I understand that the issuer has no choice.
What I can't see is how any validator will accept the new certificate.
The new cert will fail the validation check required by the field in the
existing certificate.
So it seems that the only remedy is to wait until the exist certificate
expires, so that the hash is no longer valid, and then a new cleann cert
can be issued that will be accepted.
But there is no reference in the "remedy" to waiting for the expiration.
In fact, it is only imiplictly stated that the hash expectation is no
longer valid once the certificate is expired.
Another possibility is that I am completely missing the point of the new
field. If the new clean unexpected cert will be accepted, what behavior
is improved by having the hash in the current cert.
Yours,
Joel
On 1/4/19 9:41 PM, Russ Housley wrote:
Joel:
If access to the key is lost, the commitment is broken, so the Root CA
must make a fresh start using a completely unrelated key. Maybe the
word "remedy" is creating the wrong impression for you.
Russ
On Jan 4, 2019, at 6:42 PM, jmh.direct@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
<mailto:jmh.direct@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
If the new self-signed cert uses a new key, wouldn't that be rejected
as violating the promise in the current cert? I am missing something.
Thanks,
Joel
Sent via the Samsung Galaxy S7, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone
-------- Original message --------
From: Russ Housley <housley@xxxxxxxxxxxx <mailto:housley@xxxxxxxxxxxx>>
Date: 1/4/19 17:57 (GMT-05:00)
To: Joel Halpern <jmh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx <mailto:jmh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>>
Cc: IETF Gen-ART <gen-art@xxxxxxxx <mailto:gen-art@xxxxxxxx>>,
spasm@xxxxxxxx <mailto:spasm@xxxxxxxx>,
draft-ietf-lamps-hash-of-root-key-cert-extn.all@xxxxxxxx
<mailto:draft-ietf-lamps-hash-of-root-key-cert-extn.all@xxxxxxxx>,
IETF <ietf@xxxxxxxx <mailto:ietf@xxxxxxxx>>
Subject: Re: Genart last call review of
draft-ietf-lamps-hash-of-root-key-cert-extn-03
Joel:
Thanks for the review.
> Document: draft-ietf-lamps-hash-of-root-key-cert-extn-03
> Reviewer: Joel Halpern
> Review Date: 2019-01-04
> IETF LC End Date: 2019-01-10
> IESG Telechat date: Not scheduled for a telechat
>
> Summary: This draft is nearly ready for publication as an
Informational RFC.
>
> Major issues: N/A
>
> Minor issues:
> The explanation at the end of section 5 about the remedy for
losing access
> to the new root key left me confused.
> It looks like the situation is that there is a certificate out
there, with the
> hash of root key extensions. The certificate owner loses access to
the new key
> pair underlying the hash. The certificate owner clearly has to issue
a new key
> pair. So far, so good.
>
> What the text seems to say is to simply issue a new self-signed
certificate.
> There are two possibilities for what is intended. I think the idea
is that the
> new certificate will use the existing key pair (not the promised
one, nor
> another new one) for its own signature, and include a new hash of
root key for
> the newly generated pair. If the certificate owner can do that (I
have not
> dived into the rest of the certificate operations to figure out if
that is
> legal) then it works. Please add some words explaining that better.
If the
> certificate owner can not simply issue a new self-signed certificate
with the
> existing key pair, then I am lost. It appears that the text says
that the
> certificate owner issues a new self-signed certificate using a new
key pair.
> But that will fail the check against the previous certificate hash
of root key.
> I am hoping that it is the first of these alternatives, and all that
is needed
> is clearer explanatory text stating that the new cert uses the
existing key
> pair, and includes a new hash of root key promise.
Joel, the Root CA want to start using a different key par, but they
have lost access to the one that was previously generated for that
purpose. So, the remedy is to create a new self-signed certificate
with a newly generated key.
Does that help? If so, what would make the paragraph more clear?
Russ
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