> On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 08:52:22AM +0000, Reshetova, Elena wrote: > > > On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 03:29:07PM +0000, Reshetova, Elena wrote: > > > > And this is a very special aspect of 'hardening' since it is about hardening a > > > kernel > > > > under different threat model/assumptions. > > > > > > I am not sure it's that special in that hardening IMHO is not a specific > > > threat model or a set of assumptions. IIUC it's just something that > > > helps reduce severity of vulnerabilities. Similarly, one can use the CC > > > hardware in a variety of ways I guess. And one way is just that - > > > hardening linux such that ability to corrupt guest memory does not > > > automatically escalate into guest code execution. > > > > I am not sure if I fully follow you on this. I do agree that it is in principle > > the same 'hardening' that we have been doing in Linux for decades just > > applied to a new attack surface, host <-> guest, vs userspace <->kernel. > > Sorry about being unclear this is not the type of hardening I meant > really. The "hardening" you meant is preventing kernel vulnerabilities, > right? This is what we've been doing for decades. > But I meant slightly newer things like e.g. KASLR or indeed ASLR generally - > we are trying to reduce a chance a vulnerability causes random > code execution as opposed to a DOS. To think in these terms you do not > need to think about attack surfaces - in the system including > a hypervisor, guest supervisor and guest userspace hiding > one component from others is helpful even if they share > a privelege level. Do you mean that the fact that CoCo guest has memory encrypted can help even in non-CoCo scenarios? I am sorry, I still seem not to be able to grasp your idea fully. When the privilege level is shared, there is no incentive to perform privilege escalation attacks across components, so why hide them from each other? Data protection? But I don’t think you are talking about this? I do agree that KASLR is stronger when you remove the possibility to read the memory (make sure kernel code is execute only) you are trying to attack, but again not sure if you mean this. > > > > > Interfaces have changed, but the types of vulnerabilities, etc are the same. > > The attacker model is somewhat different because we have > > different expectations on what host/hypervisor should be able to do > > to the guest (following business reasons and use-cases), versus what we > > expect normal userspace being able to "do" towards kernel. The host and > > hypervisor still has a lot of control over the guest (ability to start/stop it, > > manage its resources, etc). But the reasons behind this doesn’t come > > from the fact that security CoCo HW not being able to support this stricter > > security model (it cannot now indeed, but this is a design decision), but > > from the fact that it is important for Cloud service providers to retain that > > level of control over their infrastructure. > > Surely they need ability to control resource usage, not ability to execute DOS > attacks. Current hardware just does not have ability to allow the former > without the later. I don’t see why it cannot be added to HW if requirement comes. However, I think in cloud provider world being able to control resources equals to being able to deny these resources when required, so being able to denial of service its clients is kind of build-in expectation that everyone just agrees on. > > > > > > > If you put it this way, you get to participate in a well understood > > > problem space instead of constantly saying "yes but CC is special". And > > > further, you will now talk about features as opposed to fixing bugs. > > > Which will stop annoying people who currently seem annoyed by the > > > implication that their code is buggy simply because it does not cache in > > > memory all data read from hardware. Finally, you then don't really need > > > to explain why e.g. DoS is not a problem but info leak is a problem - when > > > for many users it's actually the reverse - the reason is not that it's > > > not part of a threat model - which then makes you work hard to define > > > the threat model - but simply that CC hardware does not support this > > > kind of hardening. > > > > But this won't be correct statement, because it is not limitation of HW, but the > > threat and business model that Confidential Computing exists in. I am not > > aware of a single cloud provider who would be willing to use the HW that > > takes the full control of their infrastructure and running confidential guests, > > leaving them with no mechanisms to control the load balancing, enforce > > resource usage, etc. So, given that nobody needs/willing to use such HW, > > such HW simply doesn’t exist. > > > > So, I would still say that the model we operate in CoCo usecases is somewhat > > special, but I do agree that given that we list a couple of these special > assumptions > > (over which ones we have no control or ability to influence, none of us are > business > > people), then the rest becomes just careful enumeration of attack surface > interfaces > > and break up of potential mitigations. > > > > Best Regards, > > Elena. > > > > I'd say each business has a slightly different business model, no? > Finding common ground is what helps us share code ... Fully agree, and a good discussion with everyone willing to listen and cooperate can go a long way into defining the best implementation. Best Regards, Elena.
