On Wed, 14 Feb 2024 at 23:32, Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > The Secure Launch (SL) stub provides the entry point for Intel TXT (and > later AMD SKINIT) to vector to during the late launch. The symbol > sl_stub_entry is that entry point and its offset into the kernel is > conveyed to the launching code using the MLE (Measured Launch > Environment) header in the structure named mle_header. The offset of the > MLE header is set in the kernel_info. The routine sl_stub contains the > very early late launch setup code responsible for setting up the basic > environment to allow the normal kernel startup_32 code to proceed. It is > also responsible for properly waking and handling the APs on Intel > platforms. The routine sl_main which runs after entering 64b mode is > responsible for measuring configuration and module information before > it is used like the boot params, the kernel command line, the TXT heap, > an external initramfs, etc. > > Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx> > --- > Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst | 21 + > arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 3 +- > arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 34 ++ > arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S | 34 ++ > arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c | 582 ++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S | 705 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 5 + > arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 1 + > arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 20 + > 9 files changed, 1404 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c > create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S > > diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst > index c513855a54bb..ce6a51c6d4e7 100644 > --- a/Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst > +++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst > @@ -482,6 +482,14 @@ Protocol: 2.00+ > - If 1, KASLR enabled. > - If 0, KASLR disabled. > > + Bit 2 (kernel internal): SLAUNCH_FLAG > + > + - Used internally by the compressed kernel to communicate decompressor > + Secure Launch status to kernel proper. > + > + - If 1, Secure Launch enabled. > + - If 0, Secure Launch disabled. > + > Bit 5 (write): QUIET_FLAG > > - If 0, print early messages. > @@ -1027,6 +1035,19 @@ Offset/size: 0x000c/4 > > This field contains maximal allowed type for setup_data and setup_indirect structs. > > +============ ================= > +Field name: mle_header_offset > +Offset/size: 0x0010/4 > +============ ================= > + > + This field contains the offset to the Secure Launch Measured Launch Environment > + (MLE) header. This offset is used to locate information needed during a secure > + late launch using Intel TXT. If the offset is zero, the kernel does not have > + Secure Launch capabilities. The MLE entry point is called from TXT on the BSP > + following a success measured launch. The specific state of the processors is > + outlined in the TXT Software Development Guide, the latest can be found here: > + https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/guides/intel-txt-software-development-guide.pdf > + > > The Image Checksum > ================== > diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile > index a1b018eb9801..012f7ca780c3 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile > +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile > @@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI) += $(obj)/efi.o > vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI_MIXED) += $(obj)/efi_mixed.o > vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI_STUB) += $(objtree)/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/lib.a > > -vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH) += $(obj)/early_sha1.o $(obj)/early_sha256.o > +vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH) += $(obj)/early_sha1.o $(obj)/early_sha256.o \ > + $(obj)/sl_main.o $(obj)/sl_stub.o > > $(obj)/vmlinux: $(vmlinux-objs-y) FORCE > $(call if_changed,ld) > diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S > index bf4a10a5794f..6fa5bb87195b 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S > +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S > @@ -415,6 +415,17 @@ SYM_CODE_START(startup_64) > pushq $0 > popfq > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH > + pushq %rsi > + This push and the associated pop are no longer needed. > + /* Ensure the relocation region coverd by a PMR */ 'is covered' > + movq %rbx, %rdi > + movl $(_bss - startup_32), %esi > + callq sl_check_region > + > + popq %rsi > +#endif > + > /* > * Copy the compressed kernel to the end of our buffer > * where decompression in place becomes safe. > @@ -457,6 +468,29 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(.Lrelocated) > shrq $3, %rcx > rep stosq > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH > + /* > + * Have to do the final early sl stub work in 64b area. > + * > + * *********** NOTE *********** > + * > + * Several boot params get used before we get a chance to measure > + * them in this call. This is a known issue and we currently don't > + * have a solution. The scratch field doesn't matter. There is no > + * obvious way to do anything about the use of kernel_alignment or > + * init_size though these seem low risk with all the PMR and overlap > + * checks in place. > + */ > + movq %r15, %rdi > + callq sl_main > + > + /* Ensure the decompression location is coverd by a PMR */ covered > + movq %rbp, %rdi > + movq output_len(%rip), %rsi > + callq sl_check_region > +#endif > + > + pushq %rsi > call load_stage2_idt > > /* Pass boot_params to initialize_identity_maps() */ > diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S > index c18f07181dd5..e199b87764e9 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S > +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S > @@ -28,6 +28,40 @@ SYM_DATA_START(kernel_info) > /* Maximal allowed type for setup_data and setup_indirect structs. */ > .long SETUP_TYPE_MAX > > + /* Offset to the MLE header structure */ > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH) > + .long rva(mle_header) > +#else > + .long 0 > +#endif > + > kernel_info_var_len_data: > /* Empty for time being... */ > SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(kernel_info, SYM_L_LOCAL, kernel_info_end) > + > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH) > + /* > + * The MLE Header per the TXT Specification, section 2.1 > + * MLE capabilities, see table 4. Capabilities set: > + * bit 0: Support for GETSEC[WAKEUP] for RLP wakeup > + * bit 1: Support for RLP wakeup using MONITOR address > + * bit 2: The ECX register will contain the pointer to the MLE page table > + * bit 5: TPM 1.2 family: Details/authorities PCR usage support > + * bit 9: Supported format of TPM 2.0 event log - TCG compliant > + */ > +SYM_DATA_START(mle_header) > + .long 0x9082ac5a /* UUID0 */ > + .long 0x74a7476f /* UUID1 */ > + .long 0xa2555c0f /* UUID2 */ > + .long 0x42b651cb /* UUID3 */ > + .long 0x00000034 /* MLE header size */ > + .long 0x00020002 /* MLE version 2.2 */ > + .long rva(sl_stub_entry) /* Linear entry point of MLE (virt. address) */ > + .long 0x00000000 /* First valid page of MLE */ > + .long 0x00000000 /* Offset within binary of first byte of MLE */ > + .long rva(_edata) /* Offset within binary of last byte + 1 of MLE */ > + .long 0x00000227 /* Bit vector of MLE-supported capabilities */ > + .long 0x00000000 /* Starting linear address of command line (unused) */ > + .long 0x00000000 /* Ending linear address of command line (unused) */ > +SYM_DATA_END(mle_header) > +#endif > diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..cd9e5c1f1719 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c > @@ -0,0 +1,582 @@ > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 > +/* > + * Secure Launch early measurement and validation routines. > + * > + * Copyright (c) 2022, Oracle and/or its affiliates. > + */ > + > +#include <linux/init.h> > +#include <linux/string.h> > +#include <linux/linkage.h> > +#include <asm/segment.h> > +#include <asm/boot.h> > +#include <asm/msr.h> > +#include <asm/mtrr.h> > +#include <asm/processor-flags.h> > +#include <asm/asm-offsets.h> > +#include <asm/bootparam.h> > +#include <asm/bootparam_utils.h> > +#include <linux/slr_table.h> > +#include <linux/slaunch.h> > +#include <crypto/sha1.h> > +#include <crypto/sha2.h> > + > +#define CAPS_VARIABLE_MTRR_COUNT_MASK 0xff > + > +#define SL_TPM12_LOG 1 > +#define SL_TPM20_LOG 2 > + > +#define SL_TPM20_MAX_ALGS 2 > + > +#define SL_MAX_EVENT_DATA 64 > +#define SL_TPM12_LOG_SIZE (sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event) + \ > + SL_MAX_EVENT_DATA) > +#define SL_TPM20_LOG_SIZE (sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event2_head) + \ > + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + \ > + sizeof(struct tcg_event_field) + \ > + SL_MAX_EVENT_DATA) > + > +static void *evtlog_base; > +static u32 evtlog_size; > +static struct txt_heap_event_log_pointer2_1_element *log20_elem; > +static u32 tpm_log_ver = SL_TPM12_LOG; > +static struct tcg_efi_specid_event_algs tpm_algs[SL_TPM20_MAX_ALGS] = {0}; > + > +extern u32 sl_cpu_type; > +extern u32 sl_mle_start; > + > +static u64 sl_txt_read(u32 reg) > +{ > + return readq((void *)(u64)(TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + reg)); > +} > + > +static void sl_txt_write(u32 reg, u64 val) > +{ > + writeq(val, (void *)(u64)(TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + reg)); > +} > + > +static void __noreturn sl_txt_reset(u64 error) > +{ > + /* Reading the E2STS register acts as a barrier for TXT registers */ > + sl_txt_write(TXT_CR_ERRORCODE, error); > + sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_E2STS); > + sl_txt_write(TXT_CR_CMD_UNLOCK_MEM_CONFIG, 1); > + sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_E2STS); > + sl_txt_write(TXT_CR_CMD_RESET, 1); > + > + for ( ; ; ) > + asm volatile ("hlt"); > + > + unreachable(); > +} > + > +static u64 sl_rdmsr(u32 reg) > +{ > + u64 lo, hi; > + > + asm volatile ("rdmsr" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi) : "c" (reg)); > + No need for volatile. > + return (hi << 32) | lo; > +} > + > +static struct slr_table *sl_locate_and_validate_slrt(void) > +{ > + struct txt_os_mle_data *os_mle_data; > + struct slr_table *slrt; > + void *txt_heap; > + > + txt_heap = (void *)sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE); > + os_mle_data = txt_os_mle_data_start(txt_heap); > + > + if (!os_mle_data->slrt) > + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_INVALID_SLRT); > + > + slrt = (struct slr_table *)os_mle_data->slrt; > + > + if (slrt->magic != SLR_TABLE_MAGIC) > + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_INVALID_SLRT); > + > + if (slrt->architecture != SLR_INTEL_TXT) > + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_INVALID_SLRT); > + > + return slrt; > +} > + > +static void sl_check_pmr_coverage(void *base, u32 size, bool allow_hi) > +{ > + struct txt_os_sinit_data *os_sinit_data; > + void *end = base + size; > + void *txt_heap; > + > + if (!(sl_cpu_type & SL_CPU_INTEL)) > + return; > + > + txt_heap = (void *)sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE); > + os_sinit_data = txt_os_sinit_data_start(txt_heap); > + > + if ((end >= (void *)0x100000000ULL) && (base < (void *)0x100000000ULL)) > + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_REGION_STRADDLE_4GB); > + > + /* > + * Note that the late stub code validates that the hi PMR covers > + * all memory above 4G. At this point the code can only check that > + * regions are within the hi PMR but that is sufficient. > + */ > + if ((end > (void *)0x100000000ULL) && (base >= (void *)0x100000000ULL)) { > + if (allow_hi) { > + if (end >= (void *)(os_sinit_data->vtd_pmr_hi_base + > + os_sinit_data->vtd_pmr_hi_size)) > + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_BUFFER_BEYOND_PMR); > + } else { > + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_REGION_ABOVE_4GB); > + } > + } > + > + if (end >= (void *)os_sinit_data->vtd_pmr_lo_size) > + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_BUFFER_BEYOND_PMR); > +} > + > +/* > + * Some MSRs are modified by the pre-launch code including the MTRRs. > + * The early MLE code has to restore these values. This code validates > + * the values after they are measured. > + */ > +static void sl_txt_validate_msrs(struct txt_os_mle_data *os_mle_data) > +{ > + struct slr_txt_mtrr_state *saved_bsp_mtrrs; > + u64 mtrr_caps, mtrr_def_type, mtrr_var; > + struct slr_entry_intel_info *txt_info; > + u64 misc_en_msr; > + u32 vcnt, i; > + > + txt_info = (struct slr_entry_intel_info *)os_mle_data->txt_info; > + saved_bsp_mtrrs = &txt_info->saved_bsp_mtrrs; > + > + mtrr_caps = sl_rdmsr(MSR_MTRRcap); > + vcnt = (u32)(mtrr_caps & CAPS_VARIABLE_MTRR_COUNT_MASK); > + > + if (saved_bsp_mtrrs->mtrr_vcnt > vcnt) > + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MTRR_INV_VCNT); > + if (saved_bsp_mtrrs->mtrr_vcnt > TXT_OS_MLE_MAX_VARIABLE_MTRRS) > + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MTRR_INV_VCNT); > + > + mtrr_def_type = sl_rdmsr(MSR_MTRRdefType); > + if (saved_bsp_mtrrs->default_mem_type != mtrr_def_type) > + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MTRR_INV_DEF_TYPE); > + > + for (i = 0; i < saved_bsp_mtrrs->mtrr_vcnt; i++) { > + mtrr_var = sl_rdmsr(MTRRphysBase_MSR(i)); > + if (saved_bsp_mtrrs->mtrr_pair[i].mtrr_physbase != mtrr_var) > + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MTRR_INV_BASE); > + mtrr_var = sl_rdmsr(MTRRphysMask_MSR(i)); > + if (saved_bsp_mtrrs->mtrr_pair[i].mtrr_physmask != mtrr_var) > + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MTRR_INV_MASK); > + } > + > + misc_en_msr = sl_rdmsr(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE); > + if (txt_info->saved_misc_enable_msr != misc_en_msr) > + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MSR_INV_MISC_EN); > +} > + > +static void sl_find_drtm_event_log(struct slr_table *slrt) > +{ > + struct txt_os_sinit_data *os_sinit_data; > + struct slr_entry_log_info *log_info; > + void *txt_heap; > + > + log_info = (struct slr_entry_log_info *) > + slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_LOG_INFO); > + if (!log_info) > + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_SLRT_MISSING_ENTRY); > + > + evtlog_base = (void *)log_info->addr; > + evtlog_size = log_info->size; > + > + txt_heap = (void *)sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE); > + > + /* > + * For TPM 2.0, the event log 2.1 extended data structure has to also > + * be located and fixed up. > + */ > + os_sinit_data = txt_os_sinit_data_start(txt_heap); > + > + /* > + * Only support version 6 and later that properly handle the > + * list of ExtDataElements in the OS-SINIT structure. > + */ > + if (os_sinit_data->version < 6) > + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_OS_SINIT_BAD_VERSION); > + > + /* Find the TPM2.0 logging extended heap element */ > + log20_elem = tpm20_find_log2_1_element(os_sinit_data); > + > + /* If found, this implies TPM20 log and family */ > + if (log20_elem) > + tpm_log_ver = SL_TPM20_LOG; > +} > + > +static void sl_validate_event_log_buffer(void) > +{ > + struct txt_os_sinit_data *os_sinit_data; > + void *txt_heap, *txt_end; > + void *mle_base, *mle_end; > + void *evtlog_end; > + > + if ((u64)evtlog_size > (LLONG_MAX - (u64)evtlog_base)) > + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_INTEGER_OVERFLOW); > + evtlog_end = evtlog_base + evtlog_size; > + > + txt_heap = (void *)sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE); > + txt_end = txt_heap + sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_SIZE); > + os_sinit_data = txt_os_sinit_data_start(txt_heap); > + > + mle_base = (void *)(u64)sl_mle_start; > + mle_end = mle_base + os_sinit_data->mle_size; > + > + /* > + * This check is to ensure the event log buffer does not overlap with > + * the MLE image. > + */ > + if (evtlog_base >= mle_end && evtlog_end > mle_end) > + goto pmr_check; /* above */ > + > + if (evtlog_end <= mle_base && evtlog_base < mle_base) > + goto pmr_check; /* below */ > + > + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MLE_BUFFER_OVERLAP); > + > +pmr_check: > + /* > + * The TXT heap is protected by the DPR. If the TPM event log is > + * inside the TXT heap, there is no need for a PMR check. > + */ > + if (evtlog_base > txt_heap && evtlog_end < txt_end) > + return; > + > + sl_check_pmr_coverage(evtlog_base, evtlog_size, true); > +} > + > +static void sl_find_event_log_algorithms(void) > +{ > + struct tcg_efi_specid_event_head *efi_head = > + (struct tcg_efi_specid_event_head *)(evtlog_base + > + log20_elem->first_record_offset + > + sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event)); > + > + if (efi_head->num_algs == 0 || efi_head->num_algs > 2) > + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_TPM_NUMBER_ALGS); > + > + memcpy(&tpm_algs[0], &efi_head->digest_sizes[0], > + sizeof(struct tcg_efi_specid_event_algs) * efi_head->num_algs); > +} > + > +static void sl_tpm12_log_event(u32 pcr, u32 event_type, > + const u8 *data, u32 length, > + const u8 *event_data, u32 event_size) > +{ > + u8 sha1_hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE] = {0}; > + u8 log_buf[SL_TPM12_LOG_SIZE] = {0}; > + struct tcg_pcr_event *pcr_event; > + u32 total_size; > + > + pcr_event = (struct tcg_pcr_event *)log_buf; > + pcr_event->pcr_idx = pcr; > + pcr_event->event_type = event_type; > + if (length > 0) { > + sha1(data, length, &sha1_hash[0]); > + memcpy(&pcr_event->digest[0], &sha1_hash[0], SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); > + } > + pcr_event->event_size = event_size; > + if (event_size > 0) > + memcpy((u8 *)pcr_event + sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event), > + event_data, event_size); > + > + total_size = sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event) + event_size; > + > + if (tpm12_log_event(evtlog_base, evtlog_size, total_size, pcr_event)) > + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_TPM_LOGGING_FAILED); > +} > + > +static void sl_tpm20_log_event(u32 pcr, u32 event_type, > + const u8 *data, u32 length, > + const u8 *event_data, u32 event_size) > +{ > + u8 sha256_hash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE] = {0}; > + u8 sha1_hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE] = {0}; > + u8 log_buf[SL_TPM20_LOG_SIZE] = {0}; > + struct sha256_state sctx256 = {0}; > + struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *head; > + struct tcg_event_field *event; > + u32 total_size; > + u16 *alg_ptr; > + u8 *dgst_ptr; > + > + head = (struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *)log_buf; > + head->pcr_idx = pcr; > + head->event_type = event_type; > + total_size = sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event2_head); > + alg_ptr = (u16 *)(log_buf + sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event2_head)); > + > + for ( ; head->count < 2; head->count++) { > + if (!tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id) > + break; > + > + *alg_ptr = tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id; > + dgst_ptr = (u8 *)alg_ptr + sizeof(u16); > + > + if (tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id == TPM_ALG_SHA256 && > + length) { > + sha256_init(&sctx256); > + sha256_update(&sctx256, data, length); > + sha256_final(&sctx256, &sha256_hash[0]); > + } else if (tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id == TPM_ALG_SHA1 && > + length) { > + sha1(data, length, &sha1_hash[0]); > + } > + > + if (tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id == TPM_ALG_SHA256) { > + memcpy(dgst_ptr, &sha256_hash[0], SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); > + total_size += SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + sizeof(u16); > + alg_ptr = (u16 *)((u8 *)alg_ptr + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + sizeof(u16)); > + } else if (tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id == TPM_ALG_SHA1) { > + memcpy(dgst_ptr, &sha1_hash[0], SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); > + total_size += SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + sizeof(u16); > + alg_ptr = (u16 *)((u8 *)alg_ptr + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + sizeof(u16)); > + } else { > + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_TPM_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); > + } > + } > + > + event = (struct tcg_event_field *)(log_buf + total_size); > + event->event_size = event_size; > + if (event_size > 0) > + memcpy((u8 *)event + sizeof(struct tcg_event_field), event_data, event_size); > + total_size += sizeof(struct tcg_event_field) + event_size; > + > + if (tpm20_log_event(log20_elem, evtlog_base, evtlog_size, total_size, &log_buf[0])) > + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_TPM_LOGGING_FAILED); > +} > + > +static void sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(u32 pcr, u32 type, > + const u8 *data, u32 length, const char *desc) > +{ > + if (tpm_log_ver == SL_TPM20_LOG) > + sl_tpm20_log_event(pcr, type, data, length, > + (const u8 *)desc, strlen(desc)); > + else > + sl_tpm12_log_event(pcr, type, data, length, > + (const u8 *)desc, strlen(desc)); > +} > + > +static struct setup_data *sl_handle_setup_data(struct setup_data *curr, > + struct slr_policy_entry *entry) > +{ > + struct setup_indirect *ind; > + struct setup_data *next; > + > + if (!curr) > + return NULL; > + > + next = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)curr->next; > + > + /* SETUP_INDIRECT instances have to be handled differently */ > + if (curr->type == SETUP_INDIRECT) { > + ind = (struct setup_indirect *)((u8 *)curr + offsetof(struct setup_data, data)); > + > + sl_check_pmr_coverage((void *)ind->addr, ind->len, true); > + > + sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(entry->pcr, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH, > + (void *)ind->addr, ind->len, > + entry->evt_info); > + > + return next; > + } > + > + sl_check_pmr_coverage(((u8 *)curr) + sizeof(struct setup_data), > + curr->len, true); > + > + sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(entry->pcr, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH, > + ((u8 *)curr) + sizeof(struct setup_data), > + curr->len, > + entry->evt_info); > + > + return next; > +} > + > +static void sl_extend_setup_data(struct slr_policy_entry *entry) > +{ > + struct setup_data *data; > + > + /* > + * Measuring the boot params measured the fixed e820 memory map. > + * Measure any setup_data entries including e820 extended entries. > + */ > + data = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)entry->entity; > + while (data) > + data = sl_handle_setup_data(data, entry); > +} > + > +static void sl_extend_slrt(struct slr_policy_entry *entry) > +{ > + struct slr_table *slrt = (struct slr_table *)entry->entity; > + struct slr_entry_intel_info *intel_info; > + > + /* > + * In revision one of the SLRT, the only table that needs to be > + * measured is the Intel info table. Everything else is meta-data, > + * addresses and sizes. Note the size of what to measure is not set. > + * The flag SLR_POLICY_IMPLICIT_SIZE leaves it to the measuring code > + * to sort out. > + */ > + if (slrt->revision == 1) { > + intel_info = (struct slr_entry_intel_info *)slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_INTEL_INFO); > + if (!intel_info) > + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_SLRT_MISSING_ENTRY); > + > + sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(entry->pcr, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH, > + (void *)entry->entity, sizeof(struct slr_entry_intel_info), > + entry->evt_info); > + } > +} > + > +static void sl_extend_txt_os2mle(struct slr_policy_entry *entry) > +{ > + struct txt_os_mle_data *os_mle_data; > + void *txt_heap; > + > + txt_heap = (void *)sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE); > + os_mle_data = txt_os_mle_data_start(txt_heap); > + > + /* > + * Version 1 of the OS-MLE heap structure has no fields to measure. It just > + * has addresses and sizes and a scratch buffer. > + */ > + if (os_mle_data->version == 1) > + return; > +} > + > +static void sl_process_extend_policy(struct slr_table *slrt) > +{ > + struct slr_entry_policy *policy; > + struct slr_policy_entry *entry; > + u16 i; > + > + policy = (struct slr_entry_policy *)slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_ENTRY_POLICY); > + if (!policy) > + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_SLRT_MISSING_ENTRY); > + > + entry = (struct slr_policy_entry *)((u8 *)policy + sizeof(*policy)); > + > + for (i = 0; i < policy->nr_entries; i++, entry++) { > + switch (entry->entity_type) { > + case SLR_ET_SETUP_DATA: > + sl_extend_setup_data(entry); > + break; > + case SLR_ET_SLRT: > + sl_extend_slrt(entry); > + break; > + case SLR_ET_TXT_OS2MLE: > + sl_extend_txt_os2mle(entry); > + break; > + case SLR_ET_UNUSED: > + continue; > + default: > + sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(entry->pcr, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH, > + (void *)entry->entity, entry->size, > + entry->evt_info); > + } > + } > +} > + > +static void sl_process_extend_uefi_config(struct slr_table *slrt) > +{ > + struct slr_entry_uefi_config *uefi_config; > + struct slr_uefi_cfg_entry *uefi_entry; > + u64 i; > + > + uefi_config =(struct slr_entry_uefi_config *)slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_UEFI_CONFIG); > + > + /* Optionally here depending on how SL kernel was booted */ > + if (!uefi_config) > + return; > + > + uefi_entry = (struct slr_uefi_cfg_entry *)((u8 *)uefi_config + sizeof(*uefi_config)); > + > + for (i = 0; i < uefi_config->nr_entries; i++, uefi_entry++) { > + sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(uefi_entry->pcr, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH, > + (void *)uefi_entry->cfg, uefi_entry->size, > + uefi_entry->evt_info); > + } > +} > + > +asmlinkage __visible void sl_check_region(void *base, u32 size) > +{ > + sl_check_pmr_coverage(base, size, false); > +} > + > +asmlinkage __visible void sl_main(void *bootparams) > +{ > + struct boot_params *bp = (struct boot_params *)bootparams; > + struct txt_os_mle_data *os_mle_data; > + struct slr_table *slrt; > + void *txt_heap; > + > + /* > + * Ensure loadflags do not indicate a secure launch was done > + * unless it really was. > + */ > + bp->hdr.loadflags &= ~SLAUNCH_FLAG; > + > + /* > + * Currently only Intel TXT is supported for Secure Launch. Testing > + * this value also indicates that the kernel was booted successfully > + * through the Secure Launch entry point and is in SMX mode. > + */ > + if (!(sl_cpu_type & SL_CPU_INTEL)) > + return; > + > + slrt = sl_locate_and_validate_slrt(); > + > + /* Locate the TPM event log. */ > + sl_find_drtm_event_log(slrt); > + > + /* Validate the location of the event log buffer before using it */ > + sl_validate_event_log_buffer(); > + > + /* > + * Find the TPM hash algorithms used by the ACM and recorded in the > + * event log. > + */ > + if (tpm_log_ver == SL_TPM20_LOG) > + sl_find_event_log_algorithms(); > + > + /* > + * Sanitize them before measuring. Set the SLAUNCH_FLAG early since if > + * anything fails, the system will reset anyway. > + */ > + sanitize_boot_params(bp); > + bp->hdr.loadflags |= SLAUNCH_FLAG; > + > + sl_check_pmr_coverage(bootparams, PAGE_SIZE, false); > + > + /* Place event log SL specific tags before and after measurements */ > + sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(17, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH_START, NULL, 0, ""); > + > + /* Process all policy entries and extend the measurements to the evtlog */ > + sl_process_extend_policy(slrt); > + > + /* Process all EFI config entries and extend the measurements to the evtlog */ > + sl_process_extend_uefi_config(slrt); > + > + sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(17, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH_END, NULL, 0, ""); > + > + /* No PMR check is needed, the TXT heap is covered by the DPR */ > + txt_heap = (void *)sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE); > + os_mle_data = txt_os_mle_data_start(txt_heap); > + > + /* > + * Now that the OS-MLE data is measured, ensure the MTRR and > + * misc enable MSRs are what we expect. > + */ > + sl_txt_validate_msrs(os_mle_data); > +} > diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..42a7436cf2ee > --- /dev/null > +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S > @@ -0,0 +1,705 @@ > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ > + > +/* > + * Secure Launch protected mode entry point. > + * > + * Copyright (c) 2022, Oracle and/or its affiliates. > + */ > + .code32 > + .text > +#include <linux/linkage.h> > +#include <asm/segment.h> > +#include <asm/msr.h> > +#include <asm/apicdef.h> > +#include <asm/trapnr.h> > +#include <asm/processor-flags.h> > +#include <asm/asm-offsets.h> > +#include <asm/bootparam.h> > +#include <asm/page_types.h> > +#include <asm/irq_vectors.h> > +#include <linux/slr_table.h> > +#include <linux/slaunch.h> > + > +/* CPUID: leaf 1, ECX, SMX feature bit */ > +#define X86_FEATURE_BIT_SMX (1 << 6) > + > +#define IDT_VECTOR_LO_BITS 0 > +#define IDT_VECTOR_HI_BITS 6 > + > +/* > + * See the comment in head_64.S for detailed information on what this macro > + * and others like it are used for. The comment appears right at the top of > + * the file. > + */ > +#define rva(X) ((X) - sl_stub_entry) > + > +/* > + * The GETSEC op code is open coded because older versions of > + * GCC do not support the getsec mnemonic. > + */ > +.macro GETSEC leaf > + pushl %ebx > + xorl %ebx, %ebx /* Must be zero for SMCTRL */ > + movl \leaf, %eax /* Leaf function */ > + .byte 0x0f, 0x37 /* GETSEC opcode */ > + popl %ebx > +.endm > + > +.macro TXT_RESET error > + /* > + * Set a sticky error value and reset. Note the movs to %eax act as > + * TXT register barriers. > + */ > + movl \error, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_ERRORCODE) > + movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_E2STS), %eax > + movl $1, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_CMD_NO_SECRETS) > + movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_E2STS), %eax > + movl $1, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_CMD_UNLOCK_MEM_CONFIG) > + movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_E2STS), %eax > + movl $1, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_CMD_RESET) > +1: > + hlt > + jmp 1b > +.endm > + > + .code32 > +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_stub_entry) > + cli > + cld > + > + /* > + * On entry, %ebx has the entry abs offset to sl_stub_entry. This > + * will be correctly scaled using the rva macro and avoid causing > + * relocations. Only %cs and %ds segments are known good. > + */ > + > + /* Load GDT, set segment regs and lret to __SL32_CS */ > + leal rva(sl_gdt_desc)(%ebx), %eax > + addl %eax, 2(%eax) > + lgdt (%eax) > + > + movl $(__SL32_DS), %eax > + movw %ax, %ds > + movw %ax, %es > + movw %ax, %fs > + movw %ax, %gs > + movw %ax, %ss > + > + /* > + * Now that %ss is known good, take the first stack for the BSP. The > + * AP stacks are only used on Intel. > + */ > + leal rva(sl_stacks_end)(%ebx), %esp > + > + leal rva(.Lsl_cs)(%ebx), %eax > + pushl $(__SL32_CS) > + pushl %eax > + lret > + > +.Lsl_cs: > + /* Save our base pointer reg and page table for MLE */ > + pushl %ebx > + pushl %ecx > + > + /* See if SMX feature is supported. */ > + movl $1, %eax > + cpuid > + testl $(X86_FEATURE_BIT_SMX), %ecx > + jz .Ldo_unknown_cpu > + > + popl %ecx > + popl %ebx > + > + /* Know it is Intel */ > + movl $(SL_CPU_INTEL), rva(sl_cpu_type)(%ebx) > + > + /* Locate the base of the MLE using the page tables in %ecx */ > + call sl_find_mle_base > + > + /* Increment CPU count for BSP */ > + incl rva(sl_txt_cpu_count)(%ebx) > + > + /* > + * Enable SMI with GETSEC[SMCTRL] which were disabled by SENTER. > + * NMIs were also disabled by SENTER. Since there is no IDT for the BSP, > + * allow the mainline kernel re-enable them in the normal course of > + * booting. > + */ > + GETSEC $(SMX_X86_GETSEC_SMCTRL) > + > + /* Clear the TXT error registers for a clean start of day */ > + movl $0, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_ERRORCODE) > + movl $0xffffffff, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_ESTS) > + > + /* On Intel, the zero page address is passed in the TXT heap */ > + /* Read physical base of heap into EAX */ > + movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE), %eax > + /* Read the size of the BIOS data into ECX (first 8 bytes) */ > + movl (%eax), %ecx > + /* Skip over BIOS data and size of OS to MLE data section */ > + leal 8(%eax, %ecx), %eax > + > + /* Need to verify the values in the OS-MLE struct passed in */ > + call sl_txt_verify_os_mle_struct > + > + /* > + * Get the boot params address from the heap. Note %esi and %ebx MUST > + * be preserved across calls and operations. > + */ > + movl SL_boot_params_addr(%eax), %esi > + > + /* Save %ebx so the APs can find their way home */ > + movl %ebx, (SL_mle_scratch + SL_SCRATCH_AP_EBX)(%eax) > + > + /* Fetch the AP wake code block address from the heap */ > + movl SL_ap_wake_block(%eax), %edi > + movl %edi, rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx) > + > + /* Store the offset in the AP wake block to the jmp address */ > + movl $(sl_ap_jmp_offset - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), \ > + (SL_mle_scratch + SL_SCRATCH_AP_JMP_OFFSET)(%eax) > + > + /* Store the offset in the AP wake block to the AP stacks block */ > + movl $(sl_stacks - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), \ > + (SL_mle_scratch + SL_SCRATCH_AP_STACKS_OFFSET)(%eax) > + > + /* %eax still is the base of the OS-MLE block, save it */ > + pushl %eax > + > + /* Relocate the AP wake code to the safe block */ > + call sl_txt_reloc_ap_wake > + > + /* > + * Wake up all APs that are blocked in the ACM and wait for them to > + * halt. This should be done before restoring the MTRRs so the ACM is > + * still properly in WB memory. > + */ > + call sl_txt_wake_aps > + > + /* Restore OS-MLE in %eax */ > + popl %eax > + > + /* > + * %edi is used by this routine to find the MTRRs which are in the SLRT > + * in the Intel info. > + */ > + movl SL_txt_info(%eax), %edi > + call sl_txt_load_regs > + > + jmp .Lcpu_setup_done > + > +.Ldo_unknown_cpu: > + /* Non-Intel CPUs are not yet supported */ > + ud2 > + > +.Lcpu_setup_done: > + /* > + * Don't enable MCE at this point. The kernel will enable > + * it on the BSP later when it is ready. > + */ > + > + /* Done, jump to normal 32b pm entry */ > + jmp startup_32 > +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_stub_entry) > + > +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_find_mle_base) > + /* %ecx has PDPT, get first PD */ > + movl (%ecx), %eax > + andl $(PAGE_MASK), %eax > + /* Get first PT from first PDE */ > + movl (%eax), %eax > + andl $(PAGE_MASK), %eax > + /* Get MLE base from first PTE */ > + movl (%eax), %eax > + andl $(PAGE_MASK), %eax > + > + movl %eax, rva(sl_mle_start)(%ebx) > + ret > +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_find_mle_base) > + > +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_check_buffer_mle_overlap) > + /* %ecx: buffer begin %edx: buffer end */ > + /* %ebx: MLE begin %edi: MLE end */ > + > + cmpl %edi, %ecx > + jb .Lnext_check > + cmpl %edi, %edx > + jbe .Lnext_check > + jmp .Lvalid /* Buffer above MLE */ > + > +.Lnext_check: > + cmpl %ebx, %edx > + ja .Linvalid > + cmpl %ebx, %ecx > + jae .Linvalid > + jmp .Lvalid /* Buffer below MLE */ > + > +.Linvalid: > + TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_MLE_BUFFER_OVERLAP) > + > +.Lvalid: > + ret > +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_check_buffer_mle_overlap) > + > +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_verify_os_mle_struct) > + pushl %ebx > + /* > + * %eax points to the base of the OS-MLE struct. Need to also > + * read some values from the OS-SINIT struct too. > + */ > + movl -8(%eax), %ecx > + /* Skip over OS to MLE data section and size of OS-SINIT structure */ > + leal (%eax, %ecx), %edx > + > + /* Load MLE image base absolute offset */ > + movl rva(sl_mle_start)(%ebx), %ebx > + > + /* Verify the value of the low PMR base. It should always be 0. */ > + movl SL_vtd_pmr_lo_base(%edx), %esi > + cmpl $0, %esi > + jz .Lvalid_pmr_base > + TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_LO_PMR_BASE) > + > +.Lvalid_pmr_base: > + /* Grab some values from OS-SINIT structure */ > + movl SL_mle_size(%edx), %edi > + addl %ebx, %edi > + jc .Loverflow_detected > + movl SL_vtd_pmr_lo_size(%edx), %esi > + > + /* Check the AP wake block */ > + movl SL_ap_wake_block(%eax), %ecx > + movl SL_ap_wake_block_size(%eax), %edx > + addl %ecx, %edx > + jc .Loverflow_detected > + call sl_check_buffer_mle_overlap > + cmpl %esi, %edx > + ja .Lbuffer_beyond_pmr > + > + /* Check the boot params */ > + movl SL_boot_params_addr(%eax), %ecx > + movl $(PAGE_SIZE), %edx > + addl %ecx, %edx > + jc .Loverflow_detected > + call sl_check_buffer_mle_overlap > + cmpl %esi, %edx > + ja .Lbuffer_beyond_pmr > + > + /* Check that the AP wake block is big enough */ > + cmpl $(sl_txt_ap_wake_end - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), \ > + SL_ap_wake_block_size(%eax) > + jae .Lwake_block_ok > + TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_WAKE_BLOCK_TOO_SMALL) > + > +.Lwake_block_ok: > + popl %ebx > + ret > + > +.Loverflow_detected: > + TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_INTEGER_OVERFLOW) > + > +.Lbuffer_beyond_pmr: > + TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_BUFFER_BEYOND_PMR) > +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_verify_os_mle_struct) > + > +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_ap_entry) > + cli > + cld > + /* > + * The %cs and %ds segments are known good after waking the AP. > + * First order of business is to find where we are and > + * save it in %ebx. > + */ > + > + /* Read physical base of heap into EAX */ > + movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE), %eax > + /* Read the size of the BIOS data into ECX (first 8 bytes) */ > + movl (%eax), %ecx > + /* Skip over BIOS data and size of OS to MLE data section */ > + leal 8(%eax, %ecx), %eax > + > + /* Saved %ebx from the BSP and stash OS-MLE pointer */ > + movl (SL_mle_scratch + SL_SCRATCH_AP_EBX)(%eax), %ebx > + > + /* Save TXT info ptr in %edi for call to sl_txt_load_regs */ > + movl SL_txt_info(%eax), %edi > + > + /* Lock and get our stack index */ > + movl $1, %ecx > +.Lspin: > + xorl %eax, %eax > + lock cmpxchgl %ecx, rva(sl_txt_spin_lock)(%ebx) > + pause > + jnz .Lspin > + > + /* Increment the stack index and use the next value inside lock */ > + incl rva(sl_txt_stack_index)(%ebx) > + movl rva(sl_txt_stack_index)(%ebx), %eax > + > + /* Unlock */ > + movl $0, rva(sl_txt_spin_lock)(%ebx) > + > + /* Location of the relocated AP wake block */ > + movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %ecx > + > + /* Load reloc GDT, set segment regs and lret to __SL32_CS */ > + lgdt (sl_ap_gdt_desc - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin)(%ecx) > + > + movl $(__SL32_DS), %edx > + movw %dx, %ds > + movw %dx, %es > + movw %dx, %fs > + movw %dx, %gs > + movw %dx, %ss > + > + /* Load our reloc AP stack */ > + movl $(TXT_BOOT_STACK_SIZE), %edx > + mull %edx > + leal (sl_stacks_end - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin)(%ecx), %esp > + subl %eax, %esp > + > + /* Switch to AP code segment */ > + leal rva(.Lsl_ap_cs)(%ebx), %eax > + pushl $(__SL32_CS) > + pushl %eax > + lret > + > +.Lsl_ap_cs: > + /* Load the relocated AP IDT */ > + lidt (sl_ap_idt_desc - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin)(%ecx) > + > + /* Fixup MTRRs and misc enable MSR on APs too */ > + call sl_txt_load_regs > + > + /* Enable SMI with GETSEC[SMCTRL] */ > + GETSEC $(SMX_X86_GETSEC_SMCTRL) > + > + /* IRET-to-self can be used to enable NMIs which SENTER disabled */ > + leal rva(.Lnmi_enabled_ap)(%ebx), %eax > + pushfl > + pushl $(__SL32_CS) > + pushl %eax > + iret > + > +.Lnmi_enabled_ap: > + /* Put APs in X2APIC mode like the BSP */ > + movl $(MSR_IA32_APICBASE), %ecx > + rdmsr > + orl $(XAPIC_ENABLE | X2APIC_ENABLE), %eax > + wrmsr > + > + /* > + * Basically done, increment the CPU count and jump off to the AP > + * wake block to wait. > + */ > + lock incl rva(sl_txt_cpu_count)(%ebx) > + > + movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %eax > + jmp *%eax > +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_ap_entry) > + > +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_reloc_ap_wake) > + /* Save boot params register */ > + pushl %esi > + > + movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %edi > + > + /* Fixup AP IDT and GDT descriptor before relocating */ > + leal rva(sl_ap_idt_desc)(%ebx), %eax > + addl %edi, 2(%eax) > + leal rva(sl_ap_gdt_desc)(%ebx), %eax > + addl %edi, 2(%eax) > + > + /* > + * Copy the AP wake code and AP GDT/IDT to the protected wake block > + * provided by the loader. Destination already in %edi. > + */ > + movl $(sl_txt_ap_wake_end - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), %ecx > + leal rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_begin)(%ebx), %esi > + rep movsb > + > + /* Setup the IDT for the APs to use in the relocation block */ > + movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %ecx > + addl $(sl_ap_idt - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), %ecx > + xorl %edx, %edx > + > + /* Form the default reset vector relocation address */ > + movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %esi > + addl $(sl_txt_int_reset - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), %esi > + > +1: > + cmpw $(NR_VECTORS), %dx > + jz .Lap_idt_done > + > + cmpw $(X86_TRAP_NMI), %dx > + jz 2f > + > + /* Load all other fixed vectors with reset handler */ > + movl %esi, %eax > + movw %ax, (IDT_VECTOR_LO_BITS)(%ecx) > + shrl $16, %eax > + movw %ax, (IDT_VECTOR_HI_BITS)(%ecx) > + jmp 3f > + > +2: > + /* Load single wake NMI IPI vector at the relocation address */ > + movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %eax > + addl $(sl_txt_int_nmi - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), %eax > + movw %ax, (IDT_VECTOR_LO_BITS)(%ecx) > + shrl $16, %eax > + movw %ax, (IDT_VECTOR_HI_BITS)(%ecx) > + > +3: > + incw %dx > + addl $8, %ecx > + jmp 1b > + > +.Lap_idt_done: > + popl %esi > + ret > +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_reloc_ap_wake) > + > +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_load_regs) > + /* Save base pointer register */ > + pushl %ebx > + > + /* > + * On Intel, the original variable MTRRs and Misc Enable MSR are > + * restored on the BSP at early boot. Each AP will also restore > + * its MTRRs and Misc Enable MSR. > + */ > + pushl %edi > + addl $(SL_saved_bsp_mtrrs), %edi > + movl (%edi), %ebx > + pushl %ebx /* default_mem_type lo */ > + addl $4, %edi > + movl (%edi), %ebx > + pushl %ebx /* default_mem_type hi */ > + addl $4, %edi > + movl (%edi), %ebx /* mtrr_vcnt lo, don't care about hi part */ > + addl $8, %edi /* now at MTRR pair array */ > + /* Write the variable MTRRs */ > + movl $(MSR_MTRRphysBase0), %ecx > +1: > + cmpl $0, %ebx > + jz 2f > + > + movl (%edi), %eax /* MTRRphysBaseX lo */ > + addl $4, %edi > + movl (%edi), %edx /* MTRRphysBaseX hi */ > + wrmsr > + addl $4, %edi > + incl %ecx > + movl (%edi), %eax /* MTRRphysMaskX lo */ > + addl $4, %edi > + movl (%edi), %edx /* MTRRphysMaskX hi */ > + wrmsr > + addl $4, %edi > + incl %ecx > + > + decl %ebx > + jmp 1b > +2: > + /* Write the default MTRR register */ > + popl %edx > + popl %eax > + movl $(MSR_MTRRdefType), %ecx > + wrmsr > + > + /* Return to beginning and write the misc enable msr */ > + popl %edi > + addl $(SL_saved_misc_enable_msr), %edi > + movl (%edi), %eax /* saved_misc_enable_msr lo */ > + addl $4, %edi > + movl (%edi), %edx /* saved_misc_enable_msr hi */ > + movl $(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE), %ecx > + wrmsr > + > + popl %ebx > + ret > +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_load_regs) > + > +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_wake_aps) > + /* Save boot params register */ > + pushl %esi > + > + /* First setup the MLE join structure and load it into TXT reg */ > + leal rva(sl_gdt)(%ebx), %eax > + leal rva(sl_txt_ap_entry)(%ebx), %ecx > + leal rva(sl_smx_rlp_mle_join)(%ebx), %edx > + movl %eax, SL_rlp_gdt_base(%edx) > + movl %ecx, SL_rlp_entry_point(%edx) > + movl %edx, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_MLE_JOIN) > + > + /* Another TXT heap walk to find various values needed to wake APs */ > + movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE), %eax > + /* At BIOS data size, find the number of logical processors */ > + movl (SL_num_logical_procs + 8)(%eax), %edx > + /* Skip over BIOS data */ > + movl (%eax), %ecx > + addl %ecx, %eax > + /* Skip over OS to MLE */ > + movl (%eax), %ecx > + addl %ecx, %eax > + /* At OS-SNIT size, get capabilities to know how to wake up the APs */ > + movl (SL_capabilities + 8)(%eax), %esi > + /* Skip over OS to SNIT */ > + movl (%eax), %ecx > + addl %ecx, %eax > + /* At SINIT-MLE size, get the AP wake MONITOR address */ > + movl (SL_rlp_wakeup_addr + 8)(%eax), %edi > + > + /* Determine how to wake up the APs */ > + testl $(1 << TXT_SINIT_MLE_CAP_WAKE_MONITOR), %esi > + jz .Lwake_getsec > + > + /* Wake using MWAIT MONITOR */ > + movl $1, (%edi) > + jmp .Laps_awake > + > +.Lwake_getsec: > + /* Wake using GETSEC(WAKEUP) */ > + GETSEC $(SMX_X86_GETSEC_WAKEUP) > + > +.Laps_awake: > + /* > + * All of the APs are woken up and rendesvous in the relocated wake > + * block starting at sl_txt_ap_wake_begin. Wait for all of them to > + * halt. > + */ > + pause > + cmpl rva(sl_txt_cpu_count)(%ebx), %edx > + jne .Laps_awake > + > + popl %esi > + ret > +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_wake_aps) > + > +/* This is the beginning of the relocated AP wake code block */ > + .global sl_txt_ap_wake_begin > +sl_txt_ap_wake_begin: > + > + /* Get the LAPIC ID for each AP and stash it on the stack */ > + movl $(MSR_IA32_X2APIC_APICID), %ecx > + rdmsr > + pushl %eax > + > + /* > + * Get a pointer to the monitor location on this APs stack to test below > + * after mwait returns. Currently %esp points to just past the pushed APIC > + * ID value. > + */ > + movl %esp, %eax > + subl $(TXT_BOOT_STACK_SIZE - 4), %eax > + movl $0, (%eax) > + > + /* Clear ecx/edx so no invalid extensions or hints are passed to monitor */ > + xorl %ecx, %ecx > + xorl %edx, %edx > + > + /* > + * Arm the monitor and wait for it to be poked by he SMP bringup code. The mwait > + * instruction can return for a number of reasons. Test to see if it returned > + * because the monitor was written to. > + */ > + monitor > + > +1: > + mfence > + mwait > + movl (%eax), %edx > + testl %edx, %edx > + jz 1b > + > + /* > + * This is the long absolute jump to the 32b Secure Launch protected mode stub > + * code in sl_trampoline_start32() in the rmpiggy. The jump address will be > + * fixed in the SMP boot code when the first AP is brought up. This whole area > + * is provided and protected in the memory map by the prelaunch code. > + */ > + .byte 0xea > +sl_ap_jmp_offset: > + .long 0x00000000 > + .word __SL32_CS > + > +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_int_nmi) > + /* NMI context, just IRET */ > + iret > +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_int_nmi) > + > +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_int_reset) > + TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_INV_AP_INTERRUPT) > +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_int_reset) > + > + .balign 8 > +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_ap_idt_desc) > + .word sl_ap_idt_end - sl_ap_idt - 1 /* Limit */ > + .long sl_ap_idt - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin /* Base */ > +SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_ap_idt_desc, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_ap_idt_desc_end) > + > + .balign 8 > +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_ap_idt) > + .rept NR_VECTORS > + .word 0x0000 /* Offset 15 to 0 */ > + .word __SL32_CS /* Segment selector */ > + .word 0x8e00 /* Present, DPL=0, 32b Vector, Interrupt */ > + .word 0x0000 /* Offset 31 to 16 */ > + .endr > +SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_ap_idt, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_ap_idt_end) > + > + .balign 8 > +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_ap_gdt_desc) > + .word sl_ap_gdt_end - sl_ap_gdt - 1 > + .long sl_ap_gdt - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin > +SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_ap_gdt_desc, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_ap_gdt_desc_end) > + > + .balign 8 > +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_ap_gdt) > + .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* NULL */ > + .quad 0x00cf9a000000ffff /* __SL32_CS */ > + .quad 0x00cf92000000ffff /* __SL32_DS */ > +SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_ap_gdt, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_ap_gdt_end) > + > + /* Small stacks for BSP and APs to work with */ > + .balign 64 > +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_stacks) > + .fill (TXT_MAX_CPUS * TXT_BOOT_STACK_SIZE), 1, 0 > +SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_stacks, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_stacks_end) > + > +/* This is the end of the relocated AP wake code block */ > + .global sl_txt_ap_wake_end > +sl_txt_ap_wake_end: > + > + .data > + .balign 8 > +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_gdt_desc) > + .word sl_gdt_end - sl_gdt - 1 > + .long sl_gdt - sl_gdt_desc > +SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_gdt_desc, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_gdt_desc_end) > + > + .balign 8 > +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_gdt) > + .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* NULL */ > + .quad 0x00cf9a000000ffff /* __SL32_CS */ > + .quad 0x00cf92000000ffff /* __SL32_DS */ > +SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_gdt, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_gdt_end) > + > + .balign 8 > +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_smx_rlp_mle_join) > + .long sl_gdt_end - sl_gdt - 1 /* GDT limit */ > + .long 0x00000000 /* GDT base */ > + .long __SL32_CS /* Seg Sel - CS (DS, ES, SS = seg_sel+8) */ > + .long 0x00000000 /* Entry point physical address */ > +SYM_DATA_END(sl_smx_rlp_mle_join) > + > +SYM_DATA(sl_cpu_type, .long 0x00000000) > + > +SYM_DATA(sl_mle_start, .long 0x00000000) > + > +SYM_DATA_LOCAL(sl_txt_spin_lock, .long 0x00000000) > + > +SYM_DATA_LOCAL(sl_txt_stack_index, .long 0x00000000) > + > +SYM_DATA_LOCAL(sl_txt_cpu_count, .long 0x00000000) > + > +SYM_DATA_LOCAL(sl_txt_ap_wake_block, .long 0x00000000) > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h > index f1bd7b91b3c6..aff899c4b6c3 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h > @@ -323,6 +323,9 @@ > #define MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE 0x00000560 > #define MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK 0x00000561 > > +#define MSR_MTRRphysBase0 0x00000200 > +#define MSR_MTRRphysMask0 0x00000201 > + > #define MSR_MTRRfix64K_00000 0x00000250 > #define MSR_MTRRfix16K_80000 0x00000258 > #define MSR_MTRRfix16K_A0000 0x00000259 > @@ -804,6 +807,8 @@ > #define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE (1<<11) > #define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BASE (0xfffff<<12) > > +#define MSR_IA32_X2APIC_APICID 0x00000802 > + > #define MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE 0x00000079 > #define MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV 0x0000008b > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h > index 01d19fc22346..74e3e7df491e 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h > @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ > /* loadflags */ > #define LOADED_HIGH (1<<0) > #define KASLR_FLAG (1<<1) > +#define SLAUNCH_FLAG (1<<2) > #define QUIET_FLAG (1<<5) > #define KEEP_SEGMENTS (1<<6) > #define CAN_USE_HEAP (1<<7) > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c > index 6913b372ccf7..c7c4d392b7d3 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c > @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ > #include <linux/hardirq.h> > #include <linux/suspend.h> > #include <linux/kbuild.h> > +#include <linux/slr_table.h> > +#include <linux/slaunch.h> > #include <asm/processor.h> > #include <asm/thread_info.h> > #include <asm/sigframe.h> > @@ -120,4 +122,22 @@ static void __used common(void) > OFFSET(ARIA_CTX_rounds, aria_ctx, rounds); > #endif > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH > + BLANK(); > + OFFSET(SL_txt_info, txt_os_mle_data, txt_info); > + OFFSET(SL_mle_scratch, txt_os_mle_data, mle_scratch); > + OFFSET(SL_boot_params_addr, txt_os_mle_data, boot_params_addr); > + OFFSET(SL_ap_wake_block, txt_os_mle_data, ap_wake_block); > + OFFSET(SL_ap_wake_block_size, txt_os_mle_data, ap_wake_block_size); > + OFFSET(SL_saved_misc_enable_msr, slr_entry_intel_info, saved_misc_enable_msr); > + OFFSET(SL_saved_bsp_mtrrs, slr_entry_intel_info, saved_bsp_mtrrs); > + OFFSET(SL_num_logical_procs, txt_bios_data, num_logical_procs); > + OFFSET(SL_capabilities, txt_os_sinit_data, capabilities); > + OFFSET(SL_mle_size, txt_os_sinit_data, mle_size); > + OFFSET(SL_vtd_pmr_lo_base, txt_os_sinit_data, vtd_pmr_lo_base); > + OFFSET(SL_vtd_pmr_lo_size, txt_os_sinit_data, vtd_pmr_lo_size); > + OFFSET(SL_rlp_wakeup_addr, txt_sinit_mle_data, rlp_wakeup_addr); > + OFFSET(SL_rlp_gdt_base, smx_rlp_mle_join, rlp_gdt_base); > + OFFSET(SL_rlp_entry_point, smx_rlp_mle_join, rlp_entry_point); > +#endif > } > -- > 2.39.3 > _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
