On 16-02-03 14:06:27, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Add IMA policy support for measuring/appraising the kexec image and
> initramfs.
>
> Moving the enumeration to the vfs layer simplified the patches, allowing
> the IMA changes, for the most part, to be separated from the other
> changes. Unfortunately, passing either a kernel_read_file_id or a
> ima_hooks enumeration within IMA is messy.
>
> Option 1: duplicate kernel_read_file enumeration in ima_hooks
>
> enum kernel_read_file_id {
> ...
> READING_KEXEC_IMAGE,
> READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS,
> READING_MAX_ID
>
> enum ima_hooks {
> ...
> KEXEC_CHECK
> INITRAMFS_CHECK
>
> Option 2: define ima_hooks as extension of kernel_read_file
> eg: enum ima_hooks {
> FILE_CHECK = READING_MAX_ID,
> MMAP_CHECK,
>
> In order to pass both kernel_read_file_id and ima_hooks values, we
> would need to specify a struct containing a union.
>
> struct caller_id {
> union {
> enum ima_hooks func_id;
> enum kernel_read_file_id read_id;
> };
> };
>
> Option 3: incorportate the ima_hooks enumeration into kernel_read_file_id,
> perhaps changing the enumeration name.
>
> For now, duplicate the new READING_KEXEC_IMAGE/INITRAMFS in ima_hooks.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Option 3 seems the right way to go, but for now:
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan at mip-labs.com>
> ---
> Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
> 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> index 0a378a8..e80f767 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Description:
> option: [[appraise_type=]] [permit_directio]
>
> base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
> - [FIRMWARE_CHECK]
> + [FIRMWARE_CHECK] [KEXEC_CHECK] [INITRAMFS_CHECK]
> mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
> [[^]MAY_EXEC]
> fsmagic:= hex value
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index a5d2592..832e62a 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -147,6 +147,8 @@ enum ima_hooks {
> POST_SETATTR,
> MODULE_CHECK,
> FIRMWARE_CHECK,
> + KEXEC_CHECK,
> + INITRAMFS_CHECK,
> MAX_CHECK
> };
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 1e91d94..ccf9526 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
> int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
> {
> - enum ima_hooks func = FILE_CHECK;
> + enum ima_hooks func;
>
> if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
> if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
> @@ -373,10 +373,23 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> return 0;
> }
>
> - if (read_id == READING_FIRMWARE)
> + switch (read_id) {
> + case READING_FIRMWARE:
> func = FIRMWARE_CHECK;
> - else if (read_id == READING_MODULE)
> + break;
> + case READING_MODULE:
> func = MODULE_CHECK;
> + break;
> + case READING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
> + func = KEXEC_CHECK;
> + break;
> + case READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS:
> + func = INITRAMFS_CHECK;
> + break;
> + default:
> + func = FILE_CHECK;
> + break;
> + }
>
> return process_measurement(file, buf, size, MAY_READ, func, 0);
> }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 7571ce8..d02560e 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -612,6 +612,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> entry->func = MMAP_CHECK;
> else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
> entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
> + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_CHECK") == 0)
> + entry->func = KEXEC_CHECK;
> + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "INITRAMFS_CHECK") == 0)
> + entry->func = INITRAMFS_CHECK;
> else
> result = -EINVAL;
> if (!result)
> @@ -855,7 +859,8 @@ static char *mask_tokens[] = {
>
> enum {
> func_file = 0, func_mmap, func_bprm,
> - func_module, func_firmware, func_post
> + func_module, func_firmware, func_post,
> + func_kexec, func_initramfs
> };
>
> static char *func_tokens[] = {
> @@ -929,6 +934,12 @@ static void policy_func_show(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_hooks func)
> case POST_SETATTR:
> seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_post));
> break;
> + case KEXEC_CHECK:
> + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_kexec));
> + break;
> + case INITRAMFS_CHECK:
> + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_initramfs));
> + break;
> default:
> snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", func);
> seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), tbuf);
> --
> 2.1.0
>
> --
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