Hello,
My syzkaller instance discovered 'KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds Read in
iov_iter_revert' bug on the v5.12 kernel (head
9f4ad9e425a1d3b6a34617b8ea226d56a119a717)
==================================================================
Kernel Crash Console Logs:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in iov_iter_revert+0x158/0x510
lib/iov_iter.c:1144
Read of size 8 at addr ffffc90000d7fa08 by task syz-executor871/333
CPU: 0 PID: 333 Comm: syz-executor871 Not tainted 5.12.0 #16
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
dump_stack+0xe9/0x15b lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description+0x81/0x3d0 mm/kasan/report.c:232
__kasan_report+0x170/0x1c0 mm/kasan/report.c:399
kasan_report+0x4f/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:416
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:177 [inline]
__asan_load8+0x94/0xb0 mm/kasan/generic.c:253
iov_iter_revert+0x158/0x510 lib/iov_iter.c:1144
io_write fs/io_uring.c:3457 [inline]
io_issue_sqe+0x3ce8/0x6050 fs/io_uring.c:6061
__io_queue_sqe+0xcd/0x3a0 fs/io_uring.c:6322
io_queue_sqe+0x7a/0x180 fs/io_uring.c:6375
io_submit_sqe+0x813/0xa10 fs/io_uring.c:6546
io_submit_sqes+0x61c/0xad0 fs/io_uring.c:6660
__do_sys_io_uring_enter fs/io_uring.c:9240 [inline]
__se_sys_io_uring_enter+0x28f/0xce0 fs/io_uring.c:9182
__x64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x82/0xa0 fs/io_uring.c:9182
do_syscall_64+0x37/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x44a2ed
Code: 28 c3 e8 06 2a 00 00 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48
89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d
01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffcc8342468 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001aa
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 000000000044a2ed
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffcc8342480 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffcc8342490
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000004c1018 R15: 0000000000000000
addr ffffc90000d7fa08 is located in stack of task syz-executor871/333
at offset 1672 in frame:
io_issue_sqe+0x0/0x6050 include/linux/refcount.h:283
this frame has 17 objects:
[32, 48) 'up.i'
[64, 72) 'file.i667'
[96, 112) 'data.i6.i'
[128, 144) 'data.i.i'
[160, 288) '__io.i'
[320, 416) 'msg.i424'
[448, 464) 'iov.i425'
[480, 848) 'iomsg.i370'
[912, 1008) 'msg.i'
[1040, 1056) 'iov.i'
[1072, 1440) 'iomsg.i'
[1504, 1536) 'ipt.i'
[1568, 1576) 'iovec.i182'
[1600, 1640) '__iter.i183'
[1680, 1808) 'inline_vecs.i'
[1840, 1848) 'iovec.i'
[1872, 1912) '__iter.i'
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffffc90000d7f900: 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00
ffffc90000d7f980: f2 f2 f2 f2 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2
>ffffc90000d7fa00: f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
^
ffffc90000d7fa80: 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 f3
ffffc90000d7fb00: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================
Syzkaller reproducer:
# {Threaded:false Collide:false Repeat:false RepeatTimes:0 Procs:1
Slowdown:1 Sandbox:none Fault:false FaultCall:-1 FaultNth:0 Leak:false
NetInjection:false NetDevices:false NetReset:false Cgroups:false
BinfmtMisc:false CloseFDs:false KCSAN:false DevlinkPCI:false USB:false
VhciInjection:false Wifi:false IEEE802154:false Sysctl:false
UseTmpDir:false HandleSegv:false Repro:false Trace:false}
r0 = syz_io_uring_setup(0x2, &(0x7f0000000080)={0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0x0, 0x0}, &(0x7f00000a0000)=nil, &(0x7f00000b0000)=nil,
&(0x7f0000000100)=<r1=>0x0, &(0x7f0000000240)=<r2=>0x0)
r3 = openat(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f0000000040)='./file0\x00', 0x4541, 0x0)
syz_io_uring_submit(r1, r2, &(0x7f0000000000)=@IORING_OP_WRITE={0x17,
0x0, 0x0, @fd=r3, 0x0, 0x0, 0xfffffffffffffff4}, 0x20)
io_uring_enter(r0, 0x1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0)
C reproducer:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#define SIZEOF_IO_URING_SQE 64
#define SIZEOF_IO_URING_CQE 16
#define SQ_TAIL_OFFSET 64
#define SQ_RING_MASK_OFFSET 256
#define SQ_RING_ENTRIES_OFFSET 264
#define CQ_RING_ENTRIES_OFFSET 268
#define CQ_CQES_OFFSET 320
struct io_sqring_offsets {
uint32_t head;
uint32_t tail;
uint32_t ring_mask;
uint32_t ring_entries;
uint32_t flags;
uint32_t dropped;
uint32_t array;
uint32_t resv1;
uint64_t resv2;
};
struct io_cqring_offsets {
uint32_t head;
uint32_t tail;
uint32_t ring_mask;
uint32_t ring_entries;
uint32_t overflow;
uint32_t cqes;
uint64_t resv[2];
};
struct io_uring_params {
uint32_t sq_entries;
uint32_t cq_entries;
uint32_t flags;
uint32_t sq_thread_cpu;
uint32_t sq_thread_idle;
uint32_t features;
uint32_t resv[4];
struct io_sqring_offsets sq_off;
struct io_cqring_offsets cq_off;
};
#define IORING_OFF_SQ_RING 0
#define IORING_OFF_SQES 0x10000000ULL
#define sys_io_uring_setup 425
static long syz_io_uring_setup(volatile long a0, volatile long a1,
volatile long a2, volatile long a3,
volatile long a4, volatile long a5)
{
uint32_t entries = (uint32_t)a0;
struct io_uring_params* setup_params = (struct io_uring_params*)a1;
void* vma1 = (void*)a2;
void* vma2 = (void*)a3;
void** ring_ptr_out = (void**)a4;
void** sqes_ptr_out = (void**)a5;
uint32_t fd_io_uring = syscall(sys_io_uring_setup, entries, setup_params);
uint32_t sq_ring_sz =
setup_params->sq_off.array + setup_params->sq_entries *
sizeof(uint32_t);
uint32_t cq_ring_sz = setup_params->cq_off.cqes +
setup_params->cq_entries * SIZEOF_IO_URING_CQE;
uint32_t ring_sz = sq_ring_sz > cq_ring_sz ? sq_ring_sz : cq_ring_sz;
*ring_ptr_out = mmap(vma1, ring_sz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED | MAP_POPULATE | MAP_FIXED, fd_io_uring,
IORING_OFF_SQ_RING);
uint32_t sqes_sz = setup_params->sq_entries * SIZEOF_IO_URING_SQE;
*sqes_ptr_out =
mmap(vma2, sqes_sz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED | MAP_POPULATE | MAP_FIXED, fd_io_uring,
IORING_OFF_SQES);
return fd_io_uring;
}
static long syz_io_uring_submit(volatile long a0, volatile long a1,
volatile long a2, volatile long a3)
{
char* ring_ptr = (char*)a0;
char* sqes_ptr = (char*)a1;
char* sqe = (char*)a2;
uint32_t sqes_index = (uint32_t)a3;
uint32_t sq_ring_entries = *(uint32_t*)(ring_ptr + SQ_RING_ENTRIES_OFFSET);
uint32_t cq_ring_entries = *(uint32_t*)(ring_ptr + CQ_RING_ENTRIES_OFFSET);
uint32_t sq_array_off =
(CQ_CQES_OFFSET + cq_ring_entries * SIZEOF_IO_URING_CQE + 63) & ~63;
if (sq_ring_entries)
sqes_index %= sq_ring_entries;
char* sqe_dest = sqes_ptr + sqes_index * SIZEOF_IO_URING_SQE;
memcpy(sqe_dest, sqe, SIZEOF_IO_URING_SQE);
uint32_t sq_ring_mask = *(uint32_t*)(ring_ptr + SQ_RING_MASK_OFFSET);
uint32_t* sq_tail_ptr = (uint32_t*)(ring_ptr + SQ_TAIL_OFFSET);
uint32_t sq_tail = *sq_tail_ptr & sq_ring_mask;
uint32_t sq_tail_next = *sq_tail_ptr + 1;
uint32_t* sq_array = (uint32_t*)(ring_ptr + sq_array_off);
*(sq_array + sq_tail) = sqes_index;
__atomic_store_n(sq_tail_ptr, sq_tail_next, __ATOMIC_RELEASE);
return 0;
}
#ifndef __NR_io_uring_enter
#define __NR_io_uring_enter 426
#endif
uint64_t r[4] = {0xffffffffffffffff, 0x0, 0x0, 0xffffffffffffffff};
void trigger_bug(void)
{
intptr_t res = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000084 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000088 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000008c = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000090 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000098 = 0;
memset((void*)0x2000009c, 0, 12);
res = -1;
res = syz_io_uring_setup(2, 0x20000080, 0x200a0000, 0x200b0000, 0x20000100,
0x20000240);
// res = 3
if (res != -1) {
r[0] = res; //3
r[1] = *(uint64_t*)0x20000100; // 0x0
r[2] = *(uint64_t*)0x20000240; // ./file
}
memcpy((void*)0x20000040, "./file0\000", 8);
res = syscall(__NR_openat, 0xffffff9c, 0x20000040ul, 0x4541ul, 0ul);
if (res != -1)
r[3] = res;
*(uint8_t*)0x20000000 = 0x17;
*(uint8_t*)0x20000001 = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x20000002 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000004 = r[3];
*(uint64_t*)0x20000008 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000010 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000018 = 0xfffffff4;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000001c = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000020 = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x20000028 = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x2000002a = 0;
syz_io_uring_submit(r[1], r[2], 0x20000000, 0x20);
syscall(__NR_io_uring_enter, r[0], 1, 0, 0ul, 0ul, 0ul);
}
int main(void)
{
// Preparatory steps
struct rlimit rlim;
rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 136 << 20;
setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim);
syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x20000000ul, 0x1000000ul, 7ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul);
trigger_bug();
return 0;
}
Kernel build config :
https://gist.github.com/oswalpalash/18e847d6e24e3452bc811526fd6f76bb
This issue has not yet been discovered by syzbot.
When rlimit is not set, unroll is set to 0. But when rlimit is set,
iov_iter_revert gets the input unroll = 2147479542 ( = MAX_RW_COUNT -
i->count ) and the only warning check implemented in that function is
if (WARN_ON(unroll > MAX_RW_COUNT))
return;
I'm still trying to understand this code better, but initially suspect
the warning check needs to be re-done.
