On Sat, Jun 05, 2021 at 05:03:57PM +0200, John Wood wrote: > [...] > the kselftest to avoid the detection ;) ). So, in this version, to track > all the statistical data (info related with application crashes), the > extended attributes feature for the executable files are used. The xattr is > also used to mark the executables as "not allowed" when an attack is > detected. Then, the execve system call rely on this flag to avoid following > executions of this file. I have some concerns about this being actually usable and not creating DoS situations. For example, let's say an attacker had found a hard-to-hit bug in "sudo", and starts brute forcing it. When the brute LSM notices, it'll make "sudo" unusable for the entire system, yes? And a reboot won't fix it, either, IIUC. It seems like there is a need to track "user" running "prog", and have that be timed out. Are there use-cases here where that wouldn't be sufficient? -Kees -- Kees Cook
