Spencer –
The choice of whether to use cryptographic authentication or not is a deployment decision. It is not the place of this RFC (or any other IGP RFC) to require that
a customer use authentication of any kind. However, in Security sections we do mention that the use of cryptographic authentication may well be prudent to avoid risks associated with the advertisements which the document is defining.
Make sense?
I agree there is an editorial issue.
“mitigation the risk” should be “mitigation of the risk”
I will address that.
Les
From: Spencer Dawkins at IETF <spencerdawkins.ietf@xxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Wednesday, December 05, 2018 6:41 PM
To: Les Ginsberg (ginsberg) <ginsberg@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: nishida@xxxxxxxxxx; tsv-art@xxxxxxxx; lsr@xxxxxxxx; IETF list <ietf@xxxxxxxx>; draft-ietf-lsr-isis-rfc7810bis.all@xxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [Tsv-art] Tsvart last call review of draft-ietf-lsr-isis-rfc7810bis-03
Hi, Les,
Yoshi -
Thanx for taking the time to review.
I can appreciate that this may the first time you have looked at RFC7810 - let alone the bis draft. As a result you have commented on content which is common to the bis draft and the RFC it is modifying (RFC 7810).
While your questions in isolation may be interesting, I believe they are out of scope for the review of the bis draft. What the bis draft is doing is addressing two modest errata - details of which can be found in
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-lsr-isis-rfc7810bis-03#appendix-A
Comments on content not related to those changes is out of scope.
If you have an interest in this topic and want to comment on the substance of RFC 7810 and its companion document for OSPF RFC 7471, I encourage you to do so. Note that all of your comments (save the one on Security) are also applicable to RFC 7471 - so any
agreed upon modification would need to be made to both documents. But I do not want to even start discussing such changes in the context of reviewing the bis draft changes. I hope you can understand why.
As regards your Security comment, I am not sure I understand what you are suggesting. As IGP info is flooded hop-by-hop, man-in-the-middle attacks have to be able to insert themselves on an IGP enabled link. Use of cryptographic authentication prevents untrusted
sources from being accepted - which is the point being made.
I'm just making sure I understand this last point.
"The use of Link State PDU cryptographic authentication allows mitigation
is saying "smart people would use Link State PDU cryptographic authentication unless they have a reason to be OK with man-in-the-middle attacks", but there's no normative requirement to use this mitigation technique.
I think that's what Yoshi was asking about.
p.s. Is there a missing word after "mitigation"?
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