Nayna Jain <nayna@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes: > On secure boot enabled systems, a verified kernel may need to kexec > additional kernels. For example, it may be used as a bootloader needing > to kexec a target kernel or it may need to kexec a crashdump kernel. In > such cases, it may want to verify the signature of the next kernel > image. > > It is further possible that the kernel image is signed with third party > keys which are stored as platform or firmware keys in the 'db' variable. > The kernel, however, can not directly verify these platform keys, and an > administrator may therefore not want to trust them for arbitrary usage. > In order to differentiate platform keys from other keys and provide the > necessary separation of trust, the kernel needs an additional keyring to > store platform keys. > > This patch creates the new keyring called ".platform" to isolate keys > provided by platform from keys by kernel. These keys are used to > facilitate signature verification during kexec. Since the scope of this > keyring is only the platform/firmware keys, it cannot be updated from > userspace. > > This keyring can be enabled by setting CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING. > > Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx> > --- > security/integrity/Kconfig | 11 +++++ > security/integrity/Makefile | 1 + > security/integrity/digsig.c | 48 +++++++++++++++------- > security/integrity/integrity.h | 3 +- > .../integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++ > 5 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> -- Thiago Jung Bauermann IBM Linux Technology Center _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
