_PTR(alt), instead of origptr for the calls to
get_alt_insn().

Suzuki


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