Hi Christian,
Thanks for your review.
There is a typo there, wrong copy and paste. It should be RFC8415 and RFC8026, as we discussed after your review.
My point, as discussed in the previous email exchange, is that this is a generic issue of DHCP. DHCP is used by both residential and non-residential service provisioning, and I don't see how we can solve that problem unless we implement some new DHCP "extension" that apply end-to-end encryption between, in this case, the CEs and the servers.
I can have a security section with basically replicates the text available in RFC8415 Security Section, including considerations of using IEEE-802.1X, DHCP snooping/guard/access control mechanisms, use of TR-069 access control mechanisms, etc.
I'm also happy to add your suggested paragraph regarding additional security analysis in more challenging environments.
Or maybe the correction of the RFC8415 references is sufficient in your opinion or you will prefer some additional text to summarize the RFC8415 security considerations/mitigations?
I'm going to wait a couple of days, in case there are further inputs, before uploading a new version correcting the mistake and also take in considerations the suggestions from the Gen-ART review a couple of days ago.
Regards,
Jordi
-----Mensaje original-----
De: v6ops <v6ops-bounces@xxxxxxxx> en nombre de Christian Huitema <huitema@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Fecha: lunes, 7 de enero de 2019, 7:28
Para: <secdir@xxxxxxxx>
CC: <v6ops@xxxxxxxx>, <ietf@xxxxxxxx>, <draft-ietf-v6ops-transition-ipv4aas..all@xxxxxxxx>
Asunto: [v6ops] Secdir telechat review of draft-ietf-v6ops-transition-ipv4aas-12
Reviewer: Christian Huitema
Review result: Ready
I already reviewed the version 11 of this draft. From a security point of view,
the main change between the two versions is the addition of a paragraph
acknowledging the potential risks of relying on DHCP for configuration. To
quote: "As described in [RFC8026] and [RFC8026] Security Consideration
sections, there are generic DHCP security issues, which in the case of this
document means that malicious nodes may alter the priority of the transition
mechanisms."
Well, on the one hand, this does directly address the point I raised in the
previous review. On the other hand, it is a bit sad to have a dry
acknowledgement like that, without any hint at mitigations. If I was writing an
April's fool RFC, I would qualify that as one of those security sections that
seem written primarily for appeasing the security reviewer. But then, do we
want to give some advice to implementers? For example, do we want to tell them
that it is OK to deploy compliant devices in a basic home network? Probably. In
the branch office of a financial institution? Most probably not. Do we have a
way to convey that in simple terms? I would add something like:
"As stated in the introduction, this document addresses deployment of IPv4 as a
service in a residential or small-office network. Deployment in more
challenging environments would require additional security analysis."
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