On 23/02/2024 5:54 pm, Eric Biggers wrote: > On Fri, Feb 23, 2024 at 04:42:11PM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote: >> Yes, and I agree. We're not looking to try and force this in with >> underhand tactics. >> >> But a blind "nack to any SHA-1" is similarly damaging in the opposite >> direction. >> > Well, reviewers have said they'd prefer that SHA-1 not be included and given > some thoughtful reasons for that. But also they've given suggestions on how to > make the SHA-1 support more palatable, such as splitting it into a separate > patch and giving it a proper justification. > > All suggestions have been ignored. The public record demonstrates otherwise. But are you saying that you'd be happy if the commit message read something more like: ---8<--- For better or worse, Secure Launch needs SHA-1 and SHA-256. The choice of hashes used lie with the platform firmware, not with software, and is often outside of the users control. Even if we'd prefer to use SHA-256-only, if firmware elected to start us with the SHA-1 and SHA-256 backs active, we still need SHA-1 to parse the TPM event log thus far, and deliberately cap the SHA-1 PCRs in order to safely use SHA-256 for everything else. --- ? ~Andrew _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
