On Fri, 31 May 2024 at 13:00, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > Hello Ross, > > On Fri, 31 May 2024 at 03:32, Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > The Secure Launch (SL) stub provides the entry point for Intel TXT (and > > later AMD SKINIT) to vector to during the late launch. The symbol > > sl_stub_entry is that entry point and its offset into the kernel is > > conveyed to the launching code using the MLE (Measured Launch > > Environment) header in the structure named mle_header. The offset of the > > MLE header is set in the kernel_info. The routine sl_stub contains the > > very early late launch setup code responsible for setting up the basic > > environment to allow the normal kernel startup_32 code to proceed. It is > > also responsible for properly waking and handling the APs on Intel > > platforms. The routine sl_main which runs after entering 64b mode is > > responsible for measuring configuration and module information before > > it is used like the boot params, the kernel command line, the TXT heap, > > an external initramfs, etc. > > > > Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx> > > --- > > Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst | 21 + > > arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 3 +- > > arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 30 + > > arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S | 34 ++ > > arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c | 577 ++++++++++++++++++++ > > arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S | 725 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 5 + > > arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 1 + > > arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 20 + > > 9 files changed, 1415 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c > > create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst > > index 4fd492cb4970..295cdf9bcbdb 100644 > > --- a/Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst > > +++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst > > @@ -482,6 +482,14 @@ Protocol: 2.00+ > > - If 1, KASLR enabled. > > - If 0, KASLR disabled. > > > > + Bit 2 (kernel internal): SLAUNCH_FLAG > > + > > + - Used internally by the setup kernel to communicate > > + Secure Launch status to kernel proper. > > + > > + - If 1, Secure Launch enabled. > > + - If 0, Secure Launch disabled. > > + > > Bit 5 (write): QUIET_FLAG > > > > - If 0, print early messages. > > @@ -1028,6 +1036,19 @@ Offset/size: 0x000c/4 > > > > This field contains maximal allowed type for setup_data and setup_indirect structs. > > > > +============ ================= > > +Field name: mle_header_offset > > +Offset/size: 0x0010/4 > > +============ ================= > > + > > + This field contains the offset to the Secure Launch Measured Launch Environment > > + (MLE) header. This offset is used to locate information needed during a secure > > + late launch using Intel TXT. If the offset is zero, the kernel does not have > > + Secure Launch capabilities. The MLE entry point is called from TXT on the BSP > > + following a success measured launch. The specific state of the processors is > > + outlined in the TXT Software Development Guide, the latest can be found here: > > + https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/guides/intel-txt-software-development-guide.pdf > > + > > > > Could we just repaint this field as the offset relative to the start > of kernel_info rather than relative to the start of the image? That > way, there is no need for patch #1, and given that the consumer of > this field accesses it via kernel_info, I wouldn't expect any issues > in applying this offset to obtain the actual address. > > > > The Image Checksum > > ================== > > diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile > > index 9189a0e28686..9076a248d4b4 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile > > +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile > > @@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI) += $(obj)/efi.o > > vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI_MIXED) += $(obj)/efi_mixed.o > > vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI_STUB) += $(objtree)/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/lib.a > > > > -vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH) += $(obj)/early_sha1.o $(obj)/early_sha256.o > > +vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH) += $(obj)/early_sha1.o $(obj)/early_sha256.o \ > > + $(obj)/sl_main.o $(obj)/sl_stub.o > > > > $(obj)/vmlinux: $(vmlinux-objs-y) FORCE > > $(call if_changed,ld) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S > > index 1dcb794c5479..803c9e2e6d85 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S > > +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S > > @@ -420,6 +420,13 @@ SYM_CODE_START(startup_64) > > pushq $0 > > popfq > > > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH > > + /* Ensure the relocation region is coverd by a PMR */ > > covered > > > + movq %rbx, %rdi > > + movl $(_bss - startup_32), %esi > > + callq sl_check_region > > +#endif > > + > > /* > > * Copy the compressed kernel to the end of our buffer > > * where decompression in place becomes safe. > > @@ -462,6 +469,29 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(.Lrelocated) > > shrq $3, %rcx > > rep stosq > > > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH > > + /* > > + * Have to do the final early sl stub work in 64b area. > > + * > > + * *********** NOTE *********** > > + * > > + * Several boot params get used before we get a chance to measure > > + * them in this call. This is a known issue and we currently don't > > + * have a solution. The scratch field doesn't matter. There is no > > + * obvious way to do anything about the use of kernel_alignment or > > + * init_size though these seem low risk with all the PMR and overlap > > + * checks in place. > > + */ > > + movq %r15, %rdi > > + callq sl_main > > + > > + /* Ensure the decompression location is covered by a PMR */ > > + movq %rbp, %rdi > > + movq output_len(%rip), %rsi > > + callq sl_check_region > > +#endif > > + > > + pushq %rsi > > This looks like a rebase error. > > > call load_stage2_idt > > > > /* Pass boot_params to initialize_identity_maps() */ > > diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S > > index c18f07181dd5..e199b87764e9 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S > > +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S > > @@ -28,6 +28,40 @@ SYM_DATA_START(kernel_info) > > /* Maximal allowed type for setup_data and setup_indirect structs. */ > > .long SETUP_TYPE_MAX > > > > + /* Offset to the MLE header structure */ > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH) > > + .long rva(mle_header) > > ... so this could just be mle_header - kernel_info, and the consumer > can do the math instead. > > > +#else > > + .long 0 > > +#endif > > + > > kernel_info_var_len_data: > > /* Empty for time being... */ > > SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(kernel_info, SYM_L_LOCAL, kernel_info_end) > > + > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH) > > + /* > > + * The MLE Header per the TXT Specification, section 2.1 > > + * MLE capabilities, see table 4. Capabilities set: > > + * bit 0: Support for GETSEC[WAKEUP] for RLP wakeup > > + * bit 1: Support for RLP wakeup using MONITOR address > > + * bit 2: The ECX register will contain the pointer to the MLE page table > > + * bit 5: TPM 1.2 family: Details/authorities PCR usage support > > + * bit 9: Supported format of TPM 2.0 event log - TCG compliant > > + */ > > +SYM_DATA_START(mle_header) > > + .long 0x9082ac5a /* UUID0 */ > > + .long 0x74a7476f /* UUID1 */ > > + .long 0xa2555c0f /* UUID2 */ > > + .long 0x42b651cb /* UUID3 */ > > + .long 0x00000034 /* MLE header size */ > > + .long 0x00020002 /* MLE version 2.2 */ > > + .long rva(sl_stub_entry) /* Linear entry point of MLE (virt. address) */ > > and these should perhaps be relative to mle_header? > > > + .long 0x00000000 /* First valid page of MLE */ > > + .long 0x00000000 /* Offset within binary of first byte of MLE */ > > + .long rva(_edata) /* Offset within binary of last byte + 1 of MLE */ > > and here > Ugh never mind - these are specified externally. _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
