Prompted by Dan's operational review I glanced at the YANG which does indeed need some work. There are two modules in the I-D, ietf-voucher-request ietf-mud-brski-masa the latter being in an appendix; I am unclear whether or not this appendix is Normative.. IANA Considerations registers a namespace for the second; it does not register either module. XXXX is used to refer to two I-D, one of which appears not to exist, the other would appear to be a published RFC. The first module references RFC8040 which is not in the references for the I-D The first module contains see [RFC8446]) which would be better as a YANG reference clause and should not contain [] The second module lacks a reference clause for its imports Security Considerations lack the required boiler plate for YANG modules The second module lacks Copyright Tom Petch ----- Original Message ----- From: "The IESG" <iesg-secretary@xxxxxxxx> To: "IETF-Announce" <ietf-announce@xxxxxxxx> Cc: <ibagdona@xxxxxxxxx>; <draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra@xxxxxxxx>; <anima@xxxxxxxx>; <anima-chairs@xxxxxxxx> Sent: Tuesday, May 21, 2019 10:21 PM > The IESG has received a request from the Autonomic Networking Integrated > Model and Approach WG (anima) to consider the following document: - > 'Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)' > <draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-20.txt> as Proposed Standard > > This is a second Last Call. IoT Directorate review was done after the ANIMA > WG Last Call and consensus to request the publication, and that review resulted > in substantial changes to the document. > > The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final > comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the > ietf@xxxxxxxx mailing lists by 2019-06-04. Exceptionally, comments may be > sent to iesg@xxxxxxxx instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of > the Subject line to allow automated sorting. > > Abstract > > > This document specifies automated bootstrapping of an Autonomic > Control Plane. To do this a remote secure key infrastructure (BRSKI) > is created using manufacturer installed X.509 certificate, in > combination with a manufacturer's authorizing service, both online > and offline. Bootstrapping a new device can occur using a routable > address and a cloud service, or using only link-local connectivity, > or on limited/disconnected networks. Support for lower security > models, including devices with minimal identity, is described for > legacy reasons but not encouraged. Bootstrapping is complete when > the cryptographic identity of the new key infrastructure is > successfully deployed to the device but the established secure > connection can be used to deploy a locally issued certificate to the > device as well. > > > > > The file can be obtained via > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra / > > IESG discussion can be tracked via > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra /ballot/ > > The following IPR Declarations may be related to this I-D: > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/2816/ > https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/3233/ > https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/2463/ > > > > The document contains these normative downward references. > See RFC 3967 for additional information: > rfc8368: Using an Autonomic Control Plane for Stable Connectivity of Network Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) (Informational - IETF stream) > > >
