Currently, a problem faced by arm64 is if a kernel image is signed by a
MOK key, loading it via the kexec_file_load() system call would be
rejected with the error "Lockdown: kexec: kexec of unsigned images is
restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7".
This patch allows to verify arm64 kernel image signature using not only
.builtin_trusted_keys but also .platform and .secondary_trusted_key
keyring.
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 4 +---
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
index 9ec34690e255..51af1c22d6da 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <linux/pe.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
-#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <asm/byteorder.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/image.h>
@@ -133,8 +132,7 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image,
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
static int image_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
{
- return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, NULL,
- VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
+ return kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig(kernel, kernel_len);
}
#endif
--
2.34.1
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