Christian, As mentioned by Jordi, RFC8026 already describes the attack vector you mentioned. Wouldn't pointing to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8415#section-22 be sufficient here? Cheers, Med > -----Message d'origine----- > De : ietf [mailto:ietf-bounces@xxxxxxxx] De la part de Christian Huitema > Envoyé : vendredi 14 décembre 2018 08:26 > À : JORDI PALET MARTINEZ; secdir@xxxxxxxx > Cc : v6ops@xxxxxxxx; ietf@xxxxxxxx; draft-ietf-v6ops-transition- > ipv4aas.all@xxxxxxxx > Objet : Re: [v6ops] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-v6ops-transition- > ipv4aas-11 > > > On 12/13/2018 2:09 PM, JORDI PALET MARTINEZ wrote: > > Hi Christian, > > > > Thanks a lot for your review. > > > > Please see below in-line. > > > > I'm working in a new version according to the comments got from the ops > review as well, so will be able to integrate yours very quickly. > > > > Regards, > > Jordi > > > > > > > > -----Mensaje original----- > > De: v6ops <v6ops-bounces@xxxxxxxx> en nombre de Christian Huitema > <huitema@xxxxxxxxxxx> > > Fecha: jueves, 13 de diciembre de 2018, 21:50 > > Para: <secdir@xxxxxxxx> > > CC: <v6ops@xxxxxxxx>, <ietf@xxxxxxxx>, <draft-ietf-v6ops-transition- > ipv4aas.all@xxxxxxxx> > > Asunto: [v6ops] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-v6ops-transition- > ipv4aas-11 > > > > Reviewer: Christian Huitema > > Review result: Has Issues > > > > I have reviewed draft-ietf-v6ops-transition-ipv4aas-11 as part of the > > security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents > > being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for > > the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG > chairs > > should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. > > > > The summary of the review is "ready with issue". > > > > The document describes solution for providing "IPv4 as a service", i.e. > > provision of IPv4 as a service over an IPv6 only network. > > It calls this support "transition as a service". > > > > For various reasons, IETF working groups have standardized not just one > but > > five different mechanisms for providing this transition: 464XLAT > [RFC6877], > > Dual-Stack Lite [RFC6333], Lightweight 4over6 (lw4o6) [RFC7596], > > MAP-E [RFC7597], and MAP-T [RFC7599]. (I am sure that Monty Python > could have > > produced a nice sketch about that.) The purpose of the draft is to > > state how home routers (a.k.a. customer premise equipment, CPE) should > > inform local devices about which of the mechanisms are available, which > > should be preferred, and what parameters should be used when deploying > > the chosen services. This is done using the DHCPv6 "S46" option > > specified in RFC 8026. > > > > The draft also makes specific recommendation regarding the use of the > UPnP and > > PCP services, by requiring specific error codes when a requested port > mapping > > is not available through the specified transition technology. > > > > The security section briefly points to the "Basic Requirements for IPv6 > > Customer Edge Routers" specified in RFC 7084, and to the security > > section of each of the RFC describing the security technologies, and > implicitly > > argues that there are no other security issues. I think that is > insufficient. > > > > The draft introduces a reliance on the DHCPv6 "S46" option for > assessing the > > relative priority of different transition technologies. An attacker > could spoof > > the DHCPv6 response, and direct client traffic to a different > technology than > > selected by the service provider. This could be used, for example, to > capture > > IPv4 traffic in an IPv6 network and send it to a route chosen by the > attacker. > > The attack might also be used in a dual stack network that does not > support > > any transition technology. I don't understand how this attack is > mitigated. > > > > Not sure if you will suggest here that we should say something about the > security considerations already mention in RFC8026. In general all those are > generic DHCPv6 security considerations I think. > > Basically, the devices should be programmed to ignore DHCPv6 if they > have another more secure way of getting their configuration data. Plus, > apply general defense against DHCPv6 hacks in the network, etc. I > understand that your draft is meant to inform the building of CPEs, but > its effect is generalization of an unsafe mechanism. > > > > > > Nits: > > > > The introduction uses the acronym WAN without spelling out "Wide Area > Network". > > Also, WAN is used as substitute for local Internet Service Provider > network. We could > > debate whether such networks are always "wide area", by opposition to > say > > "metropolitan" or "regional". This is the same convention used in RFC > 7084 that > > this document updates. It is arguably defined by reference, but > spelling it out > > would be nice. > > > > Will do. > > > > > > The comparison with RFC7084 section includes a mangled sentence: > > > > This document doesn't include support for 6rd ([RFC5969]), because > as > > in an IPv6-in-IPv4 tunneling. > > > > Typo, sorry the correct sentence was: > > This document doesn't include support for 6rd ([RFC5969]), because > is > > an IPv6-in-IPv4 tunneling. > > This document doesn't include support for 6rd ([RFC5969]), because it > is > an IPv6-in-IPv4 tunneling. > > > > > Please rephrase. Please also rephrase the next sentence, for similar > reasons: > > > > Regarding DS-LITE [RFC6333], this document includes slightly > > different requirements, because the PCP ([RFC6887]) support and the > > prioritization of the transition mechanisms, including dual-stack. > > > > I think it is much clear this way: > > > > Regarding DS-LITE [RFC6333], this document includes slightly > > different requirements, related to the support of PCP ([RFC6887]), > > IGD-PCP IWF [RFC6970] and the prioritization of the transition > > mechanisms, including dual-stack. > > OK. > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > v6ops mailing list > > v6ops@xxxxxxxx > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/v6ops > > > > > > > > > > ********************************************** > > IPv4 is over > > Are you ready for the new Internet ? > > http://www.theipv6company.com > > The IPv6 Company > > > > This electronic message contains information which may be privileged or > confidential. The information is intended to be for the exclusive use of the > individual(s) named above and further non-explicilty authorized disclosure, > copying, distribution or use of the contents of this information, even if > partially, including attached files, is strictly prohibited and will be > considered a criminal offense. If you are not the intended recipient be aware > that any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of this > information, even if partially, including attached files, is strictly > prohibited, will be considered a criminal offense, so you must reply to the > original sender to inform about this communication and delete it. > > > > > >
