Hi Akashi,
On 24/07/18 07:57, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
> With this patch, kernel verification can be done without IMA security
> subsystem enabled. Turn on CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG instead.
>
> On x86, a signature is embedded into a PE file (Microsoft's format) header
> of binary. Since arm64's "Image" can also be seen as a PE file as far as
> CONFIG_EFI is enabled, we adopt this format for kernel signing.
>
> You can create a signed kernel image with:
> $ sbsign --key ${KEY} --cert ${CERT} Image
Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
> index d64f5e9f9d22..578d358632d0 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
> @@ -102,7 +106,18 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image,
> return ERR_PTR(ret);
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
> +static int image_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
> +{
> + return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, NULL,
> + VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
> +}
> +#endif
This is identical to x86's PE image verification helper. We can clean this up
later by providing some kexec_image_verify_pe() in the core kexec_file code. Its
not worth doing now.
> const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_image_ops = {
> .probe = image_probe,
> .load = image_load,
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
> + .verify_sig = image_verify_sig,
> +#endif
> };
Thanks,
James
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