On Mon, Nov 28, 2022 at 02:03:58PM -0800, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> index 3e3230cccaa7..cfc2ed2661fc 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
> */
> void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force)
> {
> - if (this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current) == val)
> + if (!force && this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current) == val)
> return;
> this_cpu_write(x86_spec_ctrl_current, val);
Still looks hacky to me.
I think it would be a lot cleaner if MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL gets cleaned of
the speculation bits in init_speculation_control() which gets run on
*every* CPU.
So by the time check_bugs() gets to setup stuff, the MSR will be ready
to go regardless.
I.e., something like this (not supposed to work - just to show what I
mean):
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 73cc546e024d..367732c92942 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -993,9 +993,19 @@ static void init_speculation_control(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
* Intel CPUs, for finer-grained selection of what's available.
*/
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) {
+ u64 msr;
+
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
+
+ /*
+ * Clear speculation control settings from a previous kernel
+ * run, i.e., kexec.
+ */
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
+ if (msr & SPEC_CTRL_MASK)
+ wrmsr (MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr & ~SPEC_CTRL_MASK);
}
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP))
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
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