For the cases that some kernel (module) path stamps the crash
reserved memory(already mapped by the kernel) where has been
loaded the second kernel data, the kdump kernel will probably
fail to boot when panic happens (or even not happens) leaving
the culprit at large, this is unacceptable.
The patch introduces a mechanism for detecting such cases:
1) After each crash kexec loading, it simply marks the reserved
memory regions readonly since we no longer access it after that.
When someone stamps the region, the first kernel will panic and
trigger the kdump. The weak arch_kexec_protect_crashkres() is
introduced to do the actual protection.
2) To allow multiple loading, once 1) was done we also need to
remark the reserved memory to readwrite each time a system call
related to kdump is made. The weak arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres()
is introduced to undo the actual protection.
The architecture can make its specific implementation by overriding
arch_kexec_protect_crashkres() and arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres().
Signed-off-by: Xunlei Pang <xlpang at redhat.com>
---
v3->v4:
No changes.
include/linux/kexec.h | 2 ++
kernel/kexec.c | 9 ++++++++-
kernel/kexec_core.c | 6 ++++++
kernel/kexec_file.c | 8 +++++++-
4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/kexec.h b/include/linux/kexec.h
index 7b68d27..ebd6950 100644
--- a/include/linux/kexec.h
+++ b/include/linux/kexec.h
@@ -329,6 +329,8 @@ int __weak arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add(const Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, unsigned int relsec);
int __weak arch_kexec_apply_relocations(const Elf_Ehdr *ehdr, Elf_Shdr *sechdrs,
unsigned int relsec);
+void arch_kexec_protect_crashkres(void);
+void arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres(void);
#else /* !CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE */
struct pt_regs;
diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
index d873b64..3680f9c 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
@@ -167,8 +167,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
return -EBUSY;
dest_image = &kexec_image;
- if (flags & KEXEC_ON_CRASH)
+ if (flags & KEXEC_ON_CRASH) {
dest_image = &kexec_crash_image;
+ if (kexec_crash_image)
+ arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres();
+ }
+
if (nr_segments > 0) {
unsigned long i;
@@ -211,6 +215,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
image = xchg(dest_image, image);
out:
+ if ((flags & KEXEC_ON_CRASH) && kexec_crash_image)
+ arch_kexec_protect_crashkres();
+
mutex_unlock(&kexec_mutex);
kimage_free(image);
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_core.c b/kernel/kexec_core.c
index c823f30..de4dd80 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_core.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_core.c
@@ -1560,3 +1560,9 @@ void __weak crash_map_reserved_pages(void)
void __weak crash_unmap_reserved_pages(void)
{}
+
+void __weak arch_kexec_protect_crashkres(void)
+{}
+
+void __weak arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres(void)
+{}
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index b70ada0..5892d6a 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -327,8 +327,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int, initrd_fd,
return -EBUSY;
dest_image = &kexec_image;
- if (flags & KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH)
+ if (flags & KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH) {
dest_image = &kexec_crash_image;
+ if (kexec_crash_image)
+ arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres();
+ }
if (flags & KEXEC_FILE_UNLOAD)
goto exchange;
@@ -377,6 +380,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int, initrd_fd,
exchange:
image = xchg(dest_image, image);
out:
+ if ((flags & KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH) && kexec_crash_image)
+ arch_kexec_protect_crashkres();
+
mutex_unlock(&kexec_mutex);
kimage_free(image);
return ret;
--
2.5.0
