On 5/31/24 4:09 AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
On Fri, 31 May 2024 at 03:32, Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
This support allows the DRTM launch to be initiated after an EFI stub
launch of the Linux kernel is done. This is accomplished by providing
a handler to jump to when a Secure Launch is in progress. This has to be
called after the EFI stub does Exit Boot Services.
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
Just some minor remarks below. The overall approach in this patch
looks fine now.
---
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 98 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
index d5a8182cf2e1..a1143d006202 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/pci.h>
#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/slr_table.h>
+#include <linux/slaunch.h>
#include <asm/efi.h>
#include <asm/e820/types.h>
@@ -830,6 +832,97 @@ static efi_status_t efi_decompress_kernel(unsigned long *kernel_entry)
return efi_adjust_memory_range_protection(addr, kernel_text_size);
}
+#if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH))
IS_ENABLED() is mostly used for C conditionals not CPP ones.
It would be nice if this #if could be dropped, and replaced with ... (see below)
+static bool efi_secure_launch_update_boot_params(struct slr_table *slrt,
+ struct boot_params *boot_params)
+{
+ struct slr_entry_intel_info *txt_info;
+ struct slr_entry_policy *policy;
+ struct txt_os_mle_data *os_mle;
+ bool updated = false;
+ int i;
+
+ txt_info = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_INTEL_INFO);
+ if (!txt_info)
+ return false;
+
+ os_mle = txt_os_mle_data_start((void *)txt_info->txt_heap);
+ if (!os_mle)
+ return false;
+
+ os_mle->boot_params_addr = (u32)(u64)boot_params;
+
Why is this safe?
The size of the boot_params_addr is a holdover from the legacy boot
world when boot params were always loaded at a low address. We will
increase the size of the field.
+ policy = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_ENTRY_POLICY);
+ if (!policy)
+ return false;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < policy->nr_entries; i++) {
+ if (policy->policy_entries[i].entity_type == SLR_ET_BOOT_PARAMS) {
+ policy->policy_entries[i].entity = (u64)boot_params;
+ updated = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If this is a PE entry into EFI stub the mocked up boot params will
+ * be missing some of the setup header data needed for the second stage
+ * of the Secure Launch boot.
+ */
+ if (image) {
+ struct setup_header *hdr = (struct setup_header *)((u8 *)image->image_base + 0x1f1);
Could we use something other than a bare 0x1f1 constant here? struct
boot_params has a struct setup_header at the correct offset, so with
some casting of offsetof() use, we can make this look a lot more self
explanatory.
Yes we can do this.
+ u64 cmdline_ptr, hi_val;
+
+ boot_params->hdr.setup_sects = hdr->setup_sects;
+ boot_params->hdr.syssize = hdr->syssize;
+ boot_params->hdr.version = hdr->version;
+ boot_params->hdr.loadflags = hdr->loadflags;
+ boot_params->hdr.kernel_alignment = hdr->kernel_alignment;
+ boot_params->hdr.min_alignment = hdr->min_alignment;
+ boot_params->hdr.xloadflags = hdr->xloadflags;
+ boot_params->hdr.init_size = hdr->init_size;
+ boot_params->hdr.kernel_info_offset = hdr->kernel_info_offset;
+ hi_val = boot_params->ext_cmd_line_ptr;
We have efi_set_u64_split() for this.
Ok I will use that then.
+ cmdline_ptr = boot_params->hdr.cmd_line_ptr | hi_val << 32;
+ boot_params->hdr.cmdline_size = strlen((const char *)cmdline_ptr);;
+ }
+
+ return updated;
+}
+
+static void efi_secure_launch(struct boot_params *boot_params)
+{
+ struct slr_entry_dl_info *dlinfo;
+ efi_guid_t guid = SLR_TABLE_GUID;
+ dl_handler_func handler_callback;
+ struct slr_table *slrt;
+
... a C conditional here, e.g.,
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH))
return;
The difference is that all the code will get compile test coverage
every time, instead of only in configs that enable
CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH.
This significantly reduces the risk that your stuff will get broken
inadvertently.
Understood, I will address these as you suggest.
+ /*
+ * The presence of this table indicated a Secure Launch
+ * is being requested.
+ */
+ slrt = (struct slr_table *)get_efi_config_table(guid);
+ if (!slrt || slrt->magic != SLR_TABLE_MAGIC)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Since the EFI stub library creates its own boot_params on entry, the
+ * SLRT and TXT heap have to be updated with this version.
+ */
+ if (!efi_secure_launch_update_boot_params(slrt, boot_params))
+ return;
+
+ /* Jump through DL stub to initiate Secure Launch */
+ dlinfo = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_DL_INFO);
+
+ handler_callback = (dl_handler_func)dlinfo->dl_handler;
+
+ handler_callback(&dlinfo->bl_context);
+
+ unreachable();
+}
+#endif
+
static void __noreturn enter_kernel(unsigned long kernel_addr,
struct boot_params *boot_params)
{
@@ -957,6 +1050,11 @@ void __noreturn efi_stub_entry(efi_handle_t handle,
goto fail;
}
+#if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH))
... and drop this #if as well.
Yes.
Thanks
Ross
+ /* If a Secure Launch is in progress, this never returns */
+ efi_secure_launch(boot_params);
+#endif
+
/*
* Call the SEV init code while still running with the firmware's
* GDT/IDT, so #VC exceptions will be handled by EFI.
--
2.39.3
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