Re: [PATCH 1/1] io_uring: prevent reg-wait speculations

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On 11/19/24 01:29, Pavel Begunkov wrote:
With *ENTER_EXT_ARG_REG instead of passing a user pointer with arguments
for the waiting loop the user can specify an offset into a pre-mapped
region of memory, in which case the
[offset, offset + sizeof(io_uring_reg_wait)) will be intepreted as the
argument.

Jann, do mind taking a look? I hope there is some clever trick with
masks we can use instead of the barrier, it seems expensive.

The byte offset user pases is 0 based and we add it to the base
kernel address:

if (unlikely(check_add_overflow(offset, sizeof(struct ...), &end) ||
	     end > ctx->cq_wait_size))
	return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);

barrier_nospec();
return ctx->cq_wait_arg + offset;

Here in particular we know the structure size, but I also wonder how
to do it right if size is variable.


As we address a kernel array using a user given index, it'd be a subject
to speculation type of exploits.

Fixes: d617b3147d54c ("io_uring: restore back registered wait arguments")
Fixes: aa00f67adc2c0 ("io_uring: add support for fixed wait regions")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@xxxxxxxxx>
---
  io_uring/io_uring.c | 1 +
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c
index da8fd460977b..3a3e4fca1545 100644
--- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
@@ -3207,6 +3207,7 @@ static struct io_uring_reg_wait *io_get_ext_arg_reg(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
  		     end > ctx->cq_wait_size))
  		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+ barrier_nospec();
  	return ctx->cq_wait_arg + offset;
  }

--
Pavel Begunkov




[Index of Archives]     [Linux Samsung SoC]     [Linux Rockchip SoC]     [Linux Actions SoC]     [Linux for Synopsys ARC Processors]     [Linux NFS]     [Linux NILFS]     [Linux USB Devel]     [Video for Linux]     [Linux Audio Users]     [Yosemite News]     [Linux Kernel]     [Linux SCSI]


  Powered by Linux