Re: [PATCH v10 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options

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Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 4 Jul 2019 12:53:49 -0700
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@xxxxxxxxx>, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>, James Morris <jamorris@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxxxx>, James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>, Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@xxxxxxxxxx>, Kostya Serebryany <kcc@xxxxxxxxxx>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@xxxxxxxxxx>, Sandeep Patil <sspatil@xxxxxxxxxxx>, Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>, Marco Elver <elver@xxxxxxxxxx>, Qian Cai <cai@xxxxxx>, Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@xxxxxxxxx>, linux-security-module <linux-security-module@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
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On Wed, 3 Jul 2019 13:40:26 +0200 Alexander Potapenko <glider@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> > There are unchangelogged alterations between v9 and v10.  The
> > replacement of IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING)) with
> > page_poisoning_enabled().
> In the case I send another version of the patch, do I need to
> retroactively add them to the changelog?

I don't think the world could stand another version ;)

Please simply explain this change for the reviewers?

Follow-Ups:
- Re: [PATCH v10 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options
  - From: Alexander Potapenko

References:
- [PATCH v10 0/3] add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options
  - From: Alexander Potapenko
- [PATCH v10 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options
  - From: Alexander Potapenko
- Re: [PATCH v10 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options
  - From: Andrew Morton
- Re: [PATCH v10 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options
  - From: Alexander Potapenko

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