Re: [tram] Artart telechat review of draft-ietf-tram-stunbis-16

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On 04/16/2018 08:12 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 5:22 PM, Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
> 
>> Hi Marc, a few further comments inline.
>>
>> On 4/16/18 5:43 PM, Marc Petit-Huguenin wrote:
>>> Hi Peter,
>>>
>>> Thanks for the review and sorry for the delay in responding, I was
>> traveling for the last 4 weeks.
>>>
>>> See my responses inline.
>>>
>>> On 04/02/2018 03:59 PM, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
>>>> Reviewer: Peter Saint-Andre
>>>> Review result: Ready with Nits
>>>>
>>
>> <snip/>
>>
>>>> The first paragaraph of Section 6.2.3 restates recommendations from RFC
>>>> 7525; why not simply reference that specification?
>>>
>>> The original text in RFC5389 said this:
>>>
>>> " When STUN is run by itself over TLS-over-TCP, the
>>>   TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ciphersuite MUST be implemented at a
>>>   minimum. [...]"
>>>
>>> The new text is an attempt at updating it in the same spirit of giving
>> minimal instructions and complementing them with a reference to RFC 7525 -
>> which was the reason for the reference to RFC 7525 there.
>>>
>>> So I kept the text there, followed by the following paragraph, in
>> addition of moving the original last paragraph in the Security
>> Consideration section:
>>>
>>> " These recommendations are just a part of the the recommendations in
>>>   [RFC7525] that implementations and deployments of a STUN usage using
>>>   TLS or DTLS SHOULD follow."
>>
>> I would instead suggest that we do something like Section 2 of RFC 7590
>> for XMPP:
>>
>>    The best current practices documented in the "Recommendations for
>>    Secure Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525] are included here by reference.
>>    Instead of repeating those recommendations here, this document mostly
>>    provides supplementary information regarding secure implementation
>>    and deployment of XMPP technologies.
>>
>> Here's the rationale: RFC 7525 is likely to be updated/replaced more
>> quickly than STUNbis. If STUNbis recommends a particular cipher suite
>> that 7525bis stops recommending, in the absence of STUNter will STUN
>> implementations keep following STUNbis or will they upgrade to whatever
>> 7525bis recommends? I suggest it will be the former, which is not what
>> we want.
>>
> 
> I forgot about this in my review, but you should also profile ciphers for
> TLS 1.3.
> 

As suggested by Julien Élie, I now use BCP195 as reference.  Would that, and a future update of that BCP covering TLS 1.3 satisfy your comment?

Thanks.


-- 
Marc Petit-Huguenin
Email: marc@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Blog: https://marc.petit-huguenin.org
Profile: https://www.linkedin.com/in/petithug

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