>From experimentation and from looking at the sources, it appears that the signature checking is only done in the kexec_file_load(2) system all, and not in the kexec_load(2) system call. And I understand why -- the signature is not sent from userspace to the kernel in the older kexec_load(2) system call. The problem is that if you use an old version of kexec, it will use the old kexec_load(2) system call, and even though CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is enabled, kexec_load(2) will happily load an unsigned kernel, and then "kexec -e" will happily boot into it. Correct me if I am wrong, but this appears to be a hole in Secure Boot you could drive a Mack Truck through. (I noticed this because Debian is still using a kexec-tools from the stone ages, version 2.0.7, and I was wondering **why** I was able to kexec boot completely unsigned kernels.) It would appear to me that if CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is enabled, the old kexec_load(2) system call should be disabled (and a warning be placed in the Kconfig help that the user should have at least verision 2.X of kexec-tools if they enable this kernel option). Am I missing something? - Ted
