Re: [PATCH v2 2/5] crash_dump: save the dm crypt key temporarily

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On 10/01/2024 08:15, Coiby Xu wrote:
User space is supposed to write the key description to
/sys/kernel/crash_dm_crypt_key so the kernel will read the key and save
a temporary copy for later user. User space has 2 minutes at maximum to
load the kdump initrd before the key gets wiped. And after kdump
retrieves the key, the key will be wiped immediately.

Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
  include/linux/crash_core.h   |   7 +-
  include/linux/kexec.h        |   4 ++
  kernel/Makefile              |   2 +-
  kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c | 121 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  kernel/ksysfs.c              |  23 ++++++-
  5 files changed, 153 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
  create mode 100644 kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c

diff --git a/include/linux/crash_core.h b/include/linux/crash_core.h
index 5126a4fecb44..7078eda6418d 100644
--- a/include/linux/crash_core.h
+++ b/include/linux/crash_core.h
@@ -125,6 +125,12 @@ static inline void __init reserve_crashkernel_generic(char *cmdline,
  {}
  #endif
+struct kimage;
+
+int crash_sysfs_dm_crypt_key_write(const char *key_des, size_t count);
+int crash_pass_temp_dm_crypt_key(void **addr, unsigned long *sz);
+int crash_load_dm_crypt_key(struct kimage *image);
+
  /* Alignment required for elf header segment */
  #define ELF_CORE_HEADER_ALIGN   4096
@@ -140,7 +146,6 @@ extern int crash_exclude_mem_range(struct crash_mem *mem,
  extern int crash_prepare_elf64_headers(struct crash_mem *mem, int need_kernel_map,
  				       void **addr, unsigned long *sz);
-struct kimage;
  struct kexec_segment;
#define KEXEC_CRASH_HP_NONE 0
diff --git a/include/linux/kexec.h b/include/linux/kexec.h
index 6f4626490ebf..bf7ab1e927ef 100644
--- a/include/linux/kexec.h
+++ b/include/linux/kexec.h
@@ -366,6 +366,10 @@ struct kimage {
  	void *elf_headers;
  	unsigned long elf_headers_sz;
  	unsigned long elf_load_addr;
+
+	/* dm crypt key buffer */
+	unsigned long dm_crypt_key_addr;
+	unsigned long dm_crypt_key_sz;
  };
/* kexec interface functions */
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 3947122d618b..48859bf63db5 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += events/
obj-$(CONFIG_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER) += user-return-notifier.o
  obj-$(CONFIG_PADATA) += padata.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP) += crash_dump.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP) += crash_dump.o crash_dump_dm_crypt.o
  obj-$(CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL) += jump_label.o
  obj-$(CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING) += context_tracking.o
  obj-$(CONFIG_TORTURE_TEST) += torture.o
diff --git a/kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c b/kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3a0b0b773598
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <linux/crash_dump.h>
+
+static u8 *dm_crypt_key;
+static unsigned int dm_crypt_key_size;
+
+void wipe_dm_crypt_key(void)
+{
+	if (dm_crypt_key) {
+		memset(dm_crypt_key, 0, dm_crypt_key_size * sizeof(u8));
+		kfree(dm_crypt_key);
+		dm_crypt_key = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+static void _wipe_dm_crypt_key(struct work_struct *dummy)
+{
+	wipe_dm_crypt_key();
+}
+
+static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(wipe_dm_crypt_key_work, _wipe_dm_crypt_key);
+
+static unsigned __read_mostly wipe_key_delay = 120; /* 2 mins */
+
+static int crash_save_temp_dm_crypt_key(const char *key_desc, size_t count)
+{
+	const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
+	struct key *key;
+
+	if (dm_crypt_key) {
+		memset(dm_crypt_key, 0, dm_crypt_key_size * sizeof(u8));
+		kfree(dm_crypt_key);
+	}
+
+	pr_debug("Requesting key %s", key_desc);
+	key = request_key(&key_type_user, key_desc, NULL);

If we don't read the key copy form userspace (my reply to top level message) you could use key_type_logon here.

+
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		pr_debug("No such key %s", key_desc);
+		return PTR_ERR(key);
+	}
+
+	ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key);
+	if (!ukp)
+		return -EKEYREVOKED;
+
+	dm_crypt_key = kmalloc(ukp->datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!dm_crypt_key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	memcpy(dm_crypt_key, ukp->data, ukp->datalen);
+	dm_crypt_key_size = ukp->datalen;
+	pr_debug("dm crypt key (size=%u): %8ph\n", dm_crypt_key_size, dm_crypt_key);
+	schedule_delayed_work(&wipe_dm_crypt_key_work,
+			      round_jiffies_relative(wipe_key_delay * HZ));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crash_sysfs_dm_crypt_key_write(const char *key_desc, size_t count)
+{
+	if (!is_kdump_kernel())
+		return crash_save_temp_dm_crypt_key(key_desc, count);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(crash_sysfs_dm_crypt_key_write);
+
+int crash_pass_temp_dm_crypt_key(void **addr, unsigned long *sz)
+{
+	unsigned long dm_crypt_key_sz;
+	unsigned char *buf;
+	unsigned int *size_ptr;
+
+	if (!dm_crypt_key)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	dm_crypt_key_sz = sizeof(unsigned int) + dm_crypt_key_size * sizeof(u8);
+
+	buf = vzalloc(dm_crypt_key_sz);
+	if (!buf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	size_ptr = (unsigned int *)buf;
+	memcpy(size_ptr, &dm_crypt_key_size, sizeof(unsigned int));
+	memcpy(size_ptr + 1, dm_crypt_key, dm_crypt_key_size * sizeof(u8));
+	*addr = buf;
+	*sz = dm_crypt_key_sz;
+	wipe_dm_crypt_key();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crash_load_dm_crypt_key(struct kimage *image)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct kexec_buf kbuf = {
+		.image = image,
+		.buf_min = 0,
+		.buf_max = ULONG_MAX,
+		.top_down = false,
+		.random = true,
+	};
+
+	image->dm_crypt_key_addr = 0;
+	ret = crash_pass_temp_dm_crypt_key(&kbuf.buffer, &kbuf.bufsz);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	kbuf.memsz = kbuf.bufsz;
+	kbuf.buf_align = ELF_CORE_HEADER_ALIGN;
+	kbuf.mem = KEXEC_BUF_MEM_UNKNOWN;
+	ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf);
+	if (ret) {
+		vfree((void *)kbuf.buffer);
+		return ret;
+	}
+	image->dm_crypt_key_addr = kbuf.mem;
+	image->dm_crypt_key_sz = kbuf.bufsz;
+	pr_debug("Loaded dm crypt key at 0x%lx bufsz=0x%lx memsz=0x%lx\n",
+		 image->dm_crypt_key_addr, kbuf.bufsz, kbuf.bufsz);
+
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/kernel/ksysfs.c b/kernel/ksysfs.c
index 1d4bc493b2f4..f3bb6bc6a604 100644
--- a/kernel/ksysfs.c
+++ b/kernel/ksysfs.c
@@ -165,16 +165,34 @@ static ssize_t vmcoreinfo_show(struct kobject *kobj,
  }
  KERNEL_ATTR_RO(vmcoreinfo);
+static ssize_t crash_dm_crypt_key_show(struct kobject *kobj,
+					  struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+					  char *buf)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t crash_dm_crypt_key_store(struct kobject *kobj,
+					struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+					   const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = crash_sysfs_dm_crypt_key_write(buf, count);
+	return ret < 0 ? ret : count;
+}
+KERNEL_ATTR_RW(crash_dm_crypt_key);
+
  #ifdef CONFIG_CRASH_HOTPLUG
  static ssize_t crash_elfcorehdr_size_show(struct kobject *kobj,
-			       struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+					  struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+					  char *buf)
  {
  	unsigned int sz = crash_get_elfcorehdr_size();
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%u\n", sz);
  }
  KERNEL_ATTR_RO(crash_elfcorehdr_size);
-
  #endif
#endif /* CONFIG_CRASH_CORE */
@@ -267,6 +285,7 @@ static struct attribute * kernel_attrs[] = {
  #endif
  #ifdef CONFIG_CRASH_CORE
  	&vmcoreinfo_attr.attr,
+	&crash_dm_crypt_key_attr.attr,
  #ifdef CONFIG_CRASH_HOTPLUG
  	&crash_elfcorehdr_size_attr.attr,
  #endif


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