On secure boot enabled systems, the bootloader verifies the kernel image and possibly the initramfs signatures based on a set of keys. A soft reboot(kexec) of the system, with the same kernel image and initramfs, requires access to the original keys to verify the signatures. This patch allows IMA-appraisal access to those original keys, now loaded on the platform keyring, needed for verifying the kernel image and initramfs signatures. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx> - replace 'rc' with 'xattr_len' when calling integrity_digsig_verify() with INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA for readability Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx> --- Changelog: v2: - replace 'rc' with 'xattr_len' when calling integrity_digsig_verify() with INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA for readability security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index deec1804a00a..e8f520450895 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -289,12 +289,21 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, - (const char *)xattr_value, rc, + (const char *)xattr_value, + xattr_len, iint->ima_hash->digest, iint->ima_hash->length); if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) { status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; - } else if (rc) { + break; + } + if (rc && func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) + rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM, + (const char *)xattr_value, + xattr_len, + iint->ima_hash->digest, + iint->ima_hash->length); + if (rc) { cause = "invalid-signature"; status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; } else { -- 2.13.6 _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec