Hi Daniel,
Speaking as individual with chair hat off.
I'll let authors detail more responses. See
inline for my comments.
On Wed, Nov 27, 2019, 2:35 AM Daniel Migault <daniel.migault=40ericsson.com@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Hi,I do have some architecture concerns regarding the Geneve specification. My concerns have already been raised to the WG but I have not been convinced these have been resolved. I am not claiming that I am not wrong nor that I am not on the rough but for more transparency, I prefer reiterating my concern.
These were discussed at the mic and I personally think the concerns were not valid or valid ones were already addressed. Neither does the WG shared the concerns you are expressing, reading from the comments from authors and folks at the mic (refer to meeting minutes)
In my opinion, the transit devices that are not part of the generic NVO3 architecture RFC8014 should not be part of the Geneve specification as they do raise - at least to me - significant concerns.Transit devices are placed on-path of a session established between end points (NVE) which results in a three parties communication.
You are assuming the requirement here, when there is none.
The absence of explicit signaling between the the NVE and the transit device contradicts of rfc8558 - though mostly focused on TCP. The consequence I am concerned is, in my opinion, that the presence of transit devices will slow down or prevent securing NVE-to-NVE communications.
Says who?. Speaking with deployment experience of overlay network, what you mention is hypothesis. This is not how things work. Transit device is not in the mix when overlay dataplane is setup.
Typically, the document recommends securing the NVE-to-NVE communication with DTLS or IPsec which results in "bypassing" the transit devices. While the draft specifies the transit devices should not block an encrypted communication, my concern is that encrypting communications makes transit devices useless.
It is intended and as per arch RFC.
In that sense, a NVE that is not aware that no transit devices are on its path will not secure the NVE-to-NVE communication.
Please do not make assumptions. Real deployment do not go by assumption. Security of the traffic is by design and not because of transit device or whether NVE has that info. You are introducing totally non-existent requirement of NVEs being aware of transit devices. In my deployment, traffic is secured, based on how we set up overlays, not because it has to transit or not. That is outside the scope of dataplane.
As a result, my understanding is that with DTLS/IPsec: either the transit devices constitute a major obstacle to the deployment of securing NVE-to-NVE communications or transit devices have been designed to be useless.
Your assumption is wrong and not true.
Note that communication security does not necessarily needs to be performed by DTLS or IPsec, and that securing at the overlaylayer could accommodate the transit device. However, there has been no consensus on the security requirements yet, so in my opinion it is premature to rely on such mechanisms.
I would advise the authors of requirements draft (if there exists one) publish and start building consensus with the WG, if certain new arch for overlays has to be undertaken. Based on the adopted arch/rfc, the geneve draft is inline with the arch.
Cheers
Sam
Yours,Daniel--On Thu, Oct 24, 2019 at 2:42 PM The IESG <iesg-secretary@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
The IESG has received a request from the Network Virtualization Overlays WG
(nvo3) to consider the following document: - 'Geneve: Generic Network
Virtualization Encapsulation'
<draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-14.txt> as Proposed Standard
The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
last-call@xxxxxxxx mailing lists by 2019-11-07. Exceptionally, comments may
be sent to iesg@xxxxxxxx instead. In either case, please retain the beginning
of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
Abstract
Network virtualization involves the cooperation of devices with a
wide variety of capabilities such as software and hardware tunnel
endpoints, transit fabrics, and centralized control clusters. As a
result of their role in tying together different elements in the
system, the requirements on tunnels are influenced by all of these
components. Flexibility is therefore the most important aspect of a
tunnel protocol if it is to keep pace with the evolution of the
system. This document describes Geneve, an encapsulation protocol
designed to recognize and accommodate these changing capabilities and
needs.
The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve/
IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve/ballot/
The following IPR Declarations may be related to this I-D:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/2424/
https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/2423/
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