A reasonable perspective. Could that be added to the document? Yours, Joel On 3/8/18 6:33 PM, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
On Mar 8, 2018, at 5:28 PM, Joel Halpern <jmh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: It is surprising in Section 3 Bullet 4 that reporting via email requires that the report submitted use DKIM. Particularly while ignoring any security errors in communicating with the recipient domain.Actually, this is not surprising. The main security risk here is report spam, that will drown the true signal in noise, making it impossible to notice real validation failures or operate the service. Therefore, the report origin domain must be authenticated via DKIM. I'd be tempted to go further and require a particular "selector" prefix that is specifically chosen for "tlsrpt", so that with domains such as "gmail", where anyone can get an email account, just being a user on the sending system is not enough to be able to forge a DKIM authenticated report. But that would create significant complications for the sender to make it so, and so is probably not needed. In summary, when sending reports the party that needs to be authenticated is the sender domain, while the receiving domain is presumed operationally compromised, and so should be exempt from any authentication requirements.
