On Tue, Jun 16, 2020 at 09:26:31AM -0600, Jens Axboe wrote: > On 6/16/20 3:12 AM, Stefano Garzarella wrote: > > On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 11:00:25AM -0600, Jens Axboe wrote: > >> On 6/15/20 7:33 AM, Stefano Garzarella wrote: > >>> On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 11:04:06AM +0200, Jann Horn wrote: > >>>> +Kees, Christian, Sargun, Aleksa, kernel-hardening for their opinions > >>>> on seccomp-related aspects > >>>> > >>>> On Tue, Jun 9, 2020 at 4:24 PM Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >>>>> Hi Jens, > >>>>> Stefan and I have a proposal to share with io_uring community. > >>>>> Before implementing it we would like to discuss it to receive feedbacks and > >>>>> to see if it could be accepted: > >>>>> > >>>>> Adding restrictions to io_uring > >>>>> ===================================== > >>>>> The io_uring API provides submission and completion queues for performing > >>>>> asynchronous I/O operations. The queues are located in memory that is > >>>>> accessible to both the host userspace application and the kernel, making it > >>>>> possible to monitor for activity through polling instead of system calls. This > >>>>> design offers good performance and this makes exposing io_uring to guests an > >>>>> attractive idea for improving I/O performance in virtualization. > >>>> [...] > >>>>> Restrictions > >>>>> ------------ > >>>>> This document proposes io_uring API changes that safely allow untrusted > >>>>> applications or guests to use io_uring. io_uring's existing security model is > >>>>> that of kernel system call handler code. It is designed to reject invalid > >>>>> inputs from host userspace applications. Supporting guests as io_uring API > >>>>> clients adds a new trust domain with access to even fewer resources than host > >>>>> userspace applications. > >>>>> > >>>>> Guests do not have direct access to host userspace application file descriptors > >>>>> or memory. The host userspace application, a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) such > >>>>> as QEMU, grants access to a subset of its file descriptors and memory. The > >>>>> allowed file descriptors are typically the disk image files belonging to the > >>>>> guest. The memory is typically the virtual machine's RAM that the VMM has > >>>>> allocated on behalf of the guest. > >>>>> > >>>>> The following extensions to the io_uring API allow the host application to > >>>>> grant access to some of its file descriptors. > >>>>> > >>>>> These extensions are designed to be applicable to other use cases besides > >>>>> untrusted guests and are not virtualization-specific. For example, the > >>>>> restrictions can be used to allow only a subset of sqe operations available to > >>>>> an application similar to seccomp syscall whitelisting. > >>>>> > >>>>> An address translation and memory restriction mechanism would also be > >>>>> necessary, but we can discuss this later. > >>>>> > >>>>> The IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode > >>>>> ---------------------------------------- > >>>>> The new io_uring_register(2) IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode permanently > >>>>> installs a feature whitelist on an io_ring_ctx. The io_ring_ctx can then be > >>>>> passed to untrusted code with the knowledge that only operations present in the > >>>>> whitelist can be executed. > >>>> > >>>> This approach of first creating a normal io_uring instance and then > >>>> installing restrictions separately in a second syscall means that it > >>>> won't be possible to use seccomp to restrict newly created io_uring > >>>> instances; code that should be subject to seccomp restrictions and > >>>> uring restrictions would only be able to use preexisting io_uring > >>>> instances that have already been configured by trusted code. > >>>> > >>>> So I think that from the seccomp perspective, it might be preferable > >>>> to set up these restrictions in the io_uring_setup() syscall. It might > >>>> also be a bit nicer from a code cleanliness perspective, since you > >>>> won't have to worry about concurrently changing restrictions. > >>>> > >>> > >>> Thank you for these details! > >>> > >>> It seems feasible to include the restrictions during io_uring_setup(). > >>> > >>> The only doubt concerns the possibility of allowing the trusted code to > >>> do some operations, before passing queues to the untrusted code, for > >>> example registering file descriptors, buffers, eventfds, etc. > >>> > >>> To avoid this, I should include these operations in io_uring_setup(), > >>> adding some code that I wanted to avoid by reusing io_uring_register(). > >>> > >>> If I add restrictions in io_uring_setup() and then add an operation to > >>> go into safe mode (e.g. a flag in io_uring_enter()), we would have the same > >>> problem, right? > >>> > >>> Just to be clear, I mean something like this: > >>> > >>> /* params will include restrictions */ > >>> fd = io_uring_setup(entries, params); > >>> > >>> /* trusted code */ > >>> io_uring_register_files(fd, ...); > >>> io_uring_register_buffers(fd, ...); > >>> io_uring_register_eventfd(fd, ...); > >>> > >>> /* enable safe mode */ > >>> io_uring_enter(fd, ..., IORING_ENTER_ENABLE_RESTRICTIONS); > >>> > >>> > >>> Anyway, including a list of things to register in the 'params', passed > >>> to io_uring_setup(), should be feasible, if Jens agree :-) > >> > >> I wonder how best to deal with this, in terms of ring visibility vs > >> registering restrictions. We could potentially start the ring in a > >> disabled mode, if asked to. It'd still be visible in terms of having > >> the fd installed, but it'd just error requests. That'd leave you with > >> time to do the various setup routines needed before then flagging it > >> as enabled. My only worry on that would be adding overhead for doing > >> that. It'd be cheap enough to check for IORING_SETUP_DISABLED in > >> ctx->flags in io_uring_enter(), and return -EBADFD or something if > >> that's the case. That doesn't cover the SQPOLL case though, but maybe we > >> just don't start the sq thread if IORING_SETUP_DISABLED is set. > > > > It seems to me a very good approach and easy to implement. In this way > > we can reuse io_uring_register() without having to modify too much > > io_uring_setup(). > > Right > > >> We'd need a way to clear IORING_SETUP_DISABLED through > >> io_uring_register(). When clearing, that could then start the sq thread > >> as well, when SQPOLL is set. > > > > Could we do it using io_uring_enter() since we have a flag field or > > do you think it's semantically incorrect? > > Either way is probably fine, I gravitated towards io_uring_register() > since any io_uring_enter() should fail if the ring is disabled. But I > guess it's fine to allow the "enable" operation through io_uring_enter. > Keep in mind that io_uring_enter is the hottest path, where > io_uring_register is not nearly as hot and we can allow ourselves a bit > more flexibility there. Right, now I see and I totally agree! > > In summary, I'd be fine with io_uring_enter if it's slim and lean, still > leaning towards doing it in io_uring_register as it seems like a more > natural fit. Thanks for the clarification. I'll take that into account. Stefano
