Add support for measuring and appraising the IMA policy itself. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com> --- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 9 ++++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 3 +++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 10 +++++++++- 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 832e62a..6685968 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ enum ima_hooks { FIRMWARE_CHECK, KEXEC_CHECK, INITRAMFS_CHECK, + POLICY_CHECK, MAX_CHECK }; @@ -191,6 +192,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v); #define IMA_APPRAISE_LOG 0x04 #define IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES 0x08 #define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE 0x10 +#define IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY 0x20 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index 00ccd67..7b15e80 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -325,7 +325,14 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (data[0] == '/') result = ima_read_policy(data); - else + else if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY) { + pr_err("IMA: signed policy required\n"); + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL, + "policy_update", "signed policy required", + 1, 0); + if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) + result = -EACCES; + } else result = ima_parse_add_rule(data); mutex_unlock(&ima_write_mutex); out_free: diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index ccf9526..497a6f2 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -386,6 +386,9 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, case READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS: func = INITRAMFS_CHECK; break; + case READING_POLICY: + func = POLICY_CHECK; + break; default: func = FILE_CHECK; break; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index d02560e..39a811a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] = { .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID}, {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, + {.action = MEASURE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, }; static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = { @@ -616,6 +617,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->func = KEXEC_CHECK; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "INITRAMFS_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = INITRAMFS_CHECK; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "POLICY_CHECK") == 0) + entry->func = POLICY_CHECK; else result = -EINVAL; if (!result) @@ -774,6 +777,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES; else if (entry->func == FIRMWARE_CHECK) temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE; + else if (entry->func == POLICY_CHECK) + temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY; audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result); audit_log_end(ab); return result; @@ -860,7 +865,7 @@ static char *mask_tokens[] = { enum { func_file = 0, func_mmap, func_bprm, func_module, func_firmware, func_post, - func_kexec, func_initramfs + func_kexec, func_initramfs, func_policy }; static char *func_tokens[] = { @@ -940,6 +945,9 @@ static void policy_func_show(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_hooks func) case INITRAMFS_CHECK: seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_initramfs)); break; + case POLICY_CHECK: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_policy)); + break; default: snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", func); seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), tbuf); -- 2.1.0