Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure. CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Anju T Sudhakar<anju@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c b/arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c index cb50a9e1fd2d..e837717492e4 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c @@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ static int thread_imc_event_init(struct perf_event *event) if (event->attr.type != event->pmu->type) return -ENOENT; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!perfmon_capable()) return -EACCES; /* Sampling not supported */ @@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@ static int trace_imc_event_init(struct perf_event *event) if (event->attr.type != event->pmu->type) return -ENOENT; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!perfmon_capable()) return -EACCES; /* Return if this is a couting event */ -- 2.24.1 _______________________________________________ Intel-gfx mailing list Intel-gfx@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx
