On 8/11/2020 1:48 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
[...snip]
It is a
good practice to check as soon as possible such properties, and it may
enables to avoid (user space) time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU)
attacks (i.e. misuse of already open resources).
The assumption that security checks should happen as early as possible
can actually cause security problems. For example, because seccomp was
designed to do its checks as early as possible, including before
ptrace, we had an issue for a long time where the ptrace API could be
abused to bypass seccomp filters.
Please don't decide that a check must be ordered first _just_ because
it is a security check. While that can be good for limiting attack
surface, it can also create issues when the idea is applied too
broadly.
I'd be interested with such security issue examples.
I hope that delaying checks will not be an issue for mechanisms such as
IMA or IPE:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1544699060.6703.11.camel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx/
Any though Mimi, Deven, Chrome OS folks?
I don't see an issue with IPE. As long as the hypothetical new syscall
and associated security hook have the file struct available in the
hook, it should integrate fairly easily.
[...snip]
