On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 03:11:03PM +0100, David Howells wrote: > issuer and subject are mandatory fields in the ASN.1 and so their existence > needn't be tested for. They are guaranteed to end up with an empty string if > the name material has nothing we can use (see x509_fabricate_name()). > > Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter at oracle.com> > Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com> Looks good to me. Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal at redhat.com> Thanks Vivek > --- > crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 6 ++---- > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c > index 51ff36f3a913..c62cf8006e1f 100644 > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c > @@ -190,14 +190,12 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, > if (ret < 0) > return ret; > > - if (x509->issuer) > - pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer); > + pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer); > if (x509->authority) > pr_debug("- authkeyid %s\n", x509->authority); > > if (!x509->authority || > - (x509->subject && > - strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0)) { > + strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0) { > /* If there's no authority certificate specified, then > * the certificate must be self-signed and is the root > * of the chain. Likewise if the cert is its own