On Wed, 2016-02-10 at 23:09 +0200, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 3, 2016 at 9:06 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> > Add IMA policy support for measuring/appraising the kexec image and
> > initramfs.
> >
> > Moving the enumeration to the vfs layer simplified the patches, allowing
> > the IMA changes, for the most part, to be separated from the other
> > changes. Unfortunately, passing either a kernel_read_file_id or a
> > ima_hooks enumeration within IMA is messy.
> >
> > Option 1: duplicate kernel_read_file enumeration in ima_hooks
> >
> > enum kernel_read_file_id {
> > ...
> > READING_KEXEC_IMAGE,
> > READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS,
> > READING_MAX_ID
> >
> > enum ima_hooks {
> > ...
> > KEXEC_CHECK
> > INITRAMFS_CHECK
> >
> > Option 2: define ima_hooks as extension of kernel_read_file
> > eg: enum ima_hooks {
> > FILE_CHECK = READING_MAX_ID,
> > MMAP_CHECK,
> >
> > In order to pass both kernel_read_file_id and ima_hooks values, we
> > would need to specify a struct containing a union.
> >
> > struct caller_id {
> > union {
> > enum ima_hooks func_id;
> > enum kernel_read_file_id read_id;
> > };
> > };
> >
> > Option 3: incorportate the ima_hooks enumeration into kernel_read_file_id,
> > perhaps changing the enumeration name.
> >
> > For now, duplicate the new READING_KEXEC_IMAGE/INITRAMFS in ima_hooks.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> > ---
> > Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 +-
> > security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
> > 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> > index 0a378a8..e80f767 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> > +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> > @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Description:
> > option: [[appraise_type=]] [permit_directio]
> >
> > base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
> > - [FIRMWARE_CHECK]
> > + [FIRMWARE_CHECK] [KEXEC_CHECK] [INITRAMFS_CHECK]
> > mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
> > [[^]MAY_EXEC]
> > fsmagic:= hex value
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> > index a5d2592..832e62a 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> > @@ -147,6 +147,8 @@ enum ima_hooks {
> > POST_SETATTR,
> > MODULE_CHECK,
> > FIRMWARE_CHECK,
> > + KEXEC_CHECK,
> > + INITRAMFS_CHECK,
> > MAX_CHECK
> > };
> >
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > index 1e91d94..ccf9526 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > @@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
> > int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> > enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
> > {
> > - enum ima_hooks func = FILE_CHECK;
> > + enum ima_hooks func;
> >
> > if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
> > if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
> > @@ -373,10 +373,23 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > - if (read_id == READING_FIRMWARE)
> > + switch (read_id) {
> > + case READING_FIRMWARE:
> > func = FIRMWARE_CHECK;
> > - else if (read_id == READING_MODULE)
> > + break;
> > + case READING_MODULE:
> > func = MODULE_CHECK;
> > + break;
> > + case READING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
> > + func = KEXEC_CHECK;
> > + break;
> > + case READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS:
> > + func = INITRAMFS_CHECK;
> > + break;
> > + default:
> > + func = FILE_CHECK;
> > + break;
> > + }
> >
>
> I would define a separate function like "int ima_read_id_to_func(id)"
> which search over the map
>
> Something like...
>
> struct
> {
> int id;
> int func;
> } map[] = {
> { .id = READING_FIRMWARE, .fun = FIRMWARE_CHECK },
> ...
> { -1, 0 }
> };
>
So we stay with the duplication (option 1), but clean it up. That works
for me.
Mimi
> > return process_measurement(file, buf, size, MAY_READ, func, 0);
> > }
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > index 7571ce8..d02560e 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > @@ -612,6 +612,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> > entry->func = MMAP_CHECK;
> > else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
> > entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
> > + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_CHECK") == 0)
> > + entry->func = KEXEC_CHECK;
> > + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "INITRAMFS_CHECK") == 0)
> > + entry->func = INITRAMFS_CHECK;
> > else
> > result = -EINVAL;
> > if (!result)
> > @@ -855,7 +859,8 @@ static char *mask_tokens[] = {
> >
> > enum {
> > func_file = 0, func_mmap, func_bprm,
> > - func_module, func_firmware, func_post
> > + func_module, func_firmware, func_post,
> > + func_kexec, func_initramfs
> > };
> >
> > static char *func_tokens[] = {
> > @@ -929,6 +934,12 @@ static void policy_func_show(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_hooks func)
> > case POST_SETATTR:
> > seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_post));
> > break;
> > + case KEXEC_CHECK:
> > + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_kexec));
> > + break;
> > + case INITRAMFS_CHECK:
> > + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_initramfs));
> > + break;
> > default:
> > snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", func);
> > seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), tbuf);
> > --
> > 2.1.0
> >
>
>
>
