On 8/30/2022 6:08 AM, Joel Granados wrote:
> Hey Casey
>
> I have tested this patch and I see the smack_uring_cmd prevents access
> to file when smack labels are different. They way I got there was a bit
> convoluted and I'll describe it here so ppl can judge how valid the test
> is.
>
> Tested-by: Joel Granados <j.granados@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Thank you.
>
> I started by reproducing what Kanchan had done by changing the smack
> label from "_" to "Snap". Then I ran the io_uring passthrough test
> included in liburing with an unprivileged user and saw that the
> smack_uring_cmd function was NOT executed because smack prevented an open on
> the device file ("/dev/ng0n1" on my box).
>
> So here I got a bit sneaky and changed the label after the open to the
> device was done. This is how I did it:
> 1. In the io_uring_passthrough.c tests I stopped execution after the
> device was open and before the actual IO.
> 2. While on hold I changed the label of the device from "_" to "Snap".
> At this point the device had a "Snap" label and the executable had a
> "_" label.
> 3. Previous to execution I had placed a printk inside the
> smack_uring_cmd function. And I also made sure to printk whenever
> security_uring_command returned because of a security violation.
> 4. I continued execution and saw that both smack_uiring_cmd and
> io_uring_cmd returned error. Which is what I expected.
>
> I'm still a bit unsure of my setup so if anyone has comments or a way to
> make it better, I would really appreciate feedback.
This is a perfectly rational approach to the test. Another approach
would be to add a Smack access rule:
echo "_ Snap r" > /sys/fs/smackfs/load2
and label the device before the test begins. Step 2 changes from labeling
the device to removing the access rule:
echo "_ Snap -" > /sys/fs/smackfs/load2
and you will get the same result. I wouldn't change your test, but I
would probably add another that does it using the rule change.
> Best
>
> Joel
>
> On Mon, Aug 29, 2022 at 09:20:09AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 8/27/2022 8:59 AM, Kanchan Joshi wrote:
>>> On Tue, Aug 23, 2022 at 04:46:18PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>> Limit io_uring "cmd" options to files for which the caller has
>>>> Smack read access. There may be cases where the cmd option may
>>>> be closer to a write access than a read, but there is no way
>>>> to make that determination.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> --
>>>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>> 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>>>> index 001831458fa2..bffccdc494cb 100644
>>>> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>>>> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>>>> @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
>>>> #include <linux/fs_context.h>
>>>> #include <linux/fs_parser.h>
>>>> #include <linux/watch_queue.h>
>>>> +#include <linux/io_uring.h>
>>>> #include "smack.h"
>>>>
>>>> #define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
>>>> @@ -4732,6 +4733,36 @@ static int smack_uring_sqpoll(void)
>>>> return -EPERM;
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> +/**
>>>> + * smack_uring_cmd - check on file operations for io_uring
>>>> + * @ioucmd: the command in question
>>>> + *
>>>> + * Make a best guess about whether a io_uring "command" should
>>>> + * be allowed. Use the same logic used for determining if the
>>>> + * file could be opened for read in the absence of better criteria.
>>>> + */
>>>> +static int smack_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
>>>> +{
>>>> + struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
>>>> + struct smk_audit_info ad;
>>>> + struct task_smack *tsp;
>>>> + struct inode *inode;
>>>> + int rc;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (!file)
>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>> +
>>>> + tsp = smack_cred(file->f_cred);
>>>> + inode = file_inode(file);
>>>> +
>>>> + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
>>>> + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
>>>> + rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
>>>> + rc = smk_bu_credfile(file->f_cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
>>>> +
>>>> + return rc;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
>>>>
>>>> struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>>>> @@ -4889,6 +4920,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[]
>>>> __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>>>> #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
>>>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, smack_uring_override_creds),
>>>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, smack_uring_sqpoll),
>>>> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, smack_uring_cmd),
>>>> #endif
>>> Tried this on nvme device (/dev/ng0n1).
>>> Took a while to come out of noob setup-related issues but I see that
>>> smack is listed (in /sys/kernel/security/lsm), smackfs is present, and
>>> the hook (smack_uring_cmd) gets triggered fine on doing I/O on
>>> /dev/ng0n1.
>>>
>>> I/O goes fine, which seems aligned with the label on /dev/ng0n1 (which
>>> is set to floor).
>>>
>>> $ chsmack -L /dev/ng0n1
>>> /dev/ng0n1 access="_"
>> Setting the Smack on the object that the cmd operates on to
>> something other than "_" would be the correct test. If that
>> is /dev/ng0n1 you could use
>>
>> # chsmack -a Snap /dev/ng0n1
>>
>> The unprivileged user won't be able to read /dev/ng0n1 so you
>> won't get as far as testing the cmd interface. I don't know
>> io_uring and nvme well enough to know what other objects may
>> be involved. Noob here, too.
>>
>>> I ran fio (/usr/bin/fio), which also has the same label.
>>> Hope you expect the same outcome.
>>>
>>> Do you run something else to see that things are fine e.g. for
>>> /dev/null, which also has the same label "_".
>>> If yes, I can try the same on nvme side.
>>>
