On Thu, 2016-08-11 at 17:38 +1000, Balbir Singh wrote: > > On 09/08/16 22:36, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Tue, 2016-08-09 at 15:19 +1000, Balbir Singh wrote: > >> > >> On 04/08/16 22:24, Mimi Zohar wrote: > >>> The TPM PCRs are only reset on a hard reboot. In order to validate a > >>> TPM's quote after a soft reboot (eg. kexec -e), the IMA measurement list > >>> of the running kernel must be saved and then restored on the subsequent > >>> boot. > >>> > >>> The existing securityfs binary_runtime_measurements file conveniently > >>> provides a serialized format of the IMA measurement list. This patch > >>> set serializes the measurement list in this format and restores it. > >>> > >>> This patch set pre-req's Thiago Bauermann's "kexec_file: Add buffer > >>> hand-over for the next kernel" patch set* for actually carrying the > >>> serialized measurement list across the kexec. > >>> > >>> Mimi > >>> > >> > >> Hi, Mimi > >> > >> I am trying to convince myself of the security of the solution. I asked > >> Thiago as well, but may be I am be lagging behind in understanding. > >> > >> We trust the kernel to hand over PCR values of the old kernel (which > >> cannot be validated) to the IMA subsystem in the new kernel for storage. > >> I guess the idea is for ima_add_boot_aggregate to do the right thing? > >> How do we validate what the old kernel is giving us? Why do we care for > >> the old measurement list? Is it still of significance in the new kernel? > >> > > > > Hi Balbir, > > > > To validate the hardware TPM PCR values requires walking the measurement > > list simulating the TPM extend operation. The resulting values should > > match the hardware TPM PCRs. > > > > In the case of a soft reboot, the TPM PCRs are not reset to 0, so all > > the measurements of the running system, including those from previous > > soft reboots, need to be included in the measurement list. Without > > these measurements, the simulated PCR values will not match the hardware > > TPM PCR values. Thus the need for this patch set. > > > > Measurements can not be added/removed/changed in the measurement list > > without it being detectable. > > > > Thanks Mimi > > I think that makes sense > > So effectively we do > > first kernel boot -> <measurements match PCR and measurements are saved> > second kernel boot -> <new PCR = first save measurements + new measurements> > > and so on No, the running system doesn't verify the measurement list against the PCRs, before saving and carrying it across kexec. If the system has been compromised, it can't be trusted to verify itself. Verifying the measurement list needs to be done by a trusted third party. The system just carries the measurement list(s) across kexec. Mimi
